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In recent years, significant developments were introduced within the vehic-
ular domain, evolving the vehicles to become a network of many embedded
systems distributed throughout the car, known as Electronic Control Units
(ECUs). Each one of these ECUs runs a number of software components that
collaborate with each other to perform various vehicle functions. Modern
vehicles are also equipped with wireless communication technologies, such
as WiFi, Bluetooth, and so on, giving them the capability to interact with
other vehicles and roadside infrastructure. While these improvements have
increased the safety of the automotive system, they have vastly expanded the
attack surface of the vehicle and opened the door for new potential security
risks. The situation is made worse by a lack of security mechanisms in the
vehicular system which allows the escalation of a compromise in one of the
non-critical sub-systems to threaten the safety of the entire vehicle and its
passengers.
This dissertation focuses on providing a comprehensive framework that
ensures the security of the vehicular system during its whole life-cycle. This
framework aims to prevent the cyber-attacks against different components
by ensuring secure communications among them. Furthermore, it aims to
detect attacks which were not prevented successfully, and finally, to respond
to these attacks properly to ensure a high degree of safety and stability of the
system.
The thesis starts by developing a hybrid threat model which combines
multiple existing threat modeling approaches to define more comprehensive
one. This model defines (1) the various potential groups of attackers, which
may threaten the vehicular system and their capabilities, (2) the potential
targets (i.e., assets) of these groups and the various vulnerabilities that they
include, and (3) the security requirements for these targets which should be
considered to prevent the attacker from compromising them.
After defining the security requirements by using the proposed threat
model, the thesis addresses the challenges of developing the security policy,
which implements these requirements. The thesis presents a methodology
supporting the gradual definition of the security policy. Under our method-
ology, the designer of each software component is responsible for formulat-
ing the security policy of their components. As components get integrated
into larger sub-systems, the individual policies are merged into the subsys-
tem policy. This continues as we go up the ladder of bigger sub-systems until
we have a complete vehicle.
The thesis also shows how to enforce the developed security policy in an
x
efficient manner by using a lightweight distributed access framework imple-
mented within each single ECU. The enforcement takes place at the network
level, enforcing communications only between authorized components while
employing data integrity mechanisms in the communication between com-
ponents, even if they run on different ECUs. In this way, we provide a level
of compartmentalization in the in-vehicle network. With this precondition, a
malicious application might remain able to emit (a) malicious packet(s) to its
remote peer(s), if it is authorized. But, at the same time, this application can
be prevented from attacking other components, which it is not authorized to
communicate with.
A heavy-handed security policy may adversely impact availability. Taken
to the extreme, a secure system is a silent system that does not interact with
its environment, and this is clearly not the intent of a security policy aimed at
a vehicular platform. So we face the conundrum of increased security lead-
ing to false positives affecting availability and overall performance, against a
more permissive system that may fail to detect attacks (false negatives), lead-
ing to the demise of the platform. The thesis addresses this issue by using the
Red-Zone principle, whereby a tighter inner security envelope alerts the se-
curity system of a potential compromise before an actual security violation
occurs. In this way, we can observe the suspect component as it operates
within the Red-Zone, and characterize the event. We leverage the Red-zone
principle in order to develop a run-time mechanism to detect the incidence
of an attack and to prevent the attackers from gaining a foothold. The thesis
defines temporal specifications for each hard real-time software component
within the vehicle to be used as a baseline to define its nominal behavior. At-
tacks such as code injection, or Denial of Service (DoS) will usually cause a
breach of this temporal specification, and thus will be detected.
Once a software component is found to have violated its security bound-
aries, the system needs to take some remedial action. The type of response,
e.g., taking the component offline, restarting the component, initiating con-
tainment measures (e.g., resetting the entire ECU), and so on, are the respon-
sibility of the Intrusion Response System (IRS). This thesis uses the Red-Zone
principle as the basis for developing an IRS framework to manage the inter-
action between security and safety of the system.
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KURZFASSUNG
In den letzten Jahren wurden bedeutende Entwicklungen im Bereich der
Fahrzeuge vorgestellt, die die Fahrzeuge zu einem Netzwerk mit vie-
len im gesamten Fahrzeug verteile integrierte Systeme weiterentwickelten,
den sogenannten Steuergeräten (ECU, englisch = Electronic Control Units).
Jedes dieser Steuergeräte betreibt eine Reihe von Softwarekomponenten, die
bei der Ausführung verschiedener Fahrzeugfunktionen zusammenarbeiten.
Moderne Fahrzeuge sind auch mit drahtlosen Kommunikationstechnologien
wie WiFi, Bluetooth usw. ausgestattet, die ihnen die Möglichkeit geben, mit
anderen Fahrzeugen und der straßenseitigen Infrastruktur zu interagieren.
Während diese Verbesserungen die Sicherheit des Fahrzeugsystems erhöht
haben, haben sie die Angriffsfläche des Fahrzeugs erheblich vergrößert und
die Tür für neue potenzielle Sicherheitsrisiken geöffnet. Die Situation wird
durch einen Mangel an Sicherheitsmechanismen im Fahrzeugsystem ver-
schärft, die es ermöglichen, dass ein Kompromiss in einem der unkritis-
chen Subsysteme die Sicherheit des gesamten Fahrzeugs und seiner Insassen
gefährdet kann.
Diese Dissertation konzentriert sich auf die Entwicklung eines um-
fassenden Rahmens, der die Sicherheit des Fahrzeugsystems während seines
gesamten Lebenszyklus gewährleistet. Dieser Rahmen zielt darauf ab, die
Cyber-Angriffe gegen verschiedene Komponenten zu verhindern, indem
eine sichere Kommunikation zwischen ihnen gewährleistet wird. Darüber
hinaus zielt es darauf ab, Angriffe zu erkennen, die nicht erfolgreich verhin-
dert wurden, und schließlich auf diese Angriffe angemessen zu reagieren,
um ein hohes Maß an Sicherheit und Stabilität des Systems zu gewährleis-
ten.
Die Arbeit beginnt mit der Entwicklung eines hybriden Bedrohungsmod-
ells, das mehrere bestehende Ansätze zur Bedrohungsmodellierung kom-
biniert, um ein umfassenderes zu definieren. Dieses Modell definiert (1) die
verschiedenen potenziellen Gruppen von Angreifern, die das Fahrzeugsys-
tem und ihre Fähigkeiten gefährden können, (2) die potenziellen Ziele dieser
Gruppen und die verschiedenen Schwachstellen, die sie beinhalten und (3)
die Sicherheitsanforderungen für diese Ziele, die so zu betrachten sind, dass
der Angreifer sie nicht gefährden kann.
Nach der Definition der Sicherheitsanforderungen durch die Verwen-
dung des vorgeschlagenen Bedrohungsmodells, befasst sich die Disserta-
tion mit den Herausforderungen der Entwicklung der Sicherheitspolitik, die
diese Anforderungen umsetzt. Zudem stellt sie eine Methodik zur Unter-
stützung der schrittweisen Definition der Sicherheitspolitik. Nach unserer
Methodik ist der Designer jeder Softwarekomponente für die Formulierung
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der Sicherheitspolitik ihrer Komponenten verantwortlich. Wenn Komponen-
ten in größere Subsysteme integriert werden, werden die einzelnen Richtlin-
ien in die Subsystemrichtlinie integriert. Dies geht noch weiter, wenn wir die
Leiter größerer Subsysteme hinaufgehen, bis wir ein komplettes Fahrzeug
haben.
Die Arbeit zeigt auch, wie die entwickelte Sicherheitsrichtlinie ef-
fizient durchgesetzt werden kann, indem ein leichtgewichtige Struktur
für den verteilten Zugriff verwendet wird, das in jedem einzelnen ECU
implementiert ist. Die Durchsetzung erfolgt auf Netzwerkebene, wobei
die Kommunikation nur zwischen autorisierten Komponenten erzwungen
wird, während bei der Kommunikation zwischen Komponenten Datenin-
tegritätsmechanismen eingesetzt werden, auch wenn sie auf verschiedenen
Steuergeräten laufen. Auf diese Weise sorgen wir für einen Grad der Ab-
schottung im Fahrzeugnetz. Unter dieser Voraussetzung kann eine bösartige
Anwendung in der Lage bleiben, (ein) bösartiges Paket(e) an ihre entfernten
Peer(en) zu senden, wenn sie berechtigt ist. Gleichzeitig kann jedoch ver-
hindert werden, dass diese Anwendung andere Komponenten angreift, mit
denen sie nicht kommunizieren darf.
Eine schwerfällige Sicherheitsrichtlinie kann die Verfügbarkeit beein-
trächtigen. Im Extremfall ist ein sicheres System ein leises System, das
nicht mit seiner Umgebung interagiert, und das ist eindeutig nicht die Ab-
sicht einer Sicherheitspolitik, die auf eine Fahrzeugplattform abzielt. So
stehen wir vor dem Rätsel der erhöhten Sicherheit, die zu Fehlalarmen
führt, die sich auf die Verfügbarkeit und die Gesamtperformance auswirken,
gegenüber einem freizügigeren System, das Angriffe (Fehlalarme) nicht
erkennen kann, was zum Untergang der Plattform führt. Die Dissertation be-
fasst sich mit diesem Thema unter Verwendung des Red-Zone-Prinzips, bei
dem ein engerer innerer Sicherheitsbereich das Sicherheitssystem auf einen
möglichen Kompromiss aufmerksam macht, bevor eine tatsächliche Sicher-
heitsverletzung eintritt. Auf diese Weise können wir die verdächtige Kompo-
nente beobachten, wie sie innerhalb der Red Zone arbeitet, und das Ereignis
charakterisieren. Wir nutzen das Red-Zone-Prinzip, um einen Laufzeitmech-
anismus zu entwickeln, der die Häufigkeit eines Angriffs erkennt und ver-
hindert, dass die Angreifer Fuß fassen. Die Arbeit definiert zeitliche Spez-
ifikationen für jede Hardware-Echtzeit-Softwarekomponente innerhalb des
Fahrzeugs, die als Basislinie zur Definition des nominalen Verhaltens ver-
wendet werden soll. Angriffe wie Code Injection oder Denial of Service
(DoS) führen in der Regel zu einer Verletzung dieser zeitlichen Spezifikation
und werden so erkannt.
Sobald festgestellt wird, dass eine Softwarekomponente ihre Sicherheits-
grenzen überschritten hat, muss das System einige Abhilfemaßnahmen er-
greifen. Die Art der Reaktion, z.B. das Offline-Schalten der Komponente,
das Neustarten der Komponente, das Einleiten von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen
(z.B. das Zurücksetzen des gesamten Steuergeräts) usw., liegt in der Verant-
wortung des Intrusion Response System (IRS). Diese Arbeit verwendet das
Red-Zone-Prinzip als Grundlage für die Entwicklung eines IRS-Strukturs zur




I THE LANDSCAPE 1
1 Introduction 3
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Safety vs Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2 Heterogeneous Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 Security Policy Development and Enforcement . . . . . 6
1.2.4 Continuous Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.5 Tighter Security vs Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Foundations 11
2.1 Vehicular System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.1 ECU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2 Software Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Automotive Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Firmware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Development Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.3 Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Automotive Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Security Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Vulnerabilities and Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Security Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 Prevention Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Secure Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Hardware Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Cryptography And Secure Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Secure Over-The-Air Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.2 Detection Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Intrusion Detection Systems Types . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Detection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
xiv
Vehicular IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.3 Response Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Environment 35
3.1 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.2 Prototype System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Software components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2.1 Autonomous Vehicle Driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.2 Automated Obstacle Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.3 Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Multilayer Vehicle Security Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.1 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.2 Development and Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
II SOLUTIONS 47
4 Comprehensive Threat Model 49
4.1 Threat Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1.1 Attacker-Centric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1.2 Asset-Centric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1.3 Vulnerability and Threat-Centric . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1.4 Software-Centric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.1.5 Attack Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 SAVTA: A Comprehensive Vehicular Threat Model . . . . . . 54
4.2.1 Attacker Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2.2 Attackable Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.3 Attack Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2.4 Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2.5 Attack Accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.6 Abstract Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3 Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.4 Use Case: Automated Obstacle Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5 Policy-Based Secure Communication 69
5.1 Policy Development: Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2 Proposed Policy Development Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2.1 Maintaining Policy Provenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.2.2 Updating a Component Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.3 Distributed Security Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3.1 From IPC towards networked communication . . . . . 80
xv
5.3.2 From user-level networking towards a distributed fire-
wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.3.3 Security Module Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Policy Evaluation System (PES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Communication System (CS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Decisions Repository (DR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.4 Secure Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.4.1 Initiation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.4.2 Operational Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5.1 Network System of Security Module . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5.2 Initiation the Secure Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.5.3 Using the Secure Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6 Temporal-Based Intrusion Detection 95
6.1 Red-Zone Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.1.1 Adopting the Red-Zone principle . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2 Properties of Real-Time Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.2.1 Real-time Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.2.2 Worst-Case Execution Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.2.3 Worst-Case Response Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.3 Time-Based Intrusion Detection Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.4 Red-Zone Boundaries for Real-Time Systems . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.5 Response Time-Based Prediction Configuration . . . . . . . . . 105
6.5.1 Defining Temporal Nominal Behavior and MP . . . . . 105
6.5.2 Defining KP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.6 Execution Time-Based Prediction Configuration . . . . . . . . 108
6.7 Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.7.1 Task States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.7.2 Monitoring Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.7.3 Tracer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.8 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.9 From Host to Network Based IDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7 Towards a Vehicular Intrusion Response System 119
7.1 Intrusion Response Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
7.2 Vehicular Intrusion Response System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.2.1 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.2.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.3 Proposed Intrusion Response System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.3.1 Red-Zone as an IRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3.2 Local Response Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.3.3 System-wide Response Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.3.4 Intrusion Response Exchange Protocol . . . . . . . . . . 127
7.4 Vehicular IRS Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
xvi
7.4.1 Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.4.2 Attack Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.4.3 Dependency Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.4.4 Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.5 Use Case: Intrusion Response for Obstacle Avoidance System 131
7.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
III The End 135
8 Conclusion 137
8.1 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A PUBLICATIONS 141
A.1 Related to the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A.2 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
LIST OF FIGURES 147












In recent years, vehicles manufacturing has changed significantly: vehicles
moved from a largely electro-mechanical system to an Electrical and Elec-
tronic (E/E) system. This can be seen in the increased use of automotive
embedded systems and the large quantity of embedded software which is
integrated within every single vehicle [Bro+07; Cha09], as well as the high
percentage of the production cost attributable to developing these integrated
embedded systems and automotive software [Bro06a].
Continuous improvements to vehicle manufacturing have made develop-
ing Intelligence Transportation Systems (ITS) achievable. Many technologies
have been integrated within modern vehicles to give them the capability to
interact with the outside world. Figure 1.1 shows that in Germany by 2023,
more than 1.1 million new cars will be equipped with infotainment and com-
munication systems to support communications with other vehicles and in-
frastructure on the road. Ensuring road safety is the main motivation behind
introducing such technologies. Most road accidents are caused by human er-
rors (e.g., 70% of road accidents in Germany in 2015 were a result of human
mistakes [Dek17]), thus, using safety software applications within vehicles
aims to decrease the number of such accidents and therefore the number of
fatalities. In addition, improving road usability as well as drivers’ and pas-
sengers’ comfort are other benefits of such technologies.
The revolutionary changes do not stop here; the move toward full au-
tonomous vehicle technology is the next goal of all car makers. However,
there are many problems which need to be addressed before we will be able
to see the benefits of connected and autonomous vehicles in reality [DC+14;
Lia+15]. Cybersecurity is one of the most serious and urgent of these issues.
Understanding and mitigating the security issues within each vehicle is the
first step towards secure ITS.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction



















Basic Telematics Infotainment and communication system
FIGURE 1.1: Estimated number of new cars (in millions)
equipped with connected hardware in Germany from 2017 to
2023 by segment (based on [Sta18])
A modern car contains 100 - 70 micro controller-based computers (i.e.,
ECUs). Each ECU relies on a set of sensors and actuators to serve one or
more of the E/E systems or subsystems in the vehicle, which range from the
mundane such as controlling courtesy lights to highly critical applications
such as engine control. These ECUs are grouped into various sub-networks
based on their functions. The sub-networks are interconnected via a central
gateway, and the ECUs within each sub-network communicate via different
bus systems. Modern vehicles are also equipped with various technologies,
such as WiFi, 5G, Global Positioning System (GPS), and Bluetooth, giving
them the capability to collaborate and communicate with roadside units to
ensure a safe and comfortable journey for drivers and passengers.
1.2 Challenges
Many issues and challenges make securing the in-vehicle system a difficult
process. The aim of this section is to highlight some of these challenges,
which we attempt to resolve in this thesis.
1.2.1 Safety vs Security
Premium vehicles include a huge number of software components which
themselves include millions of Lines Of software Code (LOC). For example,
the radio and navigation system alone in the 2009 S-class Mercedes-Benz has
over 20 million LOC [Cha09]. Figure 1.2 shows that a modern vehicle in-
cludes more software code than a Boeing 787 Dreamliner, Mac OS X “Tiger”,
and more. The enormous number of software components within the ve-
hicle are usually written by different teams with widely varying degrees of
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FIGURE 1.2: Size of software code used to develop a mod-
ern vehicle compared with code size of other different systems
(based on [DES17])
competence. Integrating different components with high disparity in code
quality into the same vehicular network can end up leaving the entire vehi-
cle system in a non-secure state. The problem is that separating good quality
code (safety-critical) from poor quality code (non-critical) does not in itself
provide security since the two types coexist and share the same vehicular
resources (e.g., network). Compromise of non-critical components by an ad-
versary could be sufficient to enable him to control critical components across
the entire car [Laa+09].
A recent report [Syn18] revealed that out of 593 surveyed profession-
als from global automotive manufacturers, suppliers and service providers,
slightly over half of organizations do not perform any security testing to de-
tect security vulnerabilities within the software components used in the ve-
hicles they produce. The functionality and safety testing techniques which
are used to test vehicle components are insufficient for catching security vul-
nerabilities [Bay+16]. Failure analysis and statistical models have proven
quite useful for identifying components that are likely to cause problems. But
they do not address interference by malicious adversaries who base their at-
tacks on the exploitation of improbable scenarios (e.g., race conditions, mal-
formed inputs, etc.). Thus, these models are not able to detect even those vul-
nerabilities which are most well-known, such as buffer overflows [And72],
which have recently been discovered in vehicle components and exploited
[Che+11].
All this shows the need to develop systematic mechanisms to ensure the
security of the vehicle components, similar to those used to ensure safety. De-
veloping such mechanisms requires determining the security requirements,
vulnerabilities and threats which the system faces as well as the attackers
who might target it. However, extracting such information is still not very
detailed or standardized.
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1.2.2 Heterogeneous Connectivity
Historically, the intra-vehicle network was designed without considering se-
curity requirements. Most of the communication is exchanged either in clear
text or over a link with weak security, which means that malicious third par-
ties can listen to or even inject false data or commands into the communi-
cation channel [Che+11]. The unrestricted interaction between components
of mixed criticality, which can be hosted in different ECUs and allocated to
different sub-networks, may also create vulnerabilities from a security per-
spective [Rou+10]. The attacker who can hack one ECU can apparently hack
other ECUs, since they share the same network.
The assumption was that an attack on the in-vehicle network implied ac-
cess to the vehicle, so physical security measures reduced the risk of such an
attack. This assumption is becoming progressively disconnected from real-
ity because of the different technologies now integrated within the vehicle
to enable interaction with the external environment (e.g., GPS, digital radio,
Bluetooth, etc.). These technologies have left internal networks which have
weak or non-existent security mechanisms facing new threats of large-scale
attacks. Attackers have been able to use existing security weaknesses in these
technologies to intercept the connection between different ECUs, spoof the
transferred data, and emit false data [Kos+10]. In some circumstances, at-
tackers were also able to participate in communication by fraudulently using
the identity of a legitimate ECU [Rou+10; Lab18]. All these attacks took place
remotely without any need for physical access to the targeted vehicle.
As a result, securing in-vehicle communications has become a fundamen-
tal requirement. However, adding security to the existing communication
protocols within the vehicle is not straightforward because of the resource
constraints of ECUs, which might prevent the use of such mechanisms. Fur-
thermore, the original design of some protocols does not consider security.
Therefore, bringing in security for such protocols introduces performance
overheads and increases the required packet size, which contrasts with the
original goals behind designing the protocol in the first place (e.g., the Con-
troller Area Network (CAN) protocol). Developing more effective and secure
protocols is one important step towards eliminating a broad class of security
attacks which threaten in-vehicle networks.
1.2.3 Security Policy Development and Enforcement
To keep security attacks from spreading across in-vehicle components, it is
imperative to control the communications between components by defin-
ing a security policy which determines who should talk to whom. The huge
number of ECUs as well as the software components which are mapped to
them makes creating such a security policy a very difficult task, requiring
detailed knowledge of the behavior of each component and all possible in-
teractions between all potential system components. The process becomes
even more challenging when considering an evolving and updatable system,
in which component interactions may change, or new components may be
added. Any errors during the configuration of this communication policy
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may lead to mistakes that prevent the vehicle from functioning as intended,
or worse, create some new security vulnerabilities that potential attackers
can exploit.
Enforcing the security policy for this huge number of components is an-
other challenge. Using the central gateway as an evaluation and enforcement
point to authorize the various communications between ECUs in the differ-
ent sub-networks is the most common proposal [WWP04; NXP18]. However,
such a solution is not optimal, as the central gateway becomes a single point
of failure. Any malicious software components in an ECU could be used to
target the central gateway and drain its resources and, at worst, cause it to
stop working, leaving the vehicle without any access control protection.
1.2.4 Continuous Monitoring
Cars are designed to operate for many years, during which time many new
technologies could be introduced. With each new technology or application
launched, new attack vectors are introduced. A static detection mechanism
is thus inadequate since it will always be one step behind. Dependence on
continuous updating of the security rules whenever new threats appear may
not be practical, especially without the full adoption of a secure Over-The-
Air (OTA) update framework. Also, using predefined rules to authorize or
prevent a particular communication between two software components is
insufficient as a security solution when it is used alone. Consider the case
when one of these components is compromised; it would be still able to at-
tack other parts as long as it attempts to compromise only those components
with which it is authorized to communicate based on the security rules. From
the point of view of policy enforcement, this component is not carrying out
any malicious activities.
All this shows the need for behavioral-based monitoring mechanisms to
detect and predict the off-nominal behavior of vehicle components. Defin-
ing the nominal behavior of the different components correctly is the main
requirement for use of such mechanisms. Using inaccurate or the wrong
behavior as a reference for off-nominal behavior detection may cause the
monitoring system to consider a component that is operating nominally as
malicious, or to identify a malicious component as benign.
1.2.5 Tighter Security vs Availability
Security can never be absolute. Even if all security mitigation is adopted, it
is still possible for an attack to happen. The embedded nature as well as the
safety-critical aspect of vehicles makes the response to a detected attack as
critical as the detection of the attack itself. The typical system response when
detecting an attack on a component is to restart that component [Str+09] in
the hope that the failure (which was caused by the attack) was a transient one.
Disabling a perfectly functional component because of a violation, such as an
overflow, may have spectacularly unintended consequences; as the crash of
the inaugural flight of the Ariane V booster demonstrates [LL96].
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The heavy-handed security system may adversely impact availability.
Adopting such security system leads to a high rate of false positives affecting
availability and overall performance. However, once a software component
is found to have violated its security boundaries, the system needs to take
some remedial action. The security policy of the vehicle must implement
different strategies in order to react to an attack. These strategies need to en-
sure high system resilience and safety. Generally - and even more so in the
vehicular domain – intrusion response strategies have thus far received less
attention and research efforts compared to intrusion-detection mechanisms
[SBW07].
1.3 Contributions
All the aforementioned issues show the need for a holistic solution which
ensures the security of the vehicular system during its whole life cycle, start-
ing from the secure development of components, continuing to protect them
while they operate, and reacting properly even when an attack is successful.
The contribution of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive secure frame-
work which aims to ensure the prevention and detection of, and response to,
security intrusions which may face the vehicle system. The work of this the-
sis was achieved as part of the Controlling Concurrent Change (CCC) project
[CCC13], which was funded by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft) for 6 years starting from April 1, 2013. The contri-
bution of the thesis can be detailed as follows:
• Revising the existing vehicle-related threat modeling efforts to develop
a comprehensive threat model which can be used to classify all conceiv-
able attacks against the vehicular domain as well as an aid to illustrate
attack vectors which threaten the different assets of the vehicle.
• Developing a framework to formulate the security policy for intrusion
detection and response systems gradually by integrating it through the
design and life cycle of software components to preserve the intentions
of the initial designer and ensure the requirements of the actual opera-
tional platform.
• Developing a lightweight distributed access-control framework which
allows only authorized components to interact with each other inside
the vehicle and with external entities.
• Integrating and implementing a security protocol to ensure the in-
tegrity and confidentiality of in-vehicle communication as a part of the
distributed access control framework.
• Developing an efficient host-based intrusion detection mechanism for
in-vehicle systems. This mechanism is used to identify the proper tem-
poral thresholds for every safety-critical software component to give
the system the ability to predict the presence of malicious activities.
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• Defining effective strategies to respond to security violations with con-
sideration of issues such as containment, continued availability, inter-
action with other subsystems, and, in certain cases, latency.
1.4 Organization
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part provides a landscape for
the thesis via three chapters; chapter 2 gives background information about
in-vehicle systems and the different vulnerabilities and attacks which affect
them, as well as the defense mechanisms which were proposed to mitigate
these attacks. Chapter 3 presents the software and hardware setup and the
use cases which are employed throughout the thesis. In addition, it intro-
duces the proposed multilayer framework for securing the vehicle.
This framework is detailed in the second part of the thesis, which includes
four chapters. Chapter 4 details the proposed threat model. Chapter 5 ex-
plains the mechanism for constructing the security policy for the in-vehicle
system and how this policy can be enforced. In chapter 6, we demonstrate
how the temporal properties of some applications can be used to derive an
intrusion-detection schema. Chapter 7 outlines how we can develop an in-
trusion response for the in-vehicle system through the collaboration of all
previous proposed mechanisms in chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Chapter 8, which is the only chapter in the last part of the thesis, sum-
marizes the work in this thesis. It also contains an outlook on future work
on the topics covered in the thesis. Finally, a list of publications used during
this thesis, Figures, and Bibliography can be found.
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This chapter aims to give an overview of the basic concepts required to un-
derstand the following chapters. It also presents some of the most relevant
and influential research that we use as a foundation for the work in this the-
sis. Section 2.1 describes the primary components which compose the in-
vehicle system. In Section 2.2, we discuss the vulnerabilities and the attacks
which could target each of these components. Finally, Section 2.3 details the
mitigation mechanisms which were adopted to protect the in-vehicle system
and address the explained attacks.
2.1 Vehicular System
Recently, vehicle manufacturing has changed significantly. These changes
are reflected in the increased use of automotive embedded systems and em-
bedded software components, which are integrated into every single vehicle.
A modern vehicle may contain up to 100 microcontroller-based computers,
known as ECUs, which run huge codes [Bro+07; Cha09]. Each ECU relies
on a set of sensors and actuators to serve one or more of the E/E systems or
subsystems in a vehicle. Different types of communication buses are used
to interconnect the ECUs distributed inside the car. In this section, we will
discuss the ECU and what kind of software it runs, as well as how it is net-
worked within the vehicle.
2.1.1 ECU
The introduction of ECUs was the revolution which moved the vehicle from
a mechanical to E/E system. Each modern car contains a massive number
of ECUs. For example, a car like the Volvo S80 comprises more than 30
embedded processors. Similarly, BMW 7- Series and the Mercedes S-class
both include over 60 ECUs [Tur02]. Each of these ECUs is an embedded
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computer which is used to control the mechanical and electrical components
within the car. Based on the elements they manage and the software they
run, these ECUs can be categorized, from safety-critical ones such as the
emission-related control ECU to non-critical ones such as the infotainment
ECU [Bos86].
The hardware properties of vehicles’ ECUs also vary from one ECU to
another. Generally, ECUs come with limited resources concerning compu-
tational power and memory size. Most of these ECUs are able to handle a
single vehicle functionality (one function per ECU). The trend nowadays is
to merge multiple ECUs into a few ECUs with more powerful multi-core
processors, ample memory, and the capability to serve many functionali-
ties together [DNSV10]. Such ECUs were already integrated within mod-
ern vehicles for infotainment systems. The goal behind using such powerful
ECUs is to reduce their overall number, which is growing due to the increase
in newly introduced functionalities. It also aims to limit the complexity of
intra-vehicle networks. Moreover, using fewer ECUs helps to reduce vehicle
weight, power consumption, fuel consumption and production cost. How-
ever, introducing such ECUs has its own drawbacks which need to be con-
sidered [EK13].
2.1.2 Software Components
Today, a huge number of software components are running over the vari-
ous ECUs aiming to improve the safety, efficiency and comfort of modern
vehicles. In premium cars, we can find up to 2000 software-based functions
[Bro+07]. This number keeps increasing day by day. Thus, the size of soft-
ware code is also growing. For example, the radio and navigation system in
the 2009 S-class Mercedes-Benz alone has over 20 million LOCs [Cha09].
These software components include regular automotive applications as
well as the firmware which support these applications.
Automotive Applications
Modern vehicles are full of software applications. These applications differ
from each other in terms of the functions that they perform and the nonfunc-
tional requirements (i.e. security, reliability, performance, and so forth) that
they need [HZ+18; Bro+07]. In general, those applications can be grouped
into two main categories:
• Safety-critical applications: which are used to control critical func-
tions. The failure of these applications could affect the safety of the ve-
hicle’s occupants and may led to catastrophic consequences. Examples
of such applications are powertrain, chassis control, head-on collision
warning system, Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system, and control
loss warning system. Those applications have certain requirements in
terms of latency (called hard real-time applications, as we will see in
Chapter 6), error probability, and strict safety and availability require-
ments.
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• Non-safety-critical applications: which include all other vehicle ap-
plications. Mainly, applications within this category aim to improve
driver comfort and enhance traffic efficiency, such as multimedia and
telematics applications. These applications usually have more relaxed
requirements compared to safety-critical applications.
It is crucial to note that the safety-based categorization of applications has
no impact on their required security level. Software components need to be
developed with intensive security considerations, whether these applications
are safety-critical or not. This categorization can provide the system designer
with valuable information about where she can introduce another level of
security to protect highly critical applications.
Firmware
Firmware is the special class of software components which are used to con-
trol the various hardware devices of the embedded systems (i.e., ECU) and
to provide a foundation layer to run automotive applications. Firmware for
embedded devices is like the Operating System (OS) in standard computers.
However, firmware often contains a special purpose OS. This OS is often a
real-time microkernel OS designed to serve the different automotive applica-
tions and support them to meet their time constraints.
The microkernel OS is one OS type which has some unique properties.
In contrast to a monolithic OS, in which all OS services share the same ad-
dress space and run in kernel mode, the kernel in microkernel OS includes
the minimum amount of services and features required to implement an OS.
Other services, such as device drivers, file systems, and networking stacks
are run alongside the applications in user mode. Each one runs in a separate
address spaces isolated from the kernel and other services and applications.
OSEK/VDX ("Offene Systeme und deren Schnittstellen für die Elektronik
in Kraftfahrzeugen/Vehicle Distributed Executive” in German, translated to
English as “Open Systems and their Interfaces for the Electronics in Motor
Vehicles/vehicle distributed executive") standard [Isof] defined a microker-
nel Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) (known as OSEK OS) which has been
developed in many ECUs to provides an architecture for distributed real-
time applications in vehicles.
AUTomotive Open Systems ARchitecture (AUTOSAR) [AUT16] is a
widely used, open and standardized software architecture for automotive
domain. It aims to support the independent development of the automo-
tive application by abstracting the underlying ECU hardware. AUTOSAR
deploys three layers comprising the application layer where the automotive
applications can run, and the Run-Time Environment (RTE) layer which pro-
vides communication services for all applications to exchange data in the
same ECU or with other applications mapped to another ECUs. The final
layer, called the Basis Software (BSW) layer, contains the AUTOSAR OS. AU-
TOSAR defined an operating system called AUTOSAR OS based on OSEK
OS [AUT14].








FIGURE 2.1: Simplified V-Model with the different phases of
product development
Special purpose OSs, such as AUTOSAR OS and OSEK/VDX, are not the
only OSs which run over the various ECUs of the modern vehicle. Other gen-
eral purpose OSs such as Windows Embedded Automotive, Android, and
Linux-based OSs are also adapted to run non-critical safety systems [CM16].
For example, the entertainment system in Tesla vehicles runs an embedded
version of Linux [Yon14]. Other vehicle manufactures (specifically Volvo,
Nissan and Mitsubishi) have adopted a special version of Android OS called
Android Automotive to be used for their modern vehicle entertainment sys-
tems.
Development Process
The increase in the number of software components within a vehicle has
made the product development system of new vehicles a very complex oper-
ation, especially if we consider how many partners participate distributively
in the process. Thus, the adoption of a development process becomes a neces-
sary and important factor in the success or failure of a new automotive prod-
uct [HR10]. Generally, the standard V-model software development process
is adopted in the automotive domain [Isoi]. The “V” name comes from the
basic shape of the model as shown in Figure 2.1. This model extends the wa-
terfall model [FM91] by determining the relationships between each phase of
the development and its associated phase of testing.
The V model follows the top-down development approach. Develop-
ment starts at the upper left side of the model with the requirements analysis
phase, when all the functional and non-functional requirements of the sys-
tem are collected and defined. This phase is followed by the design phase,
in which the system is designed based on these defined requirements. The
last phase in the left branch is the implementation phase, during which the
actual coding of the designed system takes place. The right branch includes
progressive verification and validation operations which start by testing each
software component, then go on to test the entire system after integration of























FIGURE 2.2: Vehicle network architecture influenced by [Nol06]
the different subsystems to ensure the commitment of the defined require-
ments, before releasing the vehicle.
2.1.3 Network
The different software components which are hosted by those ECUs are re-
quired to collaborate with each other. Therefore, many ECUs are collected
together in various sub-networks and share the same bus system. Within
each sub-network, a certain type of bus system and communication protocol
is used to enable communication between the different ECUs. To access the
status of the different sub-networks from outside, a mandatory port called
On Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) port is integrated into all new vehicles. OBD-
II is located under the dashboard of the vehicle and used for maintenance and
diagnosis purposes.
Figure 2.2 shows one of the current in-vehicle network architectures
where a central gateway is used to enable the exchange of data between
the different incompatible sub-networks. Nowadays, another network ar-
chitecture is becoming more popular. This architecture is based on dividing
the automotive network system into many independent sub-networks; each
group’s components (ECUs, sensors and actuators) belong to the same func-
tional domain, such as the entertainment domain, body domain, or power-
train domain [Lim+11; HSM12]. A local gateway is used within each domain
network. Those gateways are interconnected with the central gateway via
Ethernet links as shown in Figure 2.3.


















FIGURE 2.3: Domain-based vehicle network architecture, based
on [HSM12].
However, there is no fixed architecture for vehicle networks. It varies be-
tween the different manufacturers and among models of the same manufac-
turers. In the following, we introduce the most common bus systems which
are used within the different vehicle sub-networks. More technical informa-
tion about these systems can be found at [WWP06; Tuo+15; ZKC16; NSL13;
NSL08].
• CAN: the most common bus system, which is used to interconnect
ECUs, actuators and to receive feedback from sensors via a single or
dual-wire [Isoh]. It was introduced in the early 1980s. CAN is a low cost
and reliable bus system, but it provides low bandwidth (up to 1Mbit/s).
CAN is used in powertrain, chassis, and body electronics. CAN is used
to connect applications that need real-time communications.
• Local Interconnect Network (LIN): developed in the late 1990s, LIN
provides low-cost, serial communication between automotive smart
sensors, and actuators with data rates up to 20 Kbit/s [Isoe]. LIN is
likely used for body electronics such as mirrors, seats motors, acces-
sories, door locks and climate sensors.
• FlexRay: introduced by the FlexRay consortium, a group of car man-
ufacturers and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), including
Robert Bosch GmbH. It was introduced in 2004 and, later adopted as
ISO standard 17458 [Isog]. FlexRay ensures faster communication com-
pared to CAN and LIN (bandwidth is up to 10 Mbit/s). It is used to con-
nect safety critical applications which require predictability and fault-
tolerance. FlexRay has two parallel channels; one is used as a backup in
case of any communication failure in the other. FlexRay is used in high-
performance powertrain and safety features such as drive-by-wire, ac-
tive suspension, adaptive cruise control, etc.
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• Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST): developed in 1998, the
last revision of this protocol, called MOST150, was introduced in 2007.
MOST is a high-speed bus system which was developed for vehicular
multimedia and infotainment applications which require transmission
of a large amount of data. The bandwidth of MOST150 is 150 Mbit/s.
It is only used for camera or video connections.
• Wireless-based: Wireless communication is used to connect different
sensors and actuators within the in-vehicle networks. For example,
each high-tech vehicle has a safety system called the Tire Pressure Mon-
itoring System (TPMS) which is used to monitor and display air pres-
sure inside the vehicle tires. TPMS depends on short-range wireless
communication to receive the tire pressure reading from the tire sen-
sor. Bluetooth is another wireless technology which is already used
within the vehicle to support some luxury applications such as hands-
free phone calls. WiFi is another technology which is used to connect
user devices such as phones and tablets to the vehicle.
Long-range wireless technologies are also used in vehicles. The most
common applications which deploy these technologies are the GPS re-
ceiver which is used to receive positioning information, the Traffic Mes-
sage Channel (TMC) receiver, which decodes the TMC data about the
traffic information and displays it in the navigation system map, and
digital radio.
• IP and Ethernet-based: Day by day, vehicular applications are becom-
ing more complicated and interconnected. Consequently, the need for
these applications to exchange bigger and more expressive messages
is increasing and pushing towards using IP and Ethernet-based stan-
dards for both on-board communications and Vehicle-to-everything
(V2X) communications [Ste+12; Tuo+15; Cum+12]. Ethernet is able to
transverse data two orders of magnitude faster than CAN. In addition,
Ethernet provides higher bandwidth data transmissions compared to
other bus systems.
Many authors expect that Ethernet will replace other in-vehicle bus sys-
tems in the near future [HSM12; HZ+18] similar to the case in avionics
where a modified Ethernet adoption is already happening [Ale+07]. To
achieve that, there is huge ongoing work to fill the gaps involved in full
adoption of Ethernet, such as supporting real-time safety applications.
[Ste08; SZ18]. Until now, automotive Ethernet has been used for in-
terfacing with diagnostic equipment [Isod], data-intensive applications
such as the entertainment systems [Sau14], and camera-based driver
assistance systems.
In this thesis, we consider the use of IP and Ethernet-based communica-
tion links between the different ECUs.
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2.2 Automotive Security
2.2.1 Security Attributes
The CIA ( Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) triad represents the
three most essential security attributes for any IT system.
• Confidentiality: having this property in a system means that only au-
thorized parties of that system can manage to disclose the system infor-
mation [Shi07a].
• Integrity: refers to the ability to ensure the consistency and trustwor-
thiness of system information [Shi07a].
• Availability: means that the system information and resources remain
accessible and usable upon demand by authorized parties [Shi07a].
2.2.2 Vulnerabilities and Attacks
The literature includes several studies (e.g, [MV14], [HZ+18], [SDK19],
[Stu+13], and many others) which investigate automotive security and high-
light the various vulnerabilities within vehicle systems. In this section, we
show security vulnerabilities and attacks within each of the main parts of the
automotive system (i.e., ECU, software components and network). The dan-
ger of exploiting any of these vulnerabilities is not limited to the components
in which the vulnerability exists, but extends to cover other components and
could put the entire system at huge risk. A simple buffer overflow vulnera-
bility in one software component run in a vehicle can be an entry point for
attackers to control the entire vehicle.
ECUs and connected devices: ECUs are programmable devices which in-
clude some ports and serial consoles to help the developer access and main-
tain the firmware and software mapped to this ECU. The same ports and con-
soles can give attackers the ability to re-flash the ECU with malicious custom
firmware [BAG15]. In 2015, Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek [MV15] were
able to flash one of Cherokee Jeep’s head unit chips with modified firmware
(Chip tuning attack [WW15]). Later, they used the malicious firmware to send
commands through the in-vehicle network to perform malicious actions such
as disabling brakes, taking control of the steering wheel, and even stopping
the engine. Another primary attack against the ECU is a side channel attack.
By carrying out such attacks, the attacker can gather information during the
execution of the build in crypto-system and use the information gathered to
extract secure critical information such as crypto keys [Koc96; SK14; Eis+08].
ECUs are not the only hardware components which could be targeted
by attackers. Other devices which are connected to the vehicle, such as
phones, tablets, diagnostic devices connected via ODB-II, etc., can be used
as a gateway to attack a vehicle if it contains a security vulnerability. Woo
et al. [WJL15] demonstrated the possibility of attacking a vehicle remotely
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by using a malicious application installed on a smart phone connected to the
victim’s vehicle.
Automotive Software: The massive size of the critical and noncritical soft-
ware components within each vehicle make the existence of security vulner-
abilities is not unusual. Although both critical and noncritical safety applica-
tions must consider security during development, this is not always the case
in reality. Vehicular software components are usually written by different
teams with widely varying degrees of competence; some automotive organi-
zations do not even have any product cybersecurity management programs
[Syn18].
Integrating different components with highly disparate code quality into
the same ECU could end up leaving the entire vehicle system in a non-secure
state. The compromise of non-critical components by an adversary could be
sufficient to control critical components across the entire car [Laa+09].
Besides, using unsafe programming languages (such as C which is con-
sidered defect prone [Ray+14; Ber+19]) has lead to the introduction of many
vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow, dangling pointers and so forth. Such
vulnerabilities have been the starting point for many successful attacks
[Che+11; MV15].
Almost all vehicle vendors have suffered from security weaknesses
within one or more of their software components. For example, there was
a vulnerability in Chrysler’s Uconnect software [MV15], Skoda’s SmartGate
system [Lin15], BMW’s ConnectedDrive [FAS15], the WIFI access point of the
Mitsubishi Outlander plugin hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV) [Lod16], GM’s
Onstar [Tho15], and many others. Those vulnerabilities gave attackers the
chance to perform numerous attacks and many malicious actions such as
turning on/off air conditioning, heating, and lights, disabling the theft alarm
and so forth. They also caused the recall of millions of cars.
Not only automotive applications but firmware itself can contain many
vulnerabilities or unnecessary services which could be exploited by an at-
tacker [Yon14; Dun13]. For example, Tesla S was running an Ubuntu-based
OS with opened ports for unnecessary functions such as telnet, SSH and
so forth which were employed by users to connect to the vehicle’s system
[Yon14].
OTA firmware and software updates represent a new challenge as well as
a predictable resource for introducing new vulnerabilities to the automotive
system if not handled correctly. One malicious or wrong update can end up
as a huge issue, as in the case of the 2016 Toyota Land Cruiser Enform system,
which one ECU was continuously rebooting itself because of a new update
containing errant data [Bog16].
In-Vehicle Network The notion of securing the internal vehicle network
was based on the fact that the vehicle is physically protected. The only way
to hack a car was by being inside it and using one of the external interfaces,
which give the attacker direct access to the internal network. ODB-II ports
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used to be the most famous interfaces which gave the attacker such direct ac-
cess. Other interfaces such as CD/DVD players or USB ports (which are used
to connect drivers’ smartphones) also used for the same target [Che+11].
However, the newly introduced technologies which enable the car to inter-
connect with the outside world have made the physical isolation of the inter-
nal vehicle network history. Nowadays, attackers are able to exploit various
vulnerabilities with the automotive system, and hack and control the vehicle
remotely.
Traditionally, internal vehicle bus systems have been developed to ful-
fill safety, cost and efficiency requirements without considering any security
risks. This is clear if we consider how the CAN bus system operates. CAN
messages are broadcast and transmitted in clear text without any real evi-
dence of data integrity or authenticity [Kos+10]. Consequently, any mali-
cious ECU can pretend to be any other legitimate ECU (i.e., masquerade at-
tack), intercept all the messages exchanged between the different ECUs (i.e.,
man-in-the-middle attack), manipulate the transmitted data (i.e., spoofing attack)
or fraudulently delay or re-transmit previous messages (i.e., replay attack). In
addition, the malicious component can flood the bus with fake high priority
messages to disrupt other communications (i.e., Denial of Service (DoS) attack)
[MV15].
However, these issues are not limited to the CAN bus; other bus systems
(e.g., Ethernet [NLC14], FlexRay [Nil+09], LIN [Tak+17]) suffer from similar
deficiencies which have also made them targets of many attacks.
The wireless network, which is used by multiple applications in the vehi-
cle, is not any better when it comes to security. Many attackers have targeted
systems which depend on wireless communications. For example, Roulf et
al. [Rou+10] investigated the TPMS. They found that the sensors transmit-
ted messages without any security protection. Therefore, attackers on the
roadside (up to 40 meters away) or driving another vehicle can eavesdrop,
intercept and inject spoofed messages by using a low-cost device. Other evi-
dence showed that the attacker could open vehicles without the key [FDC11;
Tho15] by replaying wirelessly transmitted messages between the car and
the smart key.
2.3 Security Mitigation
During the last few years, providing security for the automotive domain
has been a hot topic and received considerable attention; this is expected
to remain the case. Many national and European projects, such as CCC
project [CCC13], SeVeCom [Lei+06], EVITA [HRS09], PRESERVE [Con+14],
SHARCS [SHA15] and many more were funded to investigate this topic and
invent solutions for the various aforementioned and future issues related to
vehicular systems.
In this section, we surveyed these efforts and classified the proposed miti-
gation methods into three lines of security defense: prevention, detection and
response. This classification is influenced by other research such as [NL09;
HZ+18].
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2.3.1 Prevention Mechanisms
Prevention mechanisms represent the first line of security defense for the au-
tomotive system. The aim of these mechanisms is to prevent the occurrence
of attacks proactively. These mechanisms include:
• Secure development of automotive software components to prevent the
attacker from benefiting from software vulnerabilities.
• Developing hardware security mechanisms to support the reliable ex-
ecution and isolation of these software components to prevent the at-
tacker from controlling the entire system if she succeeds in compromis-
ing one part.
• Defining a secure link and a proper access control mechanism to sup-
port the secure communication of these components while they are run-
ning and prevent any malicious third party from interfering with their
interactions.
• Ensuring a reliable framework to update these components to prevent
malicious parties from introducing new vulnerabilities.
Next, each of these points is discussed in more detail.
Secure Software
Practically speaking, automotive software components form the main part of
the automotive system and used to be a very attractive point for attackers.
Many mitigation mechanisms have been used to improve automotive soft-
ware security. These techniques are used throughout the different life-cycle
phases of the software component, starting from implementation, and end-
ing with the phase where the components are running on the desired ECUs.
The first step to prevent cyberattacks is by writing a secure code in the
first place during the implementation phase. Writing vulnerability-free source
code is not a straightforward process, and is often impossible, especially in
the case of a large-scale system as in the modern vehicle. Writing secure code
requires educating software developers to understand security practices in
software development and teaching them how to eliminate common mis-
takes. However, even by doing this, there is no guarantee that even such
well-educated developers will ultimately develop secure software [Nai+17].
On the other hand, since most software bugs result from human errors, se-
cure code generation tools could be used to reduce human error interference.
However, such tools are often considered inefficient for the automotive do-
main [Bro06b].
Testing the software component is a primary part of the development pro-
cess (see Figure 2.1). Regarding ISO 26262 [Isoi], this test includes functional
testing (i.e., verify that software does not perform undesired functionality)
and safety testing (i.e., verify software fulfills the software safety require-
ments). The need to extend the testing methods by including a software se-
curity test became a crucial demand due to the many cyberattacks which
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targeted the modern vehicle [Mar13]. Software security tests help to iden-
tify and mitigate security weaknesses before an attacker can exploit them in
the field, causing catastrophic results. Many authors (e.g., [Bur+12; Bay+15])
have proposed the integration of security tests within the development pro-
cess. However, using such security tests is still not very common within the
automotive domain [Bay+16; Syn18].
Automotive software security tests can benefit from existing static analy-
sis tools [CM04; Joh+13] and use them to scan automotive software, search-
ing for hidden vulnerabilities. Such tools do not require the running of the
software code, and thus can be used before the integration of the code into
the system. A penetration test [ASM05] is another security test which can be
performed to discover other security vulnerabilities and determine the resis-
tance level of the system.
One important mechanism to prevent the attack from spreading from one
software component to another while they are running on the same ECU
is by isolating the different components from each other [Stu+09; Gu+12].
Virtualization aims to divide the ECU resources into isolated RTEs. System
virtualization could be achieved by means of different technologies such as
the hypervisor [PWW08] or containerization [Mor+17].
Hypervisor-based virtualization depends on the emulation of the plat-
form resources by a software called hypervisor, and sharing these virtual re-
sources many times with multiple instances of Virtual Machines (VMs) which
run simultaneously. There are two types of hypervisor-based virtualization:
bare metal where the hypervisor runs directly on the hardware, and hosted or
OS level where the hypervisor runs as a typical application on the top of a host
OS [AH10]. Container-based virtualization does not require the emulation of
the platform hardware. It depends on the OS creating an isolated environ-
ment for different applications which run on top of it. All these isolated ap-
plications share the same resources of the host system. Many research papers
provide a performance comparison between the traditional hypervisor-based
and container-based virtualization approaches as well as the drawbacks and
cons of using each of them [MKK15; Hei08; Mas+16; Ede16].
Although the aforementioned isolation mechanisms ensure sufficient pro-
tection for the application from other distrusted applications, they do not
protect its critical data from malicious highly privileged components such
as the host OS or the hypervisor [JKB15]. Such issues pushed toward using
hardware-based security solutions.
Hardware Security
The main goal of using hardware security mechanisms is to create safe and
secure storage for critical data such as crypto secret keys. These mechanisms
are designed with built-in defenses against physical side-channel attacks.
EVITA project has developed such a solution for automotive domain. It is
called the Hardware Security Module (HSM), which is used to store and pro-
cess security-critical applications (mainly crypto operations) shielded from
any other potentially malicious applications on the same ECU [WG11].































FIGURE 2.4: Symmetric (top) and asymmetric (bottom) encryp-
tion.
Another aim of using hardware-based security solutions is to detect and
mitigate boot code infection. In such circumstances, the HSM can be used
as a root of trust to authenticate the boot code before it runs. This include
firmware as well as other critical applications [Idr+11]. Other solutions such
as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [CD16] are introduced to guaran-
tee the integrity of an application’s code which runs on a platform where all
the privileged software is potentially malicious.
In addition, hardware solutions are used to accelerate the execution of
crypto algorithms which are used to support secure communications, as we
will see in the next subsection.
Cryptography And Secure Link
Basics: One of the main approaches to boosting the security of cyberspace
is by adopting cryptography, for example, to safeguard the confidentiality of
data exchanged between the sender and a receiver. The message sender can
use an encryption algorithm and a crypto key to translate the plain-text of
the message into cipher-text, which she can send to the remote party. Dur-
ing its journey to its final destination, no third party can read or extract the
information from the cipher-text, except if the third party knows the key and
algorithm used. The message receiver uses the same algorithm and key to
decrypt the cipher-text to obtain the same plain text which was created by
the sender.
The encryption algorithms can be either symmetric (e.g., Data Encryp-
tion Standard (DES) [PUB77] and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
[DR01]) or asymmetric (e.g., Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) [RSA78]) algo-
rithms (see Figure 2.4). In symmetric encryption algorithms (a.k.a. secret
key or shared key algorithms), both sender and receiver use the same pre-
shared secret key to encrypt and decrypt the message, while in asymmetric
algorithms (a.k.a. public key algorithms) both the sender and receiver have
a distinct pair of dependent keys. One key, which is called the private key,
is kept secret while the other, the public key, is made available to anyone. A
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message which was encrypted by one of these keys can only be decrypted by
the other.
Adopting Cryptography: Most of a vehicle’s internal communications are
exchanged in clear text, and applying encryption is still rare. This is because
of many widespread beliefs; firstly, these algorithms, especially asymmet-
ric ones, require high computational power which is not always available.
Moreover, they introduce an overhead to the system either by increasing the
size of the transmitted data or by increasing the system latency. However, in
this thesis we will show how these beliefs are not totally correct.
Some authors have proposed frameworks which use symmetric encryp-
tion algorithms to protect the confidentiality of the in-vehicle communica-
tions over CAN bus [WJL15; Sid+17; GR09]. In other cases, e.g., [Mun+15],
an asymmetric algorithm is used to encrypt the shared key which will be
used by the symmetric algorithm to encrypt the exchanged messages later.
Another goal of using cryptography is to guarantee that the transmitted
data is not changed (deliberately or unintentionally) in transit, and that it is
transferred by the sender who it should be sent by. Message Authentication
Code (MAC) [Can+99] can be used to ensure the integrity and the authentic-
ity of the message. By using a MAC algorithm and a pre-shared key, as with
symmetric encryption algorithms, the message sender can create a tag (called
MAC) for each transmitted message and send it together with the message.
The receiver uses the received message, pre-shared key, and the same MAC
algorithm to compute another tag and compare it with the one she received
from the sender. If both tags match, she knows that the message has not
been altered and it originated from the specific sender who knows the key.
MAC algorithms can be based on a symmetric key block cipher algorithm
(Cipher-based MAC [Dwo05]), such as CBC-MAC [BKR00], or based on one-
way hash function (Hash function-based MAC [BCK96; KCB97]).
Unlike encryption, MAC is adopted frequently to ensure the integrity and
authenticity of in-vehicle communications [ZM14; Mun+15; LS+11; Sch12].
In [Lin+13; WJL15; Ham+08], authors have used CMAC algorithms to pro-
tect against masquerade and replay attacks on CAN bus, while [Woo+16;
Ued+15] used HMAC algorithms for the same purpose. MAC was not used
to protect CAN only; many authors have proposed the use of HMAC to en-
sure the security of the communication over FlexRay bus [Han+14; Mou+16].
One of the main issues that MAC suffers from is the non-repudiation
problem. Digital signature sachems solve this issue by using public-key cryp-
tography. The sender of messages can cryptographically sign the transmitted
data using her own private key (in practice, the sender signs the computed
hash of the message only) so the receiver can guarantee the message’s in-
tegrity and authenticity by checking the validity of the signature using the
sender’s public key.
Many authors, such as [WWP04; Idr+11], have proposed frameworks
which use a digital signature to provide message integrity and sender au-
thentication for the intra-vehicle network. However, using a digital signa-
ture is not applicable for protecting CAN messages because the signature


































FIGURE 2.5: IP packet with IPsec fields in both modes and pro-
tocols.
produced is too long to fit in one message, therefore, securing one message
requires several messages [HL18; FL15a].
AUTOSAR has introduced many APIs for crypto services which can be
used by the software components [AUT17]. These services include specifica-
tions for calculating of hash, creating and verifying MAC value and digital
signature, and achieving symmetric and asymmetric encryption and decryp-
tion operations.
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec): As we have mentioned before, IP/Eth-
ernet represents the future for in-vehicle communication. Besides the huge
bandwidth and large payload size that it supports, IP/Ethernet brings real
opportunities to improve the security of in-vehicle (as well as Vehicle-to-
Vehicle (V2V)) communications by benefiting from the significant security
expertise that was gained during the many years of using IP/Ethernet for
traditional IT systems.
IPsec protocol [SK05] is one of the standards for protecting IP traffic. It
was designed to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of each IP packet
transmitted in the communication session. IPsec runs in the IP layer, which
makes it transparent to upper layers, and therefore applications do not need
to have any knowledge of IPsec to be able to use it.
IPsec is based on two encapsulation protocols. These are Authentica-
tion Header (AH) [Ken05a], which provides data-origin authentication, data-
integrity, and protection from replay-attack, and Encapsulating Security Pay-
load (ESP) [Ken05b] , which provides data confidentiality and also supports
its own authentication scheme like the one used in AH. IPsec can be used in
either transport or tunnel mode [SK05]. Transport mode is used to protect
the data flows between a pair of hosts, while tunnel mode is used to protect
the data flows between a pair of hosts, two gateways, or between a host and
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a gateway. In addition, the implementation of each mode is different. Figure
2.5 illustrates both AH and ESP protocols in transport and tunnel modes.
Since the adoption of IP/Ethernet-based communication is still limited
for in-vehicle communications, little effort has been made to investigate the
use of IPsec to secure such communication except for a few exceptions such
as [HP15; LH15].
In Section 5 of this thesis, we extend the implementation of an embedded
version of IPsec and adapted it to ensure secure communication between the
different ECUs within the vehicle.
Firewall
One of the most famous mechanisms for preventing network attacks is a fire-
wall. Within the traditional network systems, a firewall is used to monitor
and filter inbound and outbound network traffic based on predefined secu-
rity rules, preventing unauthorized nodes from receiving and sending data
[KP07; CBR03]. The need for such a system to control the interaction between
the components within the vehicle and between the vehicle and the outside
world has been addressed by many authors [Kos+10; KOJ11; Stu+13].
The location in which the firewall is placed and the communication that
it should control were the main differences between the various proposals.
Since the firewall is used as a boundary between two networks, the automo-
tive firewall was introduced in many proposals, such as [Zre+08], to control
the communication between the vehicle and outside world. Although pro-
tecting the vehicle from external threats is important, leaving the internal
network of the vehicle without control has serious consequences.
Chutorash [Chu00] went a step further when he proposed using a fire-
wall to control certain interactions within the vehicle. His approach was re-
stricted to monitoring the communication between human-machine interface
systems and other vehicle components only, while it ignored the other inter-
actions between the different vehicle components.
Another solution was based on using the central gateway as a firewall
to intercept the communication exchanged among the different bus systems
[WWP04; NXP18]. All the security keys to encrypt the links between the dif-
ferent sub-networks as well as the access control rules for these connections
are stored within this gateway. However, the central gateway provides an
attack surface which may be considered a single point of failure. Moreover,
the communication within each sub-network is not controlled. To cover these
limitations, another solution was introduced to use the firewall within each
sub-network gateway (these gateways are connected to the central gateway)
[Ala18].
In this thesis we extended this approach by deploying a firewall for each
single ECU in order to build a distributed firewall which is concerned about
all communications inside the vehicle as we will see in Chapter 5.
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Security Policy
The set of predefined security constraints which determines which actions
are authorized and which are not and need to be adhered to by the system, is
called the security policy [GR95]. One example of security policy is the Ac-
cess Control List (ACL) [Shi07b] which is enforced by the firewall. Each rule
in the ACL determines which network traffic should be allowed and which
should be denied based on certain characteristics that can be extracted from
each network frame, such as the address of the IP/Ethernet frame. ACL was
part of many security frameworks proposed for securing in-vehicle commu-
nications, such as in [GR09; PDB14; Rum+19].
Developing, generating, and maintaining such an access control policy
within the automotive domain is a labor intensive and error prone process.
How to express the security policy is a very crucial point. Many security
policy languages were proposed to enable the specification of the security
policies for automotive systems. XACML language [Xac], PNL [IR12] and
Abbreviated Language for Authorization (ALFA) [GNB15] are examples of
these languages which were used to describe the access control rules in the
different frameworks. To benefit from the existing modeling languages, such
as UML, some authors (e.g., [Ber+17]) have proposed extensions to such lan-
guages to enable the integration of security specifications for the communi-
cation between the software components.
Blaze et al. [BFL96] invented the concept of trust management to solve ac-
cess control problems in distributed systems. Ioannidis [Ioa05] has adopted
has provided a framework which ensures the consistencies of the huge num-
ber of distributed security polices as well as the distributed enforcement of
these polices. They proposed a language (i.e., KeyNote language [Bla+99])
to express the access control rule of the security policy. At the same time,
KeyNote provides several advantages, such as the delegation mechanism.
Many authors adopt the trust management concept to implement an access
control framework in diverse fields, such as web applications [Chu+97], dis-
tributed firewall [Ioa+00], and others.
In this thesis, we used KeyNote trust management system to support the
development of in-vehicle components security policies (see Chapter 5)
Secure Over-The-Air Update
OTA Update was introduced in the automotive domain to eliminate the need
for the vehicle’s owner to visit the dealership to install a new patch or soft-
ware. The dark side of this process is that it increases the attack surfaces of
the vehicle and creates a new attack vector for hackers. To prevent that, a
security mechanism should be adopted to make OTA update more reliable
and secure.
Digital signature schema plays a major role in securing the OTA software
and firmware update process [Kar+16; MTK19; NL08]. With the help of dig-
ital signatures, a system can verify the authenticity and integrity of the soft-
ware update before installing it in the ECU. This closes the door to installing
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malware updates which could put the entire system at huge risk by running
malicious software or firmware.
In this thesis, we consider the use of secure OTA update framework dur-
ing the update process of any software component as we will see in Chapter
5.
2.3.2 Detection Mechanisms
Despite the adoption of all the proactive security mechanisms mentioned in
the previous section, there is no guarantee that the system becomes secure
and that no attacker can strike it. These mechanisms are deployed and imple-
mented to make attacks reasonably difficult, but they do not render them im-
possible (although they aim to); many examples of successful attacks against
vehicles as a whole have proven that. Therefore, another layer of protection
becomes necessary. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a well-known
security measure which is used to monitor the system to detect suspicious
activities [MC14].
Intrusion Detection Systems Types
Based on the source of the collected data as well as the location where the
IDS is installed, IDSs can be grouped into [DDW99]:
• Host-based IDS: which is used to monitor gathered data provided by
the operating system from a single host to detect suspicious actions.
This monitored data may contain memory consumption [VH17], the
execution time of different software components which are mapped
to that host [Zim+10; Ham+18], system calls [MP16], and so forth.
SAMHAIN is a typical example of a host-based IDSs [Wot05].
• Network-based IDS: which is used to monitor traffic in a network en-
vironment to detect attacks. It needs to be installed at a point where it
can monitor all the data transferred by the network hosts. Snort [CB04]
is a good example of this type of IDSs.
• Hybrid IDS: a combination of both approaches which can be used to
analyze the data within multi-host networked systems. Distributed In-
trusion Detection System (DIDS) is one proposal for using host and net-
work based IDSs together [Sna+97].
Detection Methods
All these types of IDSs can use different methods to detect attacks [Deb00;
GT+09]. Here are the two main methods:
• Knowledge-based intrusion detection: known also as the signature-
based [SM07] or misuse-based [BCV01] method. This method uses pre-
defined rules based on accumulated knowledge about known attacks
to identify any incidents which exploit these rules. This method has
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many advantages; it is very effective for detecting known attacks. In
addition, it has a very low false positive rate regarding detected attacks.
But, Knowledge-based methods are not fully efficient at detecting zero-
day attacks [GT+09; BD12].
• Behavioral-based intrusion detection: which is also known as an
anomaly-based method [And+94]. By adopting this method, any off-
nominal behavior (which is probably an attack) is detected based on the
inconsistencies of the observed behavior with an off-line defined model
which represents the system’s nominal behavior. Compared to the
knowledge-based mechanism, the behavioral-based method has bet-
ter capability to detect unknown vulnerabilities and zero-day attacks
[Had+12]. The main drawback of this method is the high false positive
alarm rate of detected attacks. False positive alarms mean that there is
a possibility that the system could report some activities as malicious
although they are not.
Vehicular IDS
The automotive domain is different from the other traditional computer net-
work systems; it has its distinct characteristics and limitations (e.g., low pro-
cessing power) which may limit the direct adoption of existing IDSs from
other domains. A large number of research studies have investigated using
both types of IDS in the automotive domain, and using different detection
methods [AJ+19; HL18; Wu+19; TBS18; Lou+19].
Host-Based IDS: most of the intrusion detection efforts in the automotive
domain were in the direction of deploying network-based IDS for the in-
vehicle network. Host-based solutions were very few. This could be a result
of the limited resources of the hosts within the vehicle (i.e., ECUs). Also, the
network tends to be the most attractive part of the automotive system be-
cause of the lack of security protection mechanisms, and thus it has received
more attention.
The first approach which was used to develop host-based IDS for the
modern vehicle is based on the execution behavior of the software compo-
nents running on that ECU. Typically, each one of these components is imple-
mented to follow a specific sequences of calls. The change in these sequences
happens when the software is infected and tries to perform unusual or ma-
licious actions. Such components can be detected by monitoring the execu-
tion sequence of each one and determining any variations compared to the
nominal one. Based on this idea, Chen et al. [Che+07] proposed IDS to moni-
tor software component behavior. They created a look-up table including all
the possible predecessor/successor relationships of the monitored runnables.
Later, they used this table to compare the actual execution sequence with the
predefined one.
Another approach to detecting the off-nominal behaviors within each
ECU is to look at its communication behavior. Larson et al. [LNJ08] followed
this approach. They proposed building a model representing the nominal
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behavior specifications for each ECU. These specifications contain the set of
allowed out/in-going message types and the rates at which each of these
messages are transmitted and received. In the same direction, other research
(such as [LF12; AMS16]) proposed creating a list of all legitimate CAN mes-
sage IDs that each ECU is authorized to receive and send, and later used this
list to detect messages that are not predefined and treat them as malicious
injected messages.
In this thesis, we proposed a host-based IDS to detect the malicious activ-
ity of software components based on their temporal behavior (see Chapter
6).
Network-Based IDS: The literature includes plenty of research which in-
vestigated and proposed different approaches for network-based IDS for
intra-vehicle networks. The majority of these approaches were anomaly-
based and designed for CAN bus system. This focus on the CAN bus is
because it is used to control the most critical vehicle components, such as
braking and engine control; thus, it needs to be especially well protected.
Anomaly-based methods were preferred over signature-based ones because
they require less memory to be developed (no need for storing attacks sig-
natures) [Han+14]. Moreover, adopting the signature-based method requires
frequent updates to include the newly discovered attacks and keep the attack
signatures up-to-date during the whole lifetime of the vehicle. This imposes
the need to visit the dealership whenever a new attack is found. However,
the introduction of the OTA update technology will gradually diminish the
impact of this factor.
Based on the typical behavior of the in-vehicle bus systems, Müter et al.
[MGF10] have proposed eight attack detection sensors which could be used
to observe anomalies occurring inside the vehicular network. These sensors
include the formality, location, range, frequency, correlation, protocol, plau-
sibility and consistency of each transmitted message. For this thesis, we focus
on the approaches which form the nominal behavior model of the in-vehicle
network based on the frequency and time analysis of the transmitted mes-
sages.
Most CAN messages are transmitted predictably at fixed intervals. This
compatibility gave authors such as [TJL15; SKK16; HKD11; MV14], and oth-
ers the ability to design IDS which use the frequency of each message (each
message has a unique ID) to model its nominal behavior. During the oper-
ation of the vehicle, any malicious injected message will be noticed because
it will have a shorthand time interval compared to the computed established
baseline.
Miller and Valasek [MV14] were the first authors who developed a pro-
totype IDS device to detect an injection attack on the CAN bus based on the
frequency analysis of the messages. Their proposed device needs to be con-
nected to the vehicle via the OBD port to monitor the CAN bus. In the same
vein, Song et al. [SKK16] use message frequency to detect injection attacks as
well as DoS attacks. Within their proposed IDS, they calculated the interval
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between every two consecutive messages and compared it with the prede-
fined one (during the learning phase). A short detected interval indicates an
injection attack. At the same time, they monitor whether this short interval
continues to appear in a row more than a preset threshold score; if yes, the
model considers that the system is under DoS attack.
In the case of one ECU needs a certain data from another one. This ECU
broadcasts a request (it is called remote frame) with particular ID, any ECU
which is responsible for providing this data broadcasts immediately a re-
sponse (data frame), which contain the requested data. Lee at al. [LJK17]
proposed a mechanism to detect a message injection attack based on the cal-
culation of the time interval between request and response frames for a par-
ticular message identifier when these messages are transmitted in an attack-
free state over the CAN bus. The mechanism uses this computed time inter-
val to compare it with the detected one during the run-time. If the detected
time is different than the computed one, the mechanism considers that as a
sign of intrusion.
If an ECU needs certain data from another one, this ECU broadcasts a
request (called remote frame) with a particular ID, and any ECU which is
responsible for providing this data immediately broadcasts a response (data
frame) which contains the requested data. Lee at al. [LJK17] proposed a
mechanism to detect message injection attacks based on the calculation of the
time interval between request and response frames for a particular message
identifier when these messages are transmitted in an attack-free state over
the CAN bus. The mechanism uses this computed time interval to compare
it with the run-time of the detected message. If the detected time is different
than the computed one, the mechanism considers that a sign of intrusion.
All the proposed solutions focused only on the time-triggered (periodic)
frames while the event-triggered ones were not considered.
2.3.3 Response Mechanisms
Detecting an intrusion using IDS in not sufficient to ensure the safety and
security of the system; one or more reactions need to take place to respond
to the detected attack. The IRS is designed to develop such reactions, handle
the perceived malicious and suspicious actions of the attacker, and minimize
the damage to the system. Most of the existing IRSs are mainly deployed
for normal network systems and computer systems [Ste+01; Her17; Ina+16;
Foo+08]. Based on the infected system, one or more of the IRSs can be imple-
mented and selected.
In the vehicular domain, many authors have mentioned the need for
an effective intrusion response mechanism for the vehicle system [FL15b;
Sch12]. However, very few authors have investigated the design of such a
system; in existing proposals, authors have looked at responses as a part of
the intrusion detection framework [HKD08; FL15a].
A research study by Hoppe et al. [HKD08] was one of first attempts to
develop a dynamic response system to react to the security incidents which
target automotive systems. In their work, Hoppe et al. proposed the use of
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the multimedia system to alert the driver to the detected incident. However,
Informing the driver may not solve the issue, as the driver is not anything
like a network (or network security) admin. On the contrary, it may cause
the loss of the driver’s attention in case of the massive number of alarms.
Other reactions include shutting down the communication bus whenever
an incident is detected [MV14]. however, such a response may be too late as
the attacker may have already gained a foothold in the local system. Also,
the shutdown of the infected resources could be the target of the attack.
Recently, Vőlep et al. [VEV18] have proposed an intrusion-tolerant ar-
chitecture to tolerate partial compromise of software components in an au-
tonomous vehicle. Their solution is based on replicating the critical compo-
nents to hide the actions of a minority of compromised ones behind a ma-
jority of healthy replicas operating in consensus. Even in the case of using
replicas, whenever the attacker has a foot in the system (she was able to com-
promise one of the components), she may start attacking the other replicas
and compromise the majority of them. In other cases, e.g., [NH14], an in-
trusion detection and adaptive response mechanism was designed to detect
a range of attacks and to provide an effective response for Mobile Ad-hoc
Networks (MANETs).
In Chapter 7 of this thesis, we propose an intrusion response system for
vehicular systems which tries to address the issues of the currently proposed
solutions and build upon them.
Honeypots
A Honeypot is a system which is used to mimic the target of attack. Although
honeypots are considered as a detection mechanism by many researchers,
they can be adopted as a reaction mechanism to malicious activities in the
system. Honeypot is used to provide the attacker with a fake chance to per-
form its malicious activity. At the same time, it gives the system administra-
tor a real opportunity to gather as much information as possible about the
attacker and their goal. Eisenbarth et al. [Eis+08] have proposed the use of
honeypots as a means of collecting such information about attacks against
the in-vehicle network. In Section 6.1 of this thesis, we propose a mechanism
which considers any infected component as a honeypot.
2.4 Summary
Over the past two decades, significant developments were introduced within
the vehicular domain evolving the modern vehicle into a network of dozen
ECUs hosting a huge number of applications. In Section 2.1, we presented
an overview of the automotive system by describing its main components;
namely ECUs which form the backbone of the vehicle, the software which
implement the different functionalities, and the network which ensures the
environment for these applications and ECUs to exchange information and
collaborate to control the vehicle.
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Additionally, in Section 2.2, we highlighted some security vulnerabilities
which threaten each of the aforementioned components and the possible at-
tacks they could enable. In Section 2.3, we summarized the mitigation mech-
anisms which were proposed for securing the in-vehicular systems. These
mechanisms were classified into three groups: prevention, detection, and re-
sponse mechanisms. Within each group we tried to cover the most relevant
efforts for our proposed solutions.
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In this chapter, we explain our system architecture and the most critical func-
tional and nonfunctional requirements (or goals) which need to be consid-
ered or achieved through this thesis. In addition, we present in Section 3.1 the
hardware and software setup which is used to support the development and
testing of the proposed security mechanisms. We also describe the use cases
(in Section 3.2) which are used throughout the thesis to apply the proposed
solutions and to show their applicability. At the end, to give the reader a
general perception of our solutions, we briefly introduce our proposed multi-
layer framework in Section 3.3. Each layer is discussed in more detail in a
separate chapter in the next part of this thesis.
3.1 System Architecture
Figure 3.1 depicts an exemplary distributed system and the different scenar-
ios of inter-component communication. In our idealistic world, each ECU
is running an RTE that hosts multiple (interacting) software components.
These components are safety and non-safety critical applications. The ECUs
are inter-connected using IP-based Ethernet communications. Although we
consider the architecture of a research vehicle, IP-based inter ECU commu-
nication has been proposed for automotive purposes (e.g., [Gla+10; Ker12;
Bou+12]), so the chosen setup can be considered relevant for future automo-
tive applications.
Here, we identify two types of network communication: external com-
munication, which refers to the communication between one component
within the vehicle and another one from the outside world (e.g., a compo-
nent in another vehicle or with a road infrastructure). The second type is
intra-vehicle communication which refers to the communication between two
components belonging to the same vehicle. This type can be divided into
another two types: local communication, which refers to the communication
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FIGURE 3.1: The different types of communication within in-
vehicle systems
between two software components on the same ECU (e.g., SWC3 and SWC4),
and remote communication, which denotes the communication between com-
ponents on two different ECUs (e.g., SWC2 and SWC3).
3.1.1 Objectives
When it comes to designing a secure framework for distributed systems in
critical application domains such as automotive systems, some objectives
and requirements need to be considered. In the following we present the
most relevant ones which should be respected:
• Fine-grained access control: The primary goal which the secure frame-
work needs to guarantee is controlling who should talk to whom in an ef-
ficient manner without the need for static access-control mechanisms.
Components should be isolated from each other. They should only
communicate with other components which are specified by the secu-
rity policy. One main aim of this isolation and restricted interaction is
limiting the escalation of attack, so that even a compromised compo-
nent will only be able to interact with authorized components and will
be unable to attack other components indiscriminately.
• Secure communication: After specifying the authorized connections,
providing security services for them is another fundamental require-
ment. The required security services vary from one application to an-
other. Generally, most security issues in vehicle communications are
related to the lack of data and origin integrity mechanisms; provid-
ing such mechanisms is necessary to prevent unauthorized parties from
sending false data or injecting it in established connections. Thus, the
proposed designed framework should ensure provision of these ser-
vices.
• Controlling Concurrent Change / updatability: Nowadays, in-field
updates are becoming ever more popular, as demonstrated by the re-
cent OTA update for Tesla cars and others. New components could
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be added or new configurations for a certain component can be al-
tered. Any proposed security framework should ensure the integration
of new components without putting the vehicle at risk of violating the
system requirements or creating a vulnerability regarding communica-
tion and access control rules.
• Composability and migratability: In a component-based system
where the functionality is integrated by composing several interact-
ing components, we have the freedom of choice as to where to execute
each component. Figure 3.1 illustrates this for component SWC3 which
could alternatively be executed on ECU1 but then requires a remote
communication mechanism to SWC4. Hence, composability and mi-
gratability are important values whose absence would quickly restrict
the design space. Note that we consider migration in terms of a (partial)
system reconfiguration that must undergo several admission tests be-
fore being applied. Similar to the case of updating the system with new
components, the security framework should support the secure com-
posability and migratability of the components through a mechanism
to develop and adjust the security policy to reflect the system reconfig-
uration without losing system security.
• Efficient and Effective: Another essential concern is the type of secu-
rity protection that we must use for the various communications links.
Applying encryption for all transmitted messages in the in-vehicle sys-
tem could result in the opposite outcome by introducing an unaccept-
able overhead, which causes some functionalities to perform inappro-
priately. The resource-constrained nature of the hardware platform
used, as well as the time-critical nature of some of these communica-
tions, imply that we need to be more selective in the type of protection
we apply to these links. The proposed framework should provide ef-
ficient mechanisms suitable for resource-constrained devices. Also, it
should support the effective selection of security properties.
• Stability: One critical mission of any proposed security framework for
the vehicle is to implement different strategies to react to an attack and
prevent the failure of the car. The response to a security violation must
consider issues such as containment, continued availability, interaction
with other subsystems, and, in some instances, latency requirements.
These requirements are in many cases in conflict with each other; for
example, security and availability are often in conflict [TGK00]. The se-
curity framework tries to react to a malicious component by stopping it.
However, this means losing the availability of this component, which
could cause a safety issue. Therefore, the proposed framework should
consider such conflict and should attempt to resolve it or at least mini-
mize it.































FIGURE 3.2: Hardware and software setup.
3.1.2 Prototype System
Figure 3.2 represents the hardware and software setup which is used in this
thesis. This setup contains:
Hardware
We used Raspberry Pi as a simulator of a vehicle’s ECU. Raspberry Pi is con-
sidered a resource-constrained devices similar to the most in-use ECUs in the
vehicle. Also, Raspberry Pi has many other attractive properties; it is a small
size computer board composed of an ARM-like System on Chip (SoC). It in-
cludes all the I/O and storage interfaces, a slot for a SD-card, and an Ethernet
port. And, with all these properties it can be purchased at a low price (ap-
proximately tens of Euros). Moreover, it has a huge community of support.
All this made Raspberry Pi a good candidate to test the applicability of our
proposed solutions. It is worth mentioning that we are not the only people
who used Raspberry Pi in the place of an ECU; another researchers have al-
ready done so (e.g., [Vau15]). In our test-bed, we have used a Raspberry Pi
2 Model B which comes with 900MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A7 CPU and
1GB of RAM.
Software components
We used Genode framework [Gen19] as an RTE to develop our security solu-
tions. The Genode framework can be seen as a collection of three layers: (1)
The core component which implements only required system functionalities
and gives the other component the ability to access raw physical resources
such as Memory, CPU, and so forth. The core component usually runs on the
top of a third party (micro)kernel in the user mode. Genode framework can
be deployed over different kernels such as NOVA, seL4, Linux kernel (mainly
to support rapid development and testing), and many others. In addition, it
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can run directly on ARM-based hardware platforms (in our case this is Rasp-
berry Pi 2 Model B) without relying on a third-party kernel. In this case only
the core component runs in privileged mode. (2) The Genode components in
the user space; these components contain the devices drivers, resource mul-
tiplexer and protocol stacks and (3) on top is located the applications layer.
Using a microkernels OS is the first step towards providing security for
in-vehicle systems. A microkernel OS comes with a small-sized privileged
code, ensures a minimal trusted computing base, and supports the mem-
ory protection between the various platform subsystems. Genode aims to
create a generic user-level infrastructure regarding the microkernel it uses.
Genode runs each application in a dedicated sandbox and isolated from the
other components. In addition, each application has access to the rights and
resources that are required to fulfill its specific purpose. Each process is ex-
posed to only those parts of the system on which it ultimately depends. Thus,
if one part of the system is compromised, the defect is limited to that partic-
ular part and its dependent parts, while unrelated processes remain unaf-
fected.
Network
Genode relies on lightweight Internet Protocol (LwIP) [Dun02] as a TCP/IP
stack to connect the applications to an Ethernet driver. Genode ported lwlP
in the form of a library running in the user space and shares the same protec-
tion domain with the network application. Basically, lwlP implementation
is focused on reducing the usage of memory resources and the code size to
make it suitable for the embedded systems. LwIP does not include any IPsec
implementation to support the secure communications between the different
nodes which run Genode.
Genode provides a kind of network isolation by letting each network ap-
plication have its own network stack. Besides, both the network stack and
the network driver run in separate protection domains. In doing so, the sys-
tem guarantees that unrelated components will not be affected by the faulty
operation of the network stack. However, having separate network stacks for
each application may introduce some issues, as we will discuss in Chapter 5.
3.2 Use Cases
Within the scope of the thesis, we consider the research vehicle MOBILE (see
Figure 3.3-left), built at the Institute of Control Engineering [Ber14] to be used
as a demonstrator platform with which we can describe and check the ap-
plicability of our different proposed mechanisms throughout the next chap-
ters. MOBILE is equipped with multiple sensors and computers for environ-
ment perception with the goal of providing obstacle avoidance and Adaptive
Cruise Control functionalities in a static environment on a proving ground.
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3.2.1 Autonomous Vehicle Driving
Self-driving vehicles represent the car of the future and the main goal of all
automotive manufactures. During the last few years, huge efforts have been
made to develop self-driving vehicle technology. Such efforts were pushed
by the rapid progress achieved in the hardware (e.g., cameras, sensors, etc.)
and technologies areas related to autonomous driving (e.g., artificial intelli-
gence, big data, etc.). However, there is still a long way to go and more work
needed to develop the fully autonomous vehicle (i.e., SAE Level 5 [Com+14]).
Figure 3.3-right depicts the simplified hardware architecture of the au-
tonomous vehicle driving system as well as the network architecture for the
main subsystems. Three types of hardware components are used within this
use case: a) Smart sensors (e.g., GPS, LiDAR, etc.) which are used to gather
data about the environment and deliver it to b) Many ECUs running the dif-
ferent autonomous vehicle software systems which emit control commands
to the c) Actuators (e.g., steering, throttle, brakes, etc.) which apply those
commands.
The autonomous vehicle software components can be categorized into
four main subsystems [Pen+17; Cam+10]:
• Localization: refers to the ability of the vehicle to determine its position
concerning the surrounding environment as well as to get a good esti-
mation of road traveled. This position information is fed by GPS and
inertial data via CAN bus to the ECU which is responsible for vehicle
localization and motion estimation.
• Perception: translates the received raw sensor data about the surround-
ing environment into useful information to obtain a safe trajectory. Li-
dar sensors and a camera are streamed via IP-based protocol to the ECU
which is responsible for environment perception (sensor data process-
ing, data fusion, environment modeling). Data from a radar sensor is
acquired via a CAN bus connection.
• Planning: the main aim of this subsystem is utilizing aggregated data,
which is provided by the perception subsystems to plan actuation of
the vehicle. This includes the optimal trajectory planning, behavioral
planning, motion planning, etc. The planner unit passes the ultimate
information/commands to the control unit.
• Controlling: this subsystem receives the ultimate information/com-
mands of the planner unit and passes them to the actuators which gen-
erate the desired actions such as increasing the speed or moving the
steering and so forth.
Next, we introduce the two use cases which are employed in the next part
of the thesis:















FIGURE 3.3: MOBILE (left) and a simplified hardware architec-
ture and software components for autonomous driving system
(right)
3.2.2 Automated Obstacle Avoidance
This is one of the vital features which aims to ensure the safe vehicle oper-
ation and ride comfort of the autonomous vehicle. This system enables the
car (with the help of the information received from the different sensors) to
avoid obstacles in its path. The environment perception which is used by this
system is mainly based on LiDAR scanners (based on [RMM15]); a radar sen-
sor and camera present additional information sources which can be used to
monitor the environment around the car. The LiDAR sensor data is used to
create a map of the static environment, which provides the basis for model-
based trajectory planning to generate smooth maneuvers in real-time.
3.2.3 Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC)
ACC is a common and well-known automotive driver assistance system
which has been developed by most of the automobile manufacturers, which
give it different names, for example BMW’s Traffic Jam Assistant, General
Motor’s Super Cruis, Tesla’s Traffic-Aware Cruise Control, Toyota’s Auto-
mated Highway Driving Assist, and many others [DW+14].
The cruise control system, which keeps the vehicle at a steady speed en-
tered by the driver without any need to keep the accelerator pedal continu-
ously pressed down, was integrated with the vehicle a long time ago. The
ACC system is considered an improved version of this old system. An ACC
system supports the driver to adjust the vehicle’s velocity and to maintain a
safe headway distance between vehicles in the same lane. The ACC System
depends on user input to determine the desired speed or distance with the
in-front car. Internal sensors such as LiDAR and a camera are used to provide
information about the speed of the car ahead which helps the ACC system to
adjust its distance from it by controlling the engine and brakes.










































FIGURE 3.4: The different layers of the proposed secure frame-
work
3.3 Multilayer Vehicle Security Framework
In order to ensure the security of the in-vehicle system we propose a holistic
framework, shown in Figure 3.4. This framework consists of multiple layers
of mitigation strategies to deal with cybersecurity intrusions and to ensure a
high degree of security for the intra-vehicle systems.
Our defined framework is based on the cybersecurity framework pro-
posed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[Adm+16; Cyb14]. The NIST framework uses five principal functions “Iden-
tify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover,” to build a comprehensive ap-
proach to developing layered cybersecurity.
3.3.1 Design
Our framework depends on three principles, namely: prevention, detection
and response, which cover most of the NIST framework’s functions.
• Prevention: which is covered by the first two layers of the framework.
Within the first layer (i.e., layer 0), we perform a comprehensive thread-
molding process to identify all the possible threats and vulnerabilities
which could face the system. This process requires a good understand-
ing of the system functionalities as well as the system components and
their interconnections. One main outcome of this process is defining the
security requirements [MLY05] for the different system assets. These re-
quirements need to be satisfied to prevent attackers from compromis-
ing the system. Chapter 4 discusses this layer in more detail.
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The second layer (i.e., Layer 1) includes developing the security pol-
icy which implements the security requirements for each system com-
ponent. The security policy contains rules which will be used by the
other layers of the framework. Another process within this layer is
defining the mechanism which is used to enforce the security policy
as well as to implement a mechanism to ensure the security require-
ments. This function includes building an access control mechanism to
prevent unauthorized parties from accessing the system assets. Also, it
adopts some crypto mechanisms to ensure data security. Some of these
mechanisms, such as a firewall, can be considered as detection and pre-
vention tolls at the same time, therefore can overlay on the next layer.
Chapter 5 describes this layer.
• Detection: The core function of this layer (i.e., layer 2) is building moni-
toring mechanisms to detect the occurrence of cyber-attacks which were
not prevented by the prevention layers. This layer ensures continuance
monitoring as well as the early detection of attacks and suspicious ac-
tions. Both anomaly-based and signature-based detection technologies
need to be adopted in this layer. Security policy plays a pivotal role in
defining the nominal behavior of the system components. This defined
behavior is used as a reference to detect any odd behaviors. Chapter
6 of this thesis presents a proposed intrusion detection mechanism for
in-vehicle systems.
• Response: The last layer (i.e., layer 3) determines the process when a
security violation is detected either by layer 1 or layer 2. The main aim
of this layer is protecting the vehicle from entering unstable states as a
result of the detected attack. The effective design of this layer requires
inputs from the above layers, such as the properties of the detected
attack or the off-nominal behavior. The security policy is also needed
for this layer since it includes the possible response for different attacks.
Besides that, the collocated characteristics of attacks (i.e., aim, scenario,
severity, etc.) are used as feedback or input for the next threat model-
ing process. In addition, it can be used to develop patches or updates
for the security policy to mitigate these attacks. This update will be re-
flected on the underlying layers. Chapter 7 handles the development
of this layer.
3.3.2 Development and Usage
The development of our multilayer framework is achieved gradually over
the different security phases of the automotive system development life-
cycle. We follow the security phases which were presented in [Bur+12] and
recently proposed in the first working draft of the ISO/SAE 21434 standard.
These phases, which are designed similarly to the safety stages defined in
ISO 26262 [Isoi], aim to provide guidelines for designing secure systems. Fig-
ure 3.5 shows these phases, which include defining security requirements
and goals, security design, security implementation, security testing and
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verification, security validation, and security maintenance. The same fig-
ure shows how our proposed framework layers can be combined into these
phases.
The development of layer 0 takes place off-line at the lab during the con-
ceptual phase. This layer is used to derive the security requirements of each
(sub)system component. In addition, the attack scenarios which are pro-
duced by this layer are used as realistic use cases for penetration tests during
the security validation phase. The layer 1 mechanisms (i.e., security policy
and data protection protocols) are developed as a part of the system security
design, implementation, and integration. The security policy will be used
later while the vehicle is operating to support the security monitoring pro-
cess via developed monitoring techniques. The mechanisms in layer 3 and
4 are used as part of the security maintenance and monitoring phase while
the vehicle is in the field (i.e., after production). Layer 4 information about
threats is used later as part of the security vulnerabilities handling and secu-
rity updates.
In the next part of the thesis, we have dedicated a chapter to each of these
layers to discuss them in more detail.




















































































































































































































“If you know the enemy and know
yourself you need not fear the results




The increase in connectivity within vehicles is a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, it extends the vehicle’s functionalities and capabilities, but on the
other hand, it opens the door to several cybersecurity threats and makes the
vehicle a more attractive target for adversaries. The safety critical nature of
the vehicle requires the adoption of high security measures when developing
vehicular IT systems. A good understanding of security requirements, which
can be concluded from threat modeling, is a primary step towards contriv-
ing sufficient security countermeasures. Threat modeling helps to identify
and address most of the potential threats. In fact, threat identification would
likely reduce the life cycle as well as the cost of achieving security objectives
when it is considered during the design process. Furthermore, threat model-
ing provides relevant information about the attack vectors which threaten the
system. Such information can be used as a reference during the test process
to avoid the omitted threats.
Different researchers scrutinize threat modeling in the vehicular domain.
However, most of the research examines the potential threats only partially
by focusing on a certain aspect or by looking at threats which affect a par-
ticular sub-system. Practically speaking, the lack of a general threat model
within the vehicular domain makes threat analysis for the different subsys-
tems a resource-consuming task. Additionally, it increases the possibility of
inconsistencies between the interacting subsystems and causes redundancy
when defining the attack vectors.
In this chapter, we revise the existing vehicle-related threat modeling ef-
forts to develop a comprehensive threat model for the automotive domain.
Our model seeks to combine multiple approaches to arrive at a more com-
prehensive one. Within our model, we define various potential groups of
attackers, the nature of the attack, potential targets, and the security require-
ments for the vehicular domain. Then, we propose an abstract model which
can be used to classify all conceivable attacks against the vehicular domain.
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The abstract model is used as an aid to construct general attack trees [Sch99]
which illustrate attack vectors that threaten a particular vehicle sub-system.
Parts of this work have been published in [HNP16].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 4.1, we review
existing threat models in many IT domains including those which were pro-
posed for use with the vehicular domain. Then, we present our proposed
threat model in section 4.2 and explain its components. Section 4.2.6 presents
a general model to identify possible threats within the vehicle. In Section 4.4,
we used our general model to identify threats within an automated obstacle
avoidance use case. Finally, we present our conclusion in section 4.5.
4.1 Threat Modeling
Before we can explain what a threat model is, it is necessary to define some
basic principles that we will need.
Definition 4.1.1. Asset: “any system resource which needs to be protected”
[Shi07b].
Definition 4.1.2. Vulnerability: “A flaw or weakness in a system’s design, im-
plementation, or operation and management that could be exploited to violate the
system’s security policy” [Shi07b]
Definition 4.1.3. Threat: “A possible danger that might exploit a vulnerability”
[Shi07b]
Definition 4.1.4. Attack: Any malicious activity that attempts to collect, expose,
alter, disrupt, disable, degrade, destroy or gain unauthorized access to components
or the data exchanged during the communication by exploiting one or more vulner-
abilities [Isob].
Based on the previous definitions, we next provide the definition of threat
modeling:
Definition 4.1.5. Threat Modeling: A systematic process used to (a) analyze the
potential attackers, (b) identify the security vulnerabilities and threats in the
(sub-)system assets which could be exploited by an attacker and (c) provide sig-
nificant information that would help to safeguard the target (sub-)system against
attacks as well as to develop realistic and meaningful security requirements for
this (sub-)system.
Different approaches were used to develop threat modeling. Each of these
approaches focuses on a certain aspect on the system such as asset, attacker,
software, or system vulnerabilities [Sho08; Sho14]. Typically, threat mod-
eling has been implemented using one of these different approaches inde-
pendently. However, using more than one approach at a time has recently
started to become more common [Mea+18; Eng17]. Next we will look at each
of these approaches in turn and outline how they have been adopted in the
automotive domain.
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4.1.1 Attacker-Centric
This approach focuses on profiling attackers’ characteristics, goals, skills, and
motivations for targeting the studied system. By putting ourselves in the
shoes of the system attackers, we can understand their goals, which provides
us with valuable information about the most targeted assets in our system.
Consequently, this gives us a better understanding to implement appropriate
mitigation strategies for stopping these attackers.
Intel Threat Agent Library (TAL) [Cas07] is one example of attacker-
centric threat models. TAL standardized a list of 22 threat agents that pose
threats to IT systems. The classification of the agent is based on eight unique
attributes: the intent of the agent (whether to cause harm to the system or
not), the way the agent can access the assets, the agent’s main outcomes, the
limits which constrain the agent, the resources available to that agent to carry
out the attack, the skills that the attacker must have to target the system, the
agent’s objective, and the identity visibility of the threat agent. In addition,
for each of these agents, the model keeps an updated rating based on many
factors such as that agent’s recent attacking activities.
Intel’s Threat Agent Risk Assessment (TARA) [Ros09] is one of the main
examples of threat modeling methodology which consider the threat agent as
the origin of the security risk. TARA aims to narrow the field of all possible
attacks against the system and determine the most probable attacks based on
the TAL agent list and the rate which is given for each agent.
Within our previous work [HNP16], we were among the first authors to
attempt to concentrate on the attacker-centric method for the automotive do-
main by classifying attackers against the vehicular system and trying to de-
fine their different goals.
Other efforts also followed the same strategy and included the attacker in
their threat model, such as [Mon+18]. One of the most interesting efforts was
by Karahasanovic et al. [KKA17]; the authors proposed the adaptation of the
TARA threat model for the automotive system. To achieve that, they made
some changes to TARA to make it fit with the automotive industry’s needs.
4.1.2 Asset-Centric
This approach focuses on system assets to protect them from attackers. As-
sets, as stated in Definition. 4.1.1, can refer to anything valuable in the sys-
tem; this includes people, software, hardware, data, and so forth. The idea
behind this approach is that by profiling assets which are more attractive to
attackers and identifying their vulnerabilities, the organization can wisely
invest in protecting these assets and does not waste resources guarding non-
critical or unattractive assets.
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OC-
TAVE) [Car+07] is an example of asset-centric threat modeling methodology.
This approach consists of four phases: during the first phase, the organiza-
tion develops risk measurement criteria. In the second phase, the critical
assets are profiled and their security requirements are defined. Identifying
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the threats to these assets is accomplished within the third phase. Finally, an-
alyzing the risks related to the different assets and starting the development
of mitigation approaches take place during the fourth phase.
The Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Analysis (TVRA) model, which was
proposed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), is
one approach aims to support the security analysis in the vehicular domain
by focusing on the assets of the system [ERS10]. The TVRA process starts
by defining the security objectives and requirements of the system. Then, it
defines a list containing all the system’s assets is produced. For each asset in
the defined list, classification of all possible vulnerabilities and related threats
is carried out. The risks of threats are determined based on the likelihood of
the identified threats. Finally, countermeasures are proposed to reduce the
risks of the threats.
4.1.3 Vulnerability and Threat-Centric
Instead of considering all existing vulnerabilities in different assets, this ap-
proach aims to focus on the risky vulnerabilities which are most reachable
and desirable for attackers and to develop mitigation for them. Usually such
vulnerabilities exist within the assets that attackers can easily reach (i.e. at-
tack surfaces or attack entry points).
Skybox Threat–Centric Vulnerability Management (TCVM) [Sky] is an ex-
ample of such an approach. The TCVM process starts by profiling all existing
vulnerabilities in the system’s assets. The next step is identifying the exposed
and exploitable vulnerabilities from the existing ones based on context-based
prioritization and management techniques.
In the vehicular domain, many researchers have focused on identifying
the vulnerabilities of the various vehicular system assets. Checkoway et al.
[Che+11] have studied potential attack surfaces of the vehicle which could be
exploited by attackers externally. On the other hand, Koscher et al. [Kos+10]
investigated the attack surfaces on the underlying system structure. Both
demonstrated that attackers could leverage direct access to the CAN bus to
control various functions by exploiting vulnerabilities in the attack surface.
4.1.4 Software-Centric
This is also called design-centric. As the name suggests, this approach
focuses on security during the design phase of software components for
the system by identifying the threats which may expose each component.
Loren Kohnfelder and Praerit Garg at Microsoft proposed a software-centric
methodology for threat modeling called STRIDE [KG99], which stands for
the major six attack categories which threaten software products: Spoofing
of user identity, Tampering with data, Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege.
Winsen [Win17] proposed using STRIDE to identify all possible threats for
future autonomous and connected vehicles. Then, he analyses these threats
based on their severity and controllability.








FIGURE 4.1: An Attack Tree
4.1.5 Attack Trees
Threat analysis describes who the potential attacker is, what are the motiva-
tions behind an attack are, and which components could be threatened. De-
scribing how an attack could be executed is the mission of attack trees. An
attack tree is used to explain attacks in a tree structure as shown in Figure 4.1.
The root of the tree represents the attacker’s ultimate goal, while the interme-
diate nodes of the tree (sub-goals) define different stages of the attack. In the
case that a node in an attack tree requires all of its sub-goals to be achieved,
the sub-goals are combined by an AND branch. If a node requires that any
of its sub-goals be achieved, the sub-goals are combined by an OR branch.
Leaves nodes represent atomic attacks. Attack scenarios are generated from
the attack tree by traversing the tree in a depth-first method [MEL01]. Each
attack scenario will contain the minimum combination of leaves. In classical
attack tree models the attack chronology is disregarded. However, in many
cases, the success of an attack depends on the subsequent success of inter-
related attack steps. Arnold et al. [Arn+15] propose sequential AND- and
OR-gates (SAND, SOR) to handle sequential occurrence of attacks.
Attack trees have been used as a tool to illustrate the attack steps for indi-
vidual attack scenarios within the vehicular system [HNP16; Izo+16; NPR18].
Henniger et al. [Hen+09] proposed the use of an attack tree to identify attacks
and formalize the security requirements for the automotive’s on-board net-
works. Aijaz et al. [Aij+06] tried to create a reusable attack tree for V2V com-
munication threats. In our work, we are attempting to provide an abstract
model which helps to create a general attack tree for the entire vehicular do-
main.
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FIGURE 4.2: SAVTA threat model
4.2 SAVTA: A Comprehensive Vehicular Threat
Model
As we showed in the previous section, there are many threat modeling ap-
proaches that have been implemented within the vehicular domain. Using
one individual approach will not identify all the threats which could tar-
get the system and may lead to insufficient mitigation mechanisms [MHC14;
Mea+18]. For example, applying an asset-centric method requires the defi-
nition of the most critical assets which an attacker may target. However, the
type of attacker (whether she is internal such as the driver, or external) will
affect the selection of the potential attack surfaces from these assets.
Effective defense against threats requires addressing all existing security
flaws in the target system and identifying threats which exploit these vul-
nerabilities. In addition, it demands a good comprehension of the prospec-
tive attackers, their capabilities, and their objectives. To address all this, we
propose a threat model called SAVTA ( Software, Assets,Vulnerability and
Threat, and Attacker - centric method) which is a hybrid threat model that
adopts different existing approaches, bringing them together to create a com-
prehensive threat model for the vehicular system.
Figure 4.2 shows a general view of SAVTA threat model and how the
various approaches are interconnected with each other. This interaction re-
flects the threat model definition (i.e., Definition 4.1.5) which was given in
the previous section. Within a very complex environment such as a vehicle,
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different assets coexist. These assets usually suffer from several hidden vul-
nerabilities (as shown in Section 2.2). A motivated attacker could target each
of these assets by generating suitable conditions to exploit one or more of
these vulnerabilities. Exploiting any of these vulnerabilities always ends up
with violation of one or more of the security requirements.
The next steps are required during application of the SAVTA threat
model:
• We start the process by looking at what are we facing? we can address
this question by defining the Attacker Profile which includes informa-
tion about all possible attackers who may target the vehicular system.
We classify these attackers based on their motivation and the other re-
sources that they have or use to reach their goal.
• In addition, we have to answer the next main question what do we have?
the answer to this question should cover all the possible weak points
that we have in our system. We achieve that by identifying all the vehi-
cle’s Attackable assets; and for each of them, we have to identify all the
vulnerabilities and threats which affect it. We also need to define the
relations which interconnect the different assets. These relations are a
reflection of the functional requirements that the system needs to work.
By defining the relations between the different assets, we can point out
the assets on which all others depend for accomplishing the objective
(i.e., the centre of gravity [VCHP84; Ste+18]) as well as the possible at-
tack chain which leads to defining all attack surfaces
• The last question we need to answer is what do we need to secure these
assets? Security requirements need to be determined for each asset as
well as the relationship between them. Determining these requirements
involves defining the references for the security mitigation implemen-
tation against attacks that may threaten the assets, for example, the in-
tegrity requirement of the communication link which could be threat-
ened by a replay attack.
• After obtaining the previous information (it is important to note that
the three previous steps can be achieved in parallel and carried out by
different security teams), we start linking them together to create an
abstract model which can be used to classify and identify all the vul-
nerabilities, threats, and attacks.
Next, we discuss each of these steps in detail.
4.2.1 Attacker Profile
Different groups of attackers are attracted to attacking vehicles. These groups
range from the owner of the car to an expert hacker with sophisticated tools.
One of the most important steps towards securing the vehicular system is
knowing the goal of threat agents (i.e., attackers) as well as other properties
of each agent, such as motivation, skills, resources, and the accessibility of
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the attacked object, which can play a significant role in reaching this goal.
Understanding these properties for each attacker will enrich our knowledge
and improve our capabilities to define adequate mitigation. We start defin-
ing the possible threat agents for the automotive domain by looking at the
motivations behind the various attacks that we have faced:
• Falsification: An attacker (who could be the owner or the driver)
may wish to misrepresent actual vehicle information such as chang-
ing the achograph or odograph measurements to sell the car with a
false mileage reading or to defraud the operator and safety regulations
[And98].
• Illegal profit: An attacker could make a profit by stealing the vehicle or
by selling the attack capability to a different organization. Some attacks
could be driven by a commercial competitor of the target vehicle’s ven-
dor to sabotage their product and gain market share. Although there
is no published case which states that a particular attack has been car-
ried out based on industrial espionage, such motivation remains valid
since there is a history of industrial espionage between vehicle manu-
facturers [Mer97]. Such an attack requires the collusion of one or more
insiders in the targeted organization.
• Fun and vandalism: Revenge and vandalism could motivate some at-
tacks, as in the case of a dismissed employee who sought to punish his
ex-company by bricking cars sold by this company [Pou10].
• Research and test purposes: Attacks and penetration tests could be
performed by security experts or test teams. The attackers in this case
have benign motivations. They seek to discover security flaws in dif-
ferent components of the vehicle systems before they can be exploited
by third parties.
• Accidental: In some circumstances, an attack could happen without
any intention as a result of lack of security knowledge or the lack of
security tests being performed. A very well-known example of such
an attack is the one which faced Toyota Lexus vehicles in 2016 [Bog16]
and caused the GPS, climate control, front console radio systems USB,
Bluetooth, and other features to stop working suddenly after an up-
date to the Enform system. The company stated that the reason for that
malfunction was an unintentional reading of errant data, which include
traffic and weather data.
• Terrorist: Although there are still no real incidents in which such mo-
tivation has been proven to be behind the vehicle cyberattack; Richard
Clarke, Former U.S. National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure
Protection and Counterterrorism, hinted that the fatal crash of journal-
ist Michael Hastings’ Mercedes C250 coupe is consistent with a car cy-
berattack [Nim13].
• Overlap: Sometimes, multiple motives could lie behind a single attack.














FIGURE 4.3: The different assets of the automotive system
It is important to note that this list is not complete; other motivations can
be added whenever we discover a new attack. However, motivation alone
is not enough. An attacker needs sufficient resources to achieve his goals.
These resources include: skills, capabilities, technical equipment, and finan-
cial resources. The disparity in these resources could be used as a tool for
adding another level of classification of the attackers.
• Limited: Attackers in this group have limited financial resources and
insignificant knowledge about the vehicle architecture. Such attack-
ers lack the ability to use complicated tools. Regular car thieves, own-
ers who would like to install or replace a component within their cars,
an attacker who tampers with highway signals to gain a reputation in
their community, unsophisticated attackers (script kiddie) and others
are good examples of members of this group.
• Adequate: This group includes highly skilled experts who have ade-
quate tools and equipment to perform the attack. But, they may not
have sufficient financial resources to support them or to build bigger
teams and cause huge damage. However, the members of this group
could use their experience to obtain profit, such as by operating as
black-hat hackers. Mechanics, owners with good knowledge and se-
curity researchers belong to this group.
• Sophisticated: This group contains expert hackers with sophisticated
tools and huge financial support. A good example of this group are
the cybersecurity organizations (governmental and nongovernmental)
who have multiple members of the above group who work together.
Typically, massive financial support enables them to obtain the sophis-
ticated tools and attract experts. Some security research groups with
similar resources could be another example of this class.
4.2.2 Attackable Assets
Attackers may focus on different parts of the vehicle components. One of the
main steps of the SAVTA method is to determine these assets and identify
the vulnerabilities and attacks which threaten them. In autonomous vehicles
(see section 3.2), a software component in one ECU depends on the infor-
mation provided by a set of sensors or transmitted by other components in
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another ECU to perform its function. This function could be translated into a
physical action by different actuators or transmitted as an input for another
component in another ECU. For such a system and based on definition of
the asset (Definition 4.1.1), we can identify the next vehicle assets (see Fig-
ure 4.3) which may be targeted by the different threat agents and that need
to be protected:
• In-Vehicle Hardware: This includes the different ECUs distributed
across the vehicle. Reaching the in-vehicle hardware gives the attacker
the opportunity to replace any legitimate device with a malicious one,
or even to install new hardware which could cause havoc. Such hard-
ware devices may not be part of the vehicle. They could be third-party
devices plugged into the vehicle, such as the driver’s mobile phone
[Izo+16]. The smart sensors (e.g., camera, LiDAR, radar, etc.) within the
vehicle can be another hardware targets to various attacks such as cam-
era sensor blinding attacks [Pet+15], LiDAR blinding attacks [Shi+17],
and others. These attacks aim to prevent these sensors from working
properly, which has a serious safety impact on both autonomous and
normal vehicles.
• Software and Firmware: The massive amount of integrated software
in each vehicle and the different levels of security auditing between
the different vendors make the software more susceptible to attacks.
Attackers can benefit from software vulnerabilities to inject malicious
code, causing software components to behave maliciously or to stop
the application and prevent the vehicle from achieving certain func-
tionalities. The firmware which controls the ECU could be a target for
various attacks; some attackers could tamper with the ECU firmware
to achieve superior performance [WA15]. A malicious update of one
application or of internal parts of the firmware could open the door for
the attacker to inflict damage to the vehicle.
• Data: The huge amount of data exchanged, the architecture of the in-
vehicle network used to transfer this data, and the unsophisticated
hardware (i.e., ECU) used to store it make data a very attractive as-
set for security attacks. Attackers can target data stored in some ECUs;
this data could be the execution code of the applications, the firmware
drivers, crypto private keys, digital certificates, or private vehicle and
driver activities (e.g., vehicle location, navigation destination, etc.). Ex-
tracting such data may occur by targeting the hardware through side
channel attacks, or by targeting one malicious software component or
the OS itself, especially if that OS does not store the data properly with
strict access restrictions. Alternatively, attackers could threaten trans-
mitted wired/wireless data within the vehicle.
a) In-vehicle data exchanged between different components or be-
tween one component and its sensors or actuators. Attacking this
data depends on the existence of vulnerabilities in the internal net-
work protocols. Spoofing, altering, or drooping the transferred
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data between the on-board system and different sensors or actua-
tors are examples of attacks against such data [Rou+10].
b) Data transferred between the vehicle and the external world; such
as V2V communication data, V2I communication data, etc. This
data could be targeted after it is received by the sensors; in this
case, it is treated as in-vehicle exchanged data. In other cases,
the data can be infected by different attacks (such as spoofing and
emitting false data) before it has been revived by sensors [Pet+15].
Finally, the data could be targeted before it leaves its source.
• Surrounding infrastructure: Another critical asset which could be tar-
geted by attacks is the surrounding environment of the vehicle. Al-
though the surrounding environment, such as other vehicles, roadside
units (RSUs), etc., is considered external to the in-vehicle system, it has
a direct impact on the security of the in-vehicle system since it is the
data source for sensors and V2X. Note that the under-study in-vehicle
systems (or the vehicle as a unit) is considered external for other vehi-
cles moving on the same road or for road infrastructure. Thus, the sur-
rounding environment can be studied similarly to in-vehicle systems by
looking at its threat agents as well as its assets (i.e., hardware, software
and framework, data). Many security attacks can be launched against
the surrounding infrastructure. A typical example of such an attack is
adding stickers to traffic signs [Eyk+18]. Another example is modifi-
cations to electronic road signs, such as “Zombies Ahead”, where an
attacker figured out how to alter the text on electronic road signs to cre-
ate warnings of a zombie attack. Even such a ridiculous attack could
create public safety issues for drivers on the roadway [Olo14].
We need to define a list of all these assets for each subsystem within the vehi-
cle. The definition of these assets depends on the security analysis and how
it sees the system as well as how much information it has about the different
subsystems. Assets can be defined in a very abstract way by looking at each
functionality of the system as a black box which will be mapped in a hard-
ware platform and will intercommunicate with other functionalities using
very generic network architecture. From such a viewpoint, the transmitted
data will reflect the functional relationship between the different functionali-
ties. A detailed overview can be achieved if the information about the software
components as well as the actual network architecture is available. This de-
tailed information can be derived from the abstract view by decomposing
each defined functionality into its actual software components, RTE compo-
nents, devices drivers, protocols, etc. Many tools can be used to visually
represent the different assets in the system in the different ways; one exam-
ple of such tools could be flow diagrams (DFDs) [Sho14, p. 44-47]. Any other
equivalent type of diagram can also be used. Figure 4.3 shows one represen-
tation of the different system assets.
The main point here is to distinguish between the local (e.g., functionali-
ties, sensors, actuators inside the vehicle) and external domains (e.g., nearby
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TABLE 4.1: Mapping STRIDE with CIA3 security attributes.
STRIDE Security attribute (CIA3) Explanation
Spoofing Identity Authenticity pretend to be someone else
Tampering with Data Integrity improper assets alterations
Repudiation Non-Repudiation trackless
Information Disclosure Confidentiality to access to confidential data
Denial of Service Availability disable or delay accessing an asset
Elevation of Privilege Authorization perform unauthorized actions
vehicles, RSUs, etc.). Functionalities (or components) which have relation-
ships with external domains are usually more attractive targets and may
represent reachable attack entry points for attackers because they are more
accessible than others.
4.2.3 Attack Effects
The relationship between the different assets plays the main role in determin-
ing the effect of the attack on a specific component. For this contribution, we
classify attacks based on their effect:
• Limited attack: The ultimate target of some attacks could be a single
part of the vehicle. The effect of such attacks will remain limited to the
attacked ECU(s) and not propagate any further. The targeted system
will define the jeopardy level of the attack.
• Stepping stone attack: The attack can start by compromising one com-
ponent or subsystem. Later, the attacker uses this subsystem as an at-
tack surface to plague all related subsystems. The same process can be
repeated for the newly infected components. Koscher et al. [Kos+10]
showed that an attacker who can control one ECU is able to attack other
connected ECUs.
4.2.4 Security Requirements
For each one of the defined assets, a set of security requirement need to be
checked. These requirements are reflection of the various threat which may
threaten that assets. Thus, for each asset, we check weather it suffers from
one or more of the STRIDE model components. As we can see in Table 4.1,
each one of STRIDE component violate one security attributes. CIA3 (an ex-
tension of CIA with Authorization and Authenticity) attributes used as pos-
sible security requirements for each asset.
For each of the defined assets, a set of security requirements needs to be
checked. These requirements are a reflection of the various threats which
may threaten that asset. Thus, we check whether each asset suffers from one
or more of the STRIDE model components. As we can see in Table 4.1, each
of the STRIDE components violates one of the security attributes. CIA3 (an
extension of CIA with Authorization and Authenticity) attributes are used as
a source to determine the security requirements for each asset.
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Integrity: providing integrity within vehicular systems is composed of:
• Providing hardware integrity to prevent and detect any hardware com-
ponent fraud.
• Providing framework and software integrity to ensure that only trusted
code can be run and to prevent infected code and malware from run-
ning.
• Providing data integrity to safeguard against any modifications to data
during a transaction.
Authentication: is a special type of integrity which addresses the integrity
of the data origin. In the case of transmitted data, authentication is about
knowing who is communicating with whom. Authentication is essential to
support authorization.
Authorization: determines whether a certain component is allowed to ac-
cess or communicate a certain resource (i.e., who should talk to whom). Ap-
proving the request of that component depends on the authentication of the
requester as well as the access control rules for the requested resource.
Confidentiality and Privacy: while providing authentication for the ex-
changed messages in the vehicular domain is vital, providing confidentiality
is often less important. For example, there is no critical reason to encrypt
all the messages exchanged between the different ECUs inside the vehicle.
Enforcing confidentiality for the exchanged data should not be mainly to
prevent vehicle identification detection. The ability to identify the vehicle
is feasible already by different mechanisms without the need to snoop on ex-
changed messages (such as identifying the vehicle by color, number plate,
etc.) The primary goals should be preventing a leak of the driver’s critical
data (such as driver behavior, previous location) as well as guaranteeing that
any observer is unable to efficiently link different messages coming from the
same source. In some scenarios, confidentiality is required; for example, leav-
ing valuable stored information (e.g., private keys) without any confidential-
ity protection may leave the entire vehicle security at stake if an attacker is
able to extract this data.
Availability: refers to the fact that the assets must be available even if the
system is under attack. Availability is required particularly for safety-related
applications which are integrated into the vehicle. Losing the availability
of such applications may have serious consequences, and even threaten the
lives of passengers. This property is a common concern of both safety and
security, but they address it differently. While safety handles unintentional
events which may lead to loss of availability, security focuses on intentional
attacks.
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4.2.5 Attack Accessibility
The way in which threat agents can exploit a vulnerability in any one of the
aforementioned assets is very important for determining the applicability of
the attack and proposing the right mitigation against it. We have specified
the following three possible cases:
• Direct access: Some attacks require direct (physical) access by the threat
agent to the target vehicle. Replacing the hardware component or con-
necting a malicious third party to the in-vehicle network is an example
of such attacks. Such direct access could be achieved while a vehicle
is parked. In such circumstances, the attackers cannot access the in-
vehicle system, but may still be able (for example) to attach an external
device to the vehicle such as a GPS device to track the vehicle later, or to
target the vehicle’s immobilizer and electronic locks [VGE15]. In some
cases, taking the car to the service station for a regular check could be-
come an avenue for direct access by attackers. In such cases, an attacker
has full access to the in-vehicle system and could take advantage of ex-
isting physical interfaces (e.g., OBD-II port, USB port, and others) to
gain direct access to the internal network. The owner or the driver has
the advantage of log inside the vehicle for an unlimited time.
• Remote access: Other attacks do not require any direct access to the
target vehicle. Attackers could target the vehicle remotely. Such at-
tacks take advantage of the integrated wireless features of modern cars.
These features include Bluetooth, a cellular connection, wireless tire
pressure monitoring, etc. Attackers need to be within a particular dis-
tance of the targeted vehicle; this distance is based on the technology
which used to attack the vehicle, e.g., 40 meters for wireless commu-
nication. Long-range wireless technologies give the attacker the ability
to target the system from very far away, as in the case of using the en-
tertainment system to play a song laced with malware which is able to
emit malicious messages to the CAN bus [Kos+10].
• Mixed access: Direct access to the vehicle could be a means to intro-
duce remote attacks. Indeed, some attackers with rapid direct access to
the vehicle may install devices inside the vehicle (such as a USB cover,
malicious DVD, malicious component connected via OBDII port, etc.)
or outside it (communication sniffing devices). Later, they can employ
those parasitic devices to target the vehicle remotely. Attackers may
use other people to install these devices, such as a valet who parks the
victim’s car, a mechanic at a service station [Kos+10], and so on.
4.2.6 Abstract Model
In this subsection, we demonstrate how to apply the last step of adopting the
SAVTA threat model. The outcome of this step is classification of as many
known threats against vehicular systems as possible. Such a classification



























FIGURE 4.4: SAVTA method to identify and classify threats and
links them to general attack trees
could reduce redundancy and inconsistency when applying defense tech-
niques against homogeneous threats. In addition, it provides the basis for
defining generic attack trees. Three layers were used to identify and classify
threats (see Figure 4.4):
• Target assets: The first layer of the model contains all the (sub)system
assets (e.g., hardware, software and firmware, data, or surrounding in-
frastructure). Within each of these assets, there are different vulnerabil-
ities which could be targeted by motivated attackers.
• Requirements violation: The exploitation of an existing vulnerability in
any asset will lead to a violation of one or more of the security require-
ments (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, availability, authorization, and au-
thentication). We can further identify and classify potential threats
based on the violated requirement(s).
• Accessibility: Eventually, the way of accessing the assets (i.e., remote,
direct, or mixed access) in order to exploit a specific vulnerability is
used as the last level for compartmentalization.
Applying this model to the entire vehicle system will identify all the known
threats. For each asset a minimum list of 15 general threats needs to be
checked. Each of these threats is used as the root of a general attack tree
which explains how an attacker could exploit a defined vulnerability. For
example, disabling one of vehicle sensors is a root for general attack trees.
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TABLE 4.2: Factors for calculating the attack difficulty based on
[Isoc; Isoa]
Factor Description
Elapsed Time The required time to identify a vulnerability in one
asset and exploit it
Expertise The level of attacker expertise (i.e. layman, proficient,
expert, or collaboration of many experts)
Opportunity the window of opportunity to perform the attack
Equipment
and tools
The type of equipment and tools which is required to
identify and exploit a vulnerability
Disabling such a sensor requires the existence of a specific vulnerability in
that sensor which could prevent it from functioning if it is exploited.
Building the attack tree will help to illustrate attack vectors which
threaten particular vehicle (sub)systems. These trees will turn into distinct
ones, gradually reflecting the various studied subsystems. The accomplish-
ment of one tree could open the door to fulfillment of other trees, as we ex-
plained within the stepping-stone attack. However, general attack trees seem
to be indispensable for avoiding redundancy and interference between the
high number of integrated sub-systems within the vehicle. The general trees
will be derived from threats which were identified by our proposed threat
model.
4.3 Risk Analysis
Attack trees have been used to evaluate the security risk to the system and
calculate the difficulty and the probability of a successful attack. Determin-
ing the attack probability (i.e. likelihood) is related to the difficulty of iden-
tifying and exploiting attack scenarios. The great difficulty in performing
an attack leads to a low probability of this attack occurring. This difficultly
is dependent on many aspects (see Table 4.2) such as the time required for
an attack, the desired attack tools, knowledge of system, and so forth [Isoc;
Isoa; Hen+09]. However, regarding the risk analysis within the vehicular do-
main, calculation of the probability of potential attacks based on associating
numeric values with each level of these factors may need to be reconsidered.
Elapsed time, for example, has a different effect in terms of the method of
carrying out the attack (whether it is a remote attack or one involving direct
access to the vehicle). Moreover, the overlap between expertise and tools em-
ployed also has different effects. Even inexpert attackers can launch an attack
using sophisticated tools. Eventually, stepping-stone attacks should be con-
sidered during calculation of the probability of an attack. An attack might
be unlikely, but achieving one attack goal in a different subsystem could in-
crease its probability. For example, compromising the internal network of the
vehicle could have a high difficulty level. However, the same attack become













FIGURE 4.5: Hardware components and surrounding infras-
tructure in Automated Obstacle Avoidance use case
easier if we consider malicious devices attached by a valet while cleaning the
car.
Furthermore, the motivation behind the attack should be considered
when calculating the attack severity. The same attack could have varying
results. Consider the following three attacks: (1) the driver re-flashes the
ECU firmware (or replaces it with another type) to give the vehicle a more
powerful performance. (2) A company which uses malicious firmware in one
ECU to degrade the performance of a vehicle component or even lead it to
produce misleading results intentionally (e.g., Volkswagen’s emissions scan-
dal [Gui+16]). And (3), a hacker or terrorist who manages to compromise
the firmware of an ECU to steal the driver’s information or to cause an ac-
cident. In all three cases, the attack is the same (i.e., compromising the ECU
firmware) while the motivation and severity are different.
Finally, using risk assessment to identify the riskiest (sub)system and ap-
ply mitigation for that specific (sub)system is not enough to secure the vehi-
cle. Many authors have argued that mitigating all the system vulnerabilities
may involve significant costs, and therefore, particular vulnerabilities which
have a low risk should be ignored, with the system accepting that risk. In
any case, an attacker needs only one security vulnerability to break the entire
system. Therefore, attackers will ignore highly protected (sub)systems and
move to others which are not protected. Thus, the evaluation of the attack
should play a role in determining the reaction to it but not whether or not we
should mitigate it.
4.4 Use Case: Automated Obstacle Avoidance
We used our abstract model to identify the potential threats within the auto-
mated obstacle avoidance use case. Firstly, we need to define all components
which could include vulnerabilities. We concentrate on the hardware com-
ponents which are used within our use case. LiDAR, Camera, Radar, and
GPS are possible (hardware) attack surfaces which can be used to target the
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vehicle (see Figure 4.5). To keep the analysis simple, we decide to focus on
one of these hardware components, which is the camera in this case. In the
same time, we did not consider the software component which processes the
captured image or the ECU where this component is mapped.
As we have described in section 4.2.6, after choosing an asset, we need to
check the security requirements of the CIA3 that could be violated by attack-
ers directly or remotely when they target the selected asset. For the camera,
we found that Integrity and Availability are the most targeted requirements.
Attackers can disable the camera remotely (G1) using different kinds of at-
tacks such as a blinding attack (G1.1) or jamming attack (G1.2) as illustrated in
[Pet+15]. The blinding attack can be performed by placing an LED device in
a suitable place on the road (G1.1.1) and using this device to emit intense light
into the camera (G1.1.2). This overexposed light prevents the camera from de-
tecting the objects on the road. Performing such attacks requires an adequate
level of skills and resources. The available evidences showed that security
experts had performed such attack for research purposes. Also, disabling the
camera can occur directly by covering the camera with dark tape (G1.3) or
even wrecking it (G1.4). Confusing the functionality of the camera (G2) could
be another goal of the attacker, which could happen by damaging its auto
control system (G2.1). Such an attack does not require any sophisticated tools
or skills. At the same time, it is easy to be detected.
Another case which could affect the integrity of the camera data is when
the captured objects, such as road signs, traffic lights, and so forth, are man-
gled or removed. These components belong to the surrounding environment.
We concentrate on the road signs component only. We determine the secu-
rity requirements which could be violated as a result of attacks against these
signs. The most common attacks which target road signs are removing (G3.1)
or distorting them (G3.2) as in [Eyk+17]. Car thieves could perform such at-
tacks. Some attackers could try to change the information on the signs (G4.1)
or even install new fake signs (G4.2). Another exciting attack is the one in
which an attacker used a drone equipped with an image projector to project
fake road signs (G4.3) as explained in [Nas+19].
Figure 4.6 shows the general attack tree for the camera component and
the threat agents who may target it based on the abstract model and the anal-
ysis that we performed. Table 4.3 contains the meaning for each node of our
attack tree. The figure also shows how the manipulation of the surrounding
infrastructures has a direct effect on the functionality of different components
in our use case. As a result of such attacks, the camera will deliver incor-
rect information to the perception module, which leads to improper plan-
ning and motions. The wrong planning process may cause the car to drive to
unwanted places; for example, an area where the thief is waiting.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we created a comprehensive threat model based on the exist-
ing vehicle-related threat modeling efforts. The model tries to answer three
main questions: (1) what are we facing? By defining threat agents who may
4.5. Summary 67
TABLE 4.3: Notations and meanings of nodes
Notion Meaning Notion Meaning
G1 Disabling the camera G2 Confusing proper function of
the camera
G1.1 Blinding the camera [Pet+15] G1.2 Jamming Attack [Pet+15]
G1.1.1 Placing a LED device G1.1.2 Emitting a strong light to the
camera
G1.3 Covering the camera with tape G1.4 Breaking the camera
G2.1 Confusing the auto controls of
the camera
G3 Disabling road signs
G3.1 Removing the road sign totally G3.2 Distorting the road sign
[Eyk+17]
G4 Manipulating the road signs G4.1 Changing the data on the road
sign
G4.2 Installing a fake sign G4.3 Projecting images of fake road
signs [Nas+19]
target the vehicle system and their motivation and tools. (2) What do we
have? By classifying the different assets (e.g., hardware, software) and their
possible threats. And (3) what do we need? By defining the security require-
ments of the defined assets.
Our model classifies and identifies the threats based on the targeted as-
sets; the violated security requirements and the accessibility of the threats.
General attack trees can be linked to each of the identified threats. We ex-
plored the automated obstacle avoidance use case while trying to classify the
potential threats against it, based on our model.

























































































































































































































The heterogeneous nature of vehicle software components (varying in their
levels of security auditing) and network architecture (many bus systems in-
terconnecting with each other) have made the vehicle an attractive target
for many attacks, as we have already discussed in Chapter 2. Communica-
tions within this heterogeneous and distributed environment which adhere
to safety-critical and secure systems guidelines imply the formulation of a
comprehensive and consistent communications policy.
Creating this policy is a complex, error-prone and labor-intensive task,
requiring detailed knowledge of possible communication paths between all
possible components within the system. For this reason, it is often skipped,
trusting that each component will behave as intended and interact only with
its peers. Traditional testing provides sufficient confidence to enable certi-
fication. Nevertheless, the existing process ignores malicious interference,
whereby an adversary compromises a low-criticality process or subsystem
and uses that to attack other subsystems, effectively taking over the vehicle.
In this chapter, we focus on fulfilling the security requirements (which
were described in Chapter 4) to ensure the resilience of a vehicle system by
securing the in-vehicle communication between the different software com-
ponents mapped to various ECUs. To achieve this, (1) we propose a frame-
work to build a secure communication policy. (2) We also propose a security
module which acts as a connection policy checker, vetting incoming and out-
going communications and enforcing the distributed security policy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we present
the challenges of developing a secure communication policy. The proposed
policy framework and how it supports the software components updates are
explained in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 details the proposed security module
which is used to evaluate and enforce the developed security policy. The use
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of the secure module to set up secure communication for in-vehicle commu-
nications is detailed in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, we provide some measure-
ments for evaluating our proposed secure module. Finally, we discuss our
findings in Section 5.6.
Parts of this work have been published in [Ham+16; HP15; HNP17;
PH15a; HP17]
5.1 Policy Development: Challenges
The correct definition of the security policy of each vehicular software com-
ponent is a prerequisite for containing attacks against that component and
preserving the security of the in-vehicle network. The security policy deter-
mines which actions can be performed by that component and which cannot.
For example, it states which communications are authorized, how much of
a resource can be consumed, which objects can be accessed, and so forth. In
this chapter, we focus only on developing a security policy which rules the
communication and access control for the different components. Defining
such a policy is one of the main challenges for securing in-vehicle commu-
nications. It is a labor-intensive, challenging, and error-prone process, es-
pecially if we attempt to develop it during the final integration phases of a
development process. It is challenging for multiple reasons:
• The high number of integrated ECUs in the vehicle and the complex-
ity of the communication between the different applications on these
ECUs. This may lead to configuration faults [Avi+04] due to setting of
incorrect parameters which could enable unauthorized communication
to happen.
• Late definition of security parameters for the different connections is
very risky, because the chosen security parameters could violate the
initial requirements of applications which were specified during the de-
sign phase.
• Moreover, vehicular system updates make the maintenance of the ex-
isting security policy labor-intensive and prone to errors. Each modifi-
cation to the system (such as the addition of new functionality, moving
a component from one ECU to another, or changing security parame-
ters) requires updating the existing access control lists which can lead
to reconfiguration faults [Avi+04]. Such faults may prevent authorized
communication or allow unauthorized communications between soft-
ware components.
5.2 Proposed Policy Development Framework
Our approach in addressing this challenge is to build the security policy
gradually by integrating it throughout the design and life cycle of software






































FIGURE 5.1: The three tiers of the proposed system architecture
model to develop a secure communication policy
components. In doing so, the security policy will adapt to the changing cir-
cumstances during development, integration, and maintenance. Moreover,
we will preserve the intentions of the initial designer and ensure the require-
ments of the current operational platform. We achieve this by ensuring the
integrity of security requirements exchanged between the different parties
during the various development phases. Policy-based communications al-
low the system to decouple the rules that govern an application’s behavior
from its functionality. This provides the flexibility to change the application-
governed behavior without the need to re-code the system functionality after
changes.
To achieve this, a system architecture model with three tiers is proposed.
The tiers of this model reflect the life-cycle phases of software develop-
ment based on the V-model and the SAE J3061 (Cybersecurity Guidebook for
Cyber-Physical Automotive Systems). Our system model is based on similar
frameworks which were used for some other goals, e.g., to decrease the com-
plexity of automotive and embedded system software development [Bro06b;
Bro+09; Fei+09; Thy+10], or to specify and maintain the timing constraints
for different vehicle subsystems, as in [Sch11]. Within each tier there are dif-
ferent stakeholders and actors with different responsibilities, who interact
and collaborate. Here are the three tiers:
• Functional Tier: Within this tier, all system functions are stated as black
boxes within their defined boundaries. Here we have two boundaries;
one represents the vehicle and the other represents every thing else.
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The first step to define actual communication is by determining the in-
teractions (or so-called logical interconnections) between these functions
within the same vehicle, as well as their interaction with the outside
environment (e.g., some functionalities may require data from the sur-
rounding infrastructure or transmit some data to the outside world).
Each interaction between any two functions can be defined as:
f1(s) : sRsec,R f un ; s ∈ S f2 ; f1, f2 ∈ F (5.1)
with s as an identical service required by the first function ( f1) and pro-
vided by the other (i.e., f2). S f2 represents a set of all the services pro-
vided by ( f2).
The main actor in this stage is the function designer (FD), who could
represent the OEM. The FD is responsible for specifying the security
requirements Rsec which need to be satisfied for each defined logical in-
terconnection regardless of what the actual implementation of the link
and the security mechanism might look like. Rsec may contain more
than one security parameter, and in such a case, logical operators (e.g.,
&&, ‖, etc.) are used to determine the combination of required param-
eters. For example, consider the case in which the FD states the need
for (I)ntegrity and (C)onfidentiality for a certain logical interconnection.
In such a case, we can express that as:
f1(s) : s{I&&C}; s ∈ S f2 (5.2)
In addition, FD can specify other requirements, such as functional re-
quirements R f un, for the defined link. One example of such require-
ments could be the maximum allowed time for the end-to-end latency.
Since we consider using a partially automated V-Model-like develop-
ment process [Res+14], we assume that functional requirements are for-
mulated at the beginning of the development process. The output of
this tier should be a functional system architecture which determines all
the logical interactions among the different functional blocks, includ-
ing the services over which they interact as well as the various require-
ments for each interaction.
• Component Tier: This tier represents how each stated function is de-
signed and developed. Every function in the vehicle is implemented
through one or more interacting software components, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.1 (cf. [Sch+17]). Each software component encapsulates different
software methods which provide its behavior and expose well-defined
service interfaces.
We assume that a software component can be instantiated multiple
times to support different functions, for example library components
for network access. (see SWC3 and SWC1 in Figure 5.1). The differ-
ent components are implemented transparently from the actual ECU in
which they will be integrated. In this level, the logical communication
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which is derived from the functionality tier becomes more detailed. The
services that the function requires and provides are linked to the exact
software component which ensures or requires these services. More-
over, some implementation of security mitigation occurs in these tiers
either as independent components which will be used later during the
next tier or as part of the software component itself (e.g., validating the
value of different input parameters for a certain software component).
The main actor in this tier is the software developer, which could be
Tier 1 suppliers or a third-party company which is used by a Tier 1 sup-
plier to outsource the development of the software components. Each
Tier 1 supplier transfers the implementation of the functionality back to
the OEM, along with all information related to the implemented com-
ponents and the communication relations between them.
• Integration Tier: This tier represents the final stage of system develop-
ment, during which developed function is mapped to the actual ECUs
and the logical interaction translated to actual communication between
two software components. One function can be distributed to multiple
ECUs so that software components of the same function must commu-
nicate over the network (cf. Figure 5.1). In other cases, two functions
could be mapped to the same ECU so that software components from
different functions communicate internally.
Eventually, when mapping the software architecture to a distributed
system of ECUs, additional security requirements arise due to the need
to communicate over the network. At this point in the design stage, se-
curity requirements will again be refined and annotated to the service
interfaces. The same security requirement for two different logical in-
terconnections can be ended with two different security methods based
on the security proxy used (e.g., IPsec and capability passed). The OEM
is responsible for performing the different integration phases.
These tiers ensure system composability, which provides the system in-
tegrator with several degrees of freedom for mapping software components
from the processing chain to the available ECUs to satisfy different system
requirements, e.g. by mapping a component to a remote ECU because of the
restricted memory in the local ECU. Moreover, distributing the functional
blocks over several ECUs due to the assumed transparent communication
mechanisms requires an instantiation of network proxy components during
the system integration process to enable transparent communication between
network components.
To explain how this security framework could be applied, we revisit our
use case of automated obstacle avoidance, which was explained in Section
3.2. The functional system architecture of the use case is displayed in Fig-
ure 5.2, where we can see the logical communication between the different
functions. In order to generate trajectories for obstacle evasion, the vehicle
must acquire and pre-process sensor data (three-dimensional point clouds in
the case of LiDAR scanners). Pre-processing comprises filter and segmenta-
tion algorithms, ensuring that only relevant data is used to model the static
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FIGURE 5.2: Exemplary functional system architecture of the
automated obstetrical avoidance use case showing the different
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FIGURE 5.3: Software components of use case functions and
platform mapping
environment. In the example application, the environment model consists of
occupancy grid maps, which provide a map of the drivable and non-drivable
areas around the vehicle. From these grid maps, a target pose can be gener-
ated for the vehicle. A trajectory towards this target pose is planned through
the drivable areas of the environment. This trajectory provides reference val-
ues and set-points for the control algorithms which are responsible for ma-
neuvering the vehicle safely through the static environment.
Figure 5.3 shows an extract from the functional processing chain of re-
quired software components, as well as a possible distribution of software
components over several ECUs for the application at hand. During im-
plementation, when software architecture is developed, the generic func-
tional (or logical) interfaces are mapped to actual service interfaces which
connect the different software components (cf. Figure 5.3). Required and
provided services are specified and security requirements which arise from
implementation-specific considerations can be attributed to the service inter-
faces.
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LISTING 5.1: SEM services and required secuirity levels.
func t ion SEM {
s e r v i c e s {
provides srv_grid_layer_updated {
s e c u r i t y _ l e v e l == I n t e g r i t y ;
}
r e q u r i e s srv_pc_segmented {




LISTING 5.2: TPG required service.
func t ion TPG {
component targe t_pose_genera tor {
s e r v i c e s {
r e q u i r e s srv_grid_layer_updated {
s e c u r i t y _ l e v e l == I n t e g r i t y ;





In our example, the process for the development of the environment-
perception processing chain would look as follows: The designer of the func-
tion for Static Environment Modeling (SEM) specifies that the function requires
a service from Sensor Data Preprocessing (SDP) to receive segmented point
clouds and provides a environment model over a service to Target Pose Gen-
eration (TPG) (cf. Listing 5.1).
In the same manner, the designer of Target Pose Genera-
tion (TPG) functionality states that the function requires a service
("srv_grid_layer_updated") (cf. Listing 5.2). It is important to note that
at this stage the designer is not concerned about how the two ends of any
connection will be mapped or the type of bus system over which the data
will be exchanged. Moreover, the designer could determine the time con-
straints of the connection by specifying the maximum acceptable latencies
(e.g., in this case maximum latency of 2 ms), as presented in [Hol+]. After
having specified the functional dependencies, the actual implementation of
the components can be annotated in the same way, providing information
about which component provides and requires which services.
With the implementation under discussion, the software architecture can
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LISTING 5.3: TPG communication policy after the final integra-
tion phase.
func t ion TPG {
component targe t_pose_genera tor {
s e r v i c e s {
r e q u i r e s srv_grid_layer_updated {
s e c u r i t y _ l e v e l == I n t e g r i t y ;
s e c u r i t y _ p r o t o c o l AH;
b i t r a t e y ;
ECUs {















then be mapped to different ECUs during the integration process. The in-
tegrator of a specific functionality takes the designer’s policy for each com-
ponent to check the required services for this component and search for the
components that provide these services, which must be integrated. The inte-
grator can access this information from a local repository which contains all
the related-platform properties of the integrated components. The integra-
tion process may occur in multiple intermediate phases, during which more
details could be added to the policy. At the end of these sub-phases, the
logical and inter-component connections which were defined in the design
phase are translated to actual communication mechanisms available on the
platform. These include Inter Process Communication (IPC) mechanisms or
network communication via a network proxy as shown in Figure 5.3.
In the given example, the integrator of the components implementing the
TPG functionality updates the communication policy between TPG and GLS
by adding the actual location (i.e., IP address and port numbers) of both com-
ponents in the platforms. Moreover, knowledge of the components’ mapping
gives the integrator the ability to adjust the connection and specify the secu-
rity protocol which is supported by the link (see Listing 5.3).
We note here that the local parameters (e.g., local IP, local port, etc.) refer
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FIGURE 5.4: a: Trust relation between two entities, b : Trust
management module between the different entities.
to the ECU where the request will later be evaluated (i.e., where the compo-
nent was mapped).
5.2.1 Maintaining Policy Provenance
We have seen how the communication policy can be defined at the design
level in an abstract way, and how policy parameters are modified incremen-
tally during implementation. In such a hierarchy, the refined communication
policy parameters need to be consistent with the existing ones from the previ-
ous phases. Therefore, ensuring the provenance of the communication policy
during policy refinement is a crucial goal [Che11].
We construct a trust management module based on a Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) to build trust relations which provide delegation between the
multiple entities who participate in developing the communication policy
(e.g., a functionality designer (FD), Integrator (Int), etc).
Each one of these entities is identified by a public and a secret key. The
trust relation is explained in Figure 5.4-a, where the trustor entity authorizes
a trustee entity under specific conditions. The conditions could be a set of
pairs separated by logical operations (i.e., &&, ‖). Each pair represents a
defined communication variable and its desired value, with operators such
as≤,≥, <, >, 6=, or == used to express the relationship between each variable
and its value. The security credential could be derived from the trust relation
as in Listing 5.4.
The security credential, which states the public keys of the trustor and
trustee, as well as the conditions, is signed by the secret key of the trustor
entity to ensure the policy integrity. The goal of creating such a policy is
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LISTING 5.4: Security credential derived from trust relation.
Trustor : TrustorPK
Trustee : TrusteePK
Condition : { var 1 == val 1 && var 2 > val 2 }
S ignature : Signed with TrustorSK
different than the purpose of a certificate [Hou+02]. A certificate only au-
thenticates the owner’s key; it does not prove its trustworthiness.
Figure 5.4-b illustrates trust and delegation between the different entities.
For example, in the vehicular domain, an OEM starts the production of a spe-
cific vehicle model (e.g., Vxy), requiring a set of functionalities. Each designer
of these functionalities is authorized to provide its functionality. Whenever
a connection is required between components in different functionalities, a
chain of trust is established between the two functionality designers. Later,
the trust is passed to the integrators, applications, and the platform where the
applications run. By building this trust we create a chain of trust between the
requester and trusted root which is defined in the local policy of the receiver.
The receiver authorizes the request only if a trust path between the requester
and its trusted root can be found.
5.2.2 Updating a Component Scenario
In the previous section, we showed how the creation of the security policy
could take place in the lab during the production of the vehicle. However,
in-field updates are becoming ever more popular, as demonstrated by the re-
cent over-the-air updates Tesla cars and others [Res+14]. Regarding security,
the platform should thus ensure the integration of new components without
putting the vehicle at a risk of violating the system requirements or creating a
vulnerability regarding communication and access control rules. We propose
an integration procedure, as shown in Figure 5.5.
The platform receives a application description package which contains
the new software component, a signed hash value of the software component
which ensures the authenticity and the code integrity of the application, the
design-level credentials, and integration specifications which specify where
the component should be mapped. The system’s middleware verifies the re-
ceived software component then checks the required services that the new
component requires (based on the design-level credentials) and determines
whether the required application is mapped to the same platform or to a re-
mote platform. The integrator component provides an identity for the new
application and publishes its information (public key, service name, hosted
ECU, etc.) via a service name repository. Each ECU contains a service name
repository to provide the information about the other services and to broad-
cast the information of the newly added component to keep the other repos-
itories updated. Regarding the platform where the remote application was
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FIGURE 5.5: Communication policy during updating/in-
stalling an existing/a new component.
mapped, the integration component provides the application with the capa-
bility to communicate with local applications or with a proxy with required
credentials to use the network as we will explain in the next section.
5.3 Distributed Security Module
The distributed nature of a vehicular E/E system’s components makes the
use of single ECU for evaluating the communications credentials and enforc-
ing the communication policy infeasible. Therefore, we aim to enforce com-
munication policy in a distributed manner by adopting a distributed firewall
technique (cf. [Ioa+00]) so that we equip each ECU with its own security
module which acts as a connection ingress policy checker by vetting incom-
ing and outgoing communication, and enforces the distributed security pol-
icy locally.
In this section we explain how we develop such a distributed security
module and the different components it includes.
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5.3.1 From IPC towards networked communication
Any microkernel architecture provides strong isolation of application com-
ponents in order to minimize the trusted computing base. Therefore, any
communication between isolated components (i.e., IPC) needs to be medi-
ated by the kernel. On the one hand, this introduces an additional overhead,
which was historically one of the main drawbacks of the microkernel ap-
proach, but was weakened by the optimization of (synchronous) IPC mech-
anisms and the evolution of microkernels [Lie93; EH13]. On the other hand,
this has the benefit of making any communication explicit. This property was
further strengthened by introducing capability-based access control that en-
ables fine-grained and unforgeable control of a component’s communication
channels. As a result, today’s microkernel architectures allow us to apply
the principle of least privilege and to enforce security policies when inte-
grating application components from different, potentially distrusted parties
[LW09]. In summary, all these properties helped establish microkernels as a
sophisticated, and also commercialized [Gen19; Okl; Qnx], implementation
for critical application domains such as vehicles.
When it comes to more dynamic scenarios like distributed systems, a
service-oriented approach is commonly taken to equip the system with the
required flexibility. Typically, a communication middleware then takes care
of routing the messages to the communication partner, which registered un-
der a certain service name, thereby deploying a communication mechanism
(API) that is agnostic regarding the actual communication partners and their
location. However, a major drawback of such middleware is that enforc-
ing security policies and providing isolation (e.g., local namespaces) with-
out adding a significant overhead is a non-trivial obligation. This approach
clearly trades ease-of-use against simplicity and efficiency.
We therefore believe that the strong architectural guarantees already pro-
vided by microkernels can and should be utilized in such scenarios. That
means local communication shall still benefit from the existing efficient and
secure implementations while we transparently transform the local and re-
mote communication mechanisms where necessary. The challenge here is to
provide similar guarantees for remote communication, i.e., the fine-grained
access control and integrity of remote communication channels. Yet there
is a mismatch between the fine-grained access control for local IPC and the
socket API typically used for network applications which give full access to
any attached network. We therefore need to provide the infrastructure with
which we can control network accesses in order to establish unforgeable net-
work communication between application components, as we are used to
doing when using local IPC.
5.3.2 From user-level networking towards a distributed fire-
wall
Microkernel philosophy is based on moving all components, including de-
vice drivers and protocol stacks, from the kernel to the userspace. Therefore,













FIGURE 5.6: Architecture with multiple TCP/IP stacks and a
shared multiplexer (a) compared to a security module with a
shared and integrated TCP/IP stack (b).
implementing the network stack in the userspace was a hot topic for many
years; it was proposed for different motivations, including increasing the per-
formance and flexibility of the network layer [Eic+95].
Providing maximum isolation between different applications, a straight-
forward approach of executing several network applications on a microker-
nel consists in using dedicated network stacks for each application (cf. Fig-
ure 5.6-a). Here, the low-level Network Interface Controller (NIC) must be
multiplexed/virtualized, e.g., by a network bridge. As a result each ap-
plication is linked to its network-stack library and requires its own MAC
and IP addresses. The drawback of this approach is that unless some sort
of packet filtering is deployed, each application also gains full access to the
shared network, which contradicts our objective of fine-grained access con-
trol. More precisely, this approach is susceptible to the following communi-
cation threats:
• Spoofing: An application which has full access to the network stack,
can emit a frame with fake IP or MAC addresses. Such an application
may imitate other applications, eavesdrop on their communication, or
collect relevant information about the platform. It could also change
the transmitted data and inject false values.
• Denial of service (DoS): One of the primary results of IP spoofing can
be a DoS attack, i.e., a malicious application could spoof a target ser-
vice’s IP address and send many packets to different receivers. All re-
sponses to the spoofed packets will be directed to the service’s IP, which
will be flooded. Sometimes an attack cannot cause disruption to the
service, but can cause a degradation of its quality (e.g., by increasing its
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response time). The DoS could lead to serious issues if that service is
responsible for users’ safety.
In order to combat these threats, adequate access-control mechanisms
should be implemented to control the interaction between different appli-
cations and to prevent unauthorized parties from processing foreign data.
However, packet filtering is more network-centric and typically too abstract
for fine-grained application-level access control. Moreover, there is a con-
sistency challenge when it comes to updating static filtering rules in a dis-
tributed system in the context of a dynamically changing environment.
Hence, adopting the distributed firewall technique [Ioa+00] seems to be a
favorable solution to remove any performance bottlenecks. We applied this
method by providing a single security module for each ECU, as shown in
Figure 5.6-b. This module is playing the role of a firewall by controlling all
incoming and outgoing communications on a single ECU and by enforcing
the security policy locally.
As a system integrator, we can thus perfectly control the local inter-
component communication and thus guarantee that no application compo-
nent has direct access to the network interface. Moreover, the security mod-
ule is able to distinguish its clients by their capabilities and can therefore
select and enforce different (pre-defined) policies for network communica-
tion. In this way, all network accesses are securely mediated by the security
module. Note that this is based on the assumption that capabilities cannot be
arbitrarily delegated between application components.
The security policy is managed centrally and then distributed to all ECUs.
Note that the security module implements a shared network stack and mul-
tiplexes the network device. It is therefore a potentially complex compo-
nent that might compromise the isolation of the application components.
We believe, however, that this design choice can actually simplify the policy
enforcement and multiplexing task in contrast to solutions that implement
these on other layers of abstraction.
5.3.3 Security Module Components
The security module is composed of four cooperating components as de-
picted in Figure 5.7. In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on the
design and implementation of these components in more detail:
Proxy
This component plays a central role by providing a suitable interface to the
applications as well as by coordinating the other components. Many conven-
tional (legacy) applications use a socket-like API (as in the standard C library)
to access the network stack. The proxy represents the interface which the
applications use to interact with the security module. In contrast to the con-
ventional function/library calls, the proxy uses local IPC and must therefore
take care of the memory management between the different address spaces
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FIGURE 5.7: Architecture of the security module
of the communication system and its clients before a call can be handed over
to the actual network stack.
More precisely, shared memory was used to transfer the data between the
address space of the application and the security module to avoid imposing
extra overhead by copying data multiple times. All this is transparently taken
care of by this component, so that the clients can still use the typical socket
API functions. Legacy applications can be supported by linking against a
slightly modified version of the standard C library that forwards the socket
API calls to the security module.
Policy Evaluation System (PES)
This system is responsible for monitoring (i.e., granting or denying) an ap-
plications’ main requests, such as initiating a connection, and sending or re-
ceiving data. In order to make a decision, it determines whether a proposed
request is consistent with the global system policy, which represents the least
accepted security parameters and system-wide security configuration, and
whether the conditions specified in the communication policy were met. This
system depends on the KeyNote trust management engine which is used
to evaluate the potential action of each application. Each application has a
communication policy (we can also refer to it as a credential) which gives it
the ability to communicate with other components, regardless its topological
location in the network. The communication policy of each component, in
principle, should not conflict with the global policy.
The KeyNote policy definition language [Bla+99] is used to formulate the
communication policy. The application-independent design of KeyNote al-
lows for the support of a variety of different applications. KeyNote further-
more enables the delegation of the policy by allowing principals to delegate
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authorization to other principals. This fits perfectly with the policy devel-
opment framework which was presented in Section 5.2. Consequently, the
delegation capability enables decentralization of policy administration.
Communication System (CS)
As mentioned before, the network stack was integrated into the security
module to provide basic network access. In our module, we have used the
LwIP for this purpose. In addition, we integrated embedded IPsec [SK05]
into this network stack (as proposed in [HP15]) in order to provide basic
security services (e.g. integrity, confidentiality) to the various software com-
ponents.
IPsec may be implemented in a host using several methods. It can be
implemented through the bump-in-the-stack (BITS) method by implement-
ing IPsec as a separate architectural layer between the IP and the data link
layer. Another method of implementation which we adopted, is integrating
IPsec into the IP layer [Koz05, p. 455]. In our implementation we used an
existing package developed by Schild et al. [NC03]. They adopted the BITS
method for their implementation. This package has a number of deficien-
cies: it supported the tunnel mode only while the transport mode was not
implemented. Moreover, it supports only manual keying to set up the Secu-
rity Association (SA) parameters. Finally, it does not handle the problem of
IPsec with fragmentation; the package can handle packets whose size is less
than the maximum transmission unit (MTU). The previous implementation
drops the packet silently. In the case in which the protected packet exceeds
the MTU, this action may later stop the entire communications.
We enhanced their package by implementing the transport mode for
both AH and ESP. We also removed the implementation of MD5, SHA1,
and 3DES-CBC algorithms from the package since they are already part of
OpenSSL library which is ported to the Genode framework. Adding frag-
mentation to the IPsec implementation could be achieved in two ways: (a) by
continuing to use the BITS architecture and re-implementing the fragmenta-
tion services to keep the IPsec package independent or (b) by integrating the
IPsec into the IP layer and using the existing fragmentation code. We selected
the second option in our implementation.
Decisions Repository (DR)
This component provides a repository for saving policy decisions. Such a
repository is an essential technique in our design to spare the run-time costs
of request evaluation. By doing this, evaluation only occurs when an appli-
cation initiates a connection (i.e., uses accept and connect calls for TCP-based
communication). For this purpose, the decision repository stores the decided
rules for any opened connections. These rules contain all the information that
the IPsec protocol needs to process ongoing and outgoing packets.
5.4. Secure Communication 85
ECU1
Add





Crs,Msg, SIGECU1SK (Msg), ECU1PK




























FIGURE 5.8: Secure connection setup.
5.4 Secure Communication
The security module within each ECU ensures secure communication links
for all software components mapped to it. Before we reach that point, a con-
nection initiation needs to take place; Figure 5.8 illustrates this process. To
explain this, we consider the case where SWC1, which is mapped in ECU1,
wants to communicate securely with SWC2, which is assigned to a different
ECU (i.e., ECU2).
5.4.1 Initiation Phase
During the initiation phase, whenever SWC1 on ECU1 establishes a connec-
tion (e.g., it uses a connect socket call), the proxy intercepts this call and redi-
rects it to the CS. The proxy also delivers all required credentials (Crs) to
vouch for the local ECU to communicate with the remote ECU. It also pre-
pares all the required assertions (Asrt), which will be needed by the remote
counterpart to evaluate the request. A session key (SesK) could be created
and delivered to the proxy. This key will be used later as a symmetric key
to secure communication between SWC1 and SWC2 after validating the re-
quest and when the initiation phase is over. This key will be changed at a
later point at regular intervals. This key is encrypted (ENC) by the remote
application public key (SWC2PK) to prevent any third party from perceiving
it during the request transmission.
The CS on ECU1 uses the private key of ECU1 (i.e., ECU1SK) to sign (SIG)
the transmitted message (Msg) to the remote ECU2 to ensure communica-
tion integrity and message origin authentication. The Msg contains the re-
ceived assertions (Asrt), and the encrypted session key, alongside a mono-
tonic counter value. This value is used to guarantee that messages are up-to-
date and to prevent replay attacks. A dedicated manager usually generates
this counter value as in [AUT17]. The mechanism of creating such a value is
out of the scope of the thesis.
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The signed message, the ECU1’s public key (ECU1PK) and the credentials
are all sent to the remote communication counterpart (i.e., ECU2). Note here
that we sent the credentials without signing them because they were already
signed and require no further protection. The security module in the ECU2
delivers the received request and the credentials to the PES to evaluate them
based on the local communication policy. If ECU2’s PES authorizes the re-
quest, a new security rule will be added to the DR.
Each inserted rule includes all the communication identifiers such as the
local and remote IPs, local and remote applications ports, remote public keys,
the required security service (i.e., integrity, confidentiality, no security), ac-
cess control role (i.e., authorize, deny), an identifier for the session key, and
others.
The location where the Crypto keys (i.e., SWC2SK, ECU2SK, SesK, and
other secrete keys) is stored and the different crypto operations are per-
formed is a very critical aspect. We propose to avoid saving the keys directly
in the DR. Instead, an identifier of each key should be used to refer to the
actual key. We recommend the use of a dedicated crypto module, which will
be responsible for all crypto operations and for storing the keys. Or placing
the crypto code in a trusted environment, e.g., ARM TrustZone technology.
Later, CM on ECU2 sends the answer of the request to the remote CM. The
answer is signed by the ECU2’s secret key (ECU2SK) to prevent any modifica-
tion of the response by third parties and to give ECU1 the ability to authenti-
cate its origin. In case of authorized connections, one rule is added to DR on
the ECU1.
5.4.2 Operational Phase
After the initiation phase is done, both software components can exchange
data securely. The secure connection here means that IPsec protocol is in-
volved to ensure data integrity (by using AH protocol), or to ensure the confi-
dentiality of exchanged data (by using ESP protocol) or even both principles.
Also, secure connection implies that SWC2 receives messages only from au-
thorized software components (SWC1 in our example) while the CS will ig-
nore other messages. The CS represents the first policy enforcement point.
It intercepts each incoming and outgoing packet selectors (i.e., IP, Port, etc.)
and applies the relevant security rules (i.e., pass or deny).
It is important to note that the role of PES is only limited to the connection
initiation phase to check the validity of the request. Whenever this phase is
finished, PES does not interfere.
The second enforcement point in our security module is the proxy which
provides an efficient and flexible access control layer to enforce the security
policy between the applications on the same platform. The use of Genode
allows us to leverage its efficient message-passing capabilities for the en-
forcement of the socket APIs of the different application. We can achieve
that by replacing direct calls with IPC that are implemented via the Gen-
ode message-passing mechanism. The implemented proxy is responsible for
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translating the socket calls to the proper IPC call and redirect it either to the
CS or to a local application in the same platform.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the results of a number of experiments on proto-
type implementation to validate our proposed secure module. The goals of
the experiments are:
• Determining the introduced overhead of the security module in terms
of source lines of code as well as the effect of using a single network
stack (as in our security module) instead of multiple ones (as in Genode
framework by using nic_bridge components).
• Measuring the overhead of setting up secure communication as ex-
plained in Section 5.4.1.
• And finally, measuring the overhead of the embedded IPsec which we
implemented to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of communica-
tion between different ECUs.
The rest of this section details the result of each of the abovementioned
points:
5.5.1 Network System of Security Module
We evaluated our implementation of the security module with regard to its
overhead in terms of source lines of code (SLOC) of the different components.
We also measure the latency of the network system component of our module
without considering any interference with other module’s components.
Table 5.1 summarizes the SLOC values that have been acquired by the
CLOC tool [Dan09]. Note that we only evaluated the part of the policy eval-
uation system which interfaces the unmodified KeyNote library. It is also
worth mentioning that our approach saves about 750 SLOC by superseding
the multiplexing component (i.e., nic_bridge).
Regarding the latency, we used the Netperf benchmark [Jon+96] in order
to measure the network performance of our secure module. Netperf works
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FIGURE 5.9: Average round-trip latency results for our produc-
tion platform


















FIGURE 5.10: Average round-trip latency results for our secu-
rity module running over Linux OS
based on the client/server model. It consists of two applications; the first one
is the netserver, which runs in the local host and waits for the connection from
the remote host. The remote side runs the second application, called netperf,
which is used to transfer the test configuration to the netserver application
and receive the result from it.
As a matter of course, the network system within our security module
must perform worse than a scenario where a single application directly ac-
cesses the network device. Note that at this stage, we do not consider the
interference of IPsec protocol. We therefore compared our approach with the
scenario illustrated in Figure 5.6-a. The Genode OS framework proposed the
use of a nic_bridge which implements the Proxy-ARP protocol [CMQ87] to
multiplex and monitor the communications of different applications that run
on the same host. Neither solutions use filtering mechanisms which identify
the application properly.
Hence the scenarios we compared both include additional copying and
context switching caused by the nic_bridge and the security module. The
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FIGURE 5.11: Performance evaluation of the security module.
netserver component was executed on the system under test while the netperf
binary was run from a standard linux machine. In particular, we used the
TCP_RR with the parameters -i 10,3 -I 99,5 in order to perform multiple
iterations and achieve a confidence level of 99 %.
The average round-trip latency results are shown for different package
sizes and two different platforms in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10. As a base-
line, we also included the results for a setup in which the netserver directly
accesses the network device. One of the test platforms (production platform)
was running Genode on a Raspberry Pi as described in Section 5.4.1 whereas
the other platform was running Genode directly on the same Linux machine
as the netperf binary. Note that we used the latter to bypass any physical
network devices and drivers as it only utilizes rather simple virtual network
interfaces.
From Figure 5.9, we can observe a slight improvement in the latency for
our approach in comparison to the case where each software component has
its network stack which shares the network device with other components
via nic_bridge as it is adopted by Genode framework.
5.5.2 Initiation the Secure Connection
The next step was to evaluate the initiation phase of secure communication
between the two applications run over RPIs using our security module. Both
platforms are running Genode OS and our framework and communicating
over a local network. The overhead is introduced from two parts: the nec-
essary time to transmit the required credentials and time overhead of the
request evaluation. At the same time, we want to show the effect of the num-
ber of credentials to evaluate transmission and request evaluation times. In
this respect, Figure 5.11 shows the overhead observed from transmitting and
evaluating the credentials. Each time we used a different number of creden-
tials (i.e., from 1 to 6) to evaluate the performance.
We were able to notice that increasing the number of delegations (i.e., cre-
dentials numbers) introduces more overhead in both parts (i.e., evaluation
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and transmission). Most of the evaluation overhead comes from the signa-
ture verification of the credentials; we can lessen this overhead by caching the
verified credentials and used it later without the need to verify its signature
again.
Other than that, we evaluated the overhead regarding the size of the
transmitted messages. Table 5.2 defines the size for each required file to
set up the connections (i.e., credentials, public key, signed request). From
the same table, we can estimate the required saving size for each application
within 1-level of delegation which is around 3.7 KB (i.e., the size of creden-
tial, keys). we can estimate the size of the transited data for the evaluations
which is also around 2.9 KB (i.e., credential, public key, signed request).
5.5.3 Using the Secure Communication
The last experiment was to measure the overhead of using our security mod-
ule to secure the network while using IPsec protocol. The IPsec configura-
tions for the measurement were as follow:
• AH protocol: we configured the test bed to use MD5 hash function
combined with HMAC as a keyed authentication mechanism.
• ESP protocol: we set up the testbed to use both MD5 as an authentica-
tion algorithm and 3DES-CBC as encryption algorithm.
• IPsec for both AH and ESP was configured to use transport mode.
These configurations were hardwired in the IPsec code. The secret key which
is used by IPsec is the session key (SesK) which was exchanged during the
initiation phase.
Figure 5.12 shows the network latency of our security module. The la-
tency was measured as a function of the size of the different transmitted
packets while applying AH, ESP, and without IPsec (we refer to it in the fig-
ures as NoSec). Figure 5.12 shows that applying ESP protocol introduces
more overhead compared to the use of AH protocol. However, the difference
in the latency values between the case of using LwIP without IPsec and using
IPsec (whether AH or ESP) is still negligible in most cases (less than 0.06 ms).
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FIGURE 5.12: Latency of our security module while using AH,
ESP, and no security protocol

















FIGURE 5.13: Throughput of our security module while using
AH, ESP, and no security protocol
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FIGURE 5.14: The Round Trip Time using Linux
In addition to latency, we were interested in measuring network through-
put. Throughput is defined as the amount of data that can be transferred
from the source to the destination in a specific period. Figure 5.13 repre-
sents the result of testing throughput as a function of the size of the different
transmitted packets in the same previous three cases (i.e., IPsec with AH,
IPsec with ESP, and NoSec). Based on the Figure 5.13, we can indicate that
the throughput decreases 33% when we use AH compared to its value with-
out using IPsec, while it decreases 77% when we use ESP compared to the
throughput value without using IPsec.
It is important to note that our IPsec implementation did not cause the
low network performance of the security module. When we measured the
throughput of the system without our IPsec code, we obtained close results
when comparing to our results in the case of using NoSec with our imple-
mentation. The next step was to check the effect of the hardware platform.
Therefore, we ran the same measurement, but instead of using RPI, we run
Genode (including our security module) directly on the top of Linux ma-
chine. Figure 5.14 shows the results of this measurement. As we expected,
the network latency is far less compared to the case when we used RPI. Also,
the introduced overhead of using IPsec was relatively similar to the case us-
ing RPI.
To discover the reason for low throughput values during the use of secu-
rity module over RPI, we checked to see whether the network is facing the
packet loss issue; we found that the rate of packet re-transmission was neg-
ligible (2%), so it cannot be the main reason for the low performance. We
conclude that the low throughput was a result of the current version of the
USB driver and the way of processing the high interrupt load on the system.
Optimizing the process of handling the interrupts issued by the Network
Interface Card will improve the performance of the network, which conse-
quently will reflect on the IPsec performance [IVS09].
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5.6 Summary
Our work is based on the observation that controlling the communications
between different applications within a vehicular platform is a necessary pre-
requisite for containing an attack and preserving the security of the in-vehicle
network. However, defining a static communications policy for a vehicular
distributed system is both labor-intensive and error-prone and becomes more
difficult if it is performed during the final integration stage. In this chapter,
we propose a methodology supporting a gradual definition of the security
policy, starting with the designer of the component, and then adapting and
specializing the policy as the component is linked to other components and
eventually integrated with the rest of the system. Additionally, we created
a framework which allows communication policy to be deployed incremen-
tally and ensures the integrity of this policy during the life cycle of software
components.
The advantage of using a policy definition language for the expression
of the vehicular communications policy is that we have a lot of expressive
power which is reflected in our ability to refine and extend the original com-
ponent policy during integration, while ensuring that the adaptations are
consistent with the original policy. By creating a “chain of trust” from the
original designer to the production system, we ensure the consistent applica-
tion of the security policy without the need for manual intervention.
Maintaining the security policy enforcement mechanism on the opera-
tional vehicle does not impose an excessive performance burden, as demon-
strated by the results from the preceding section. There we noted that the
credential evaluation, whose overhead is shown in Figure 5.11, is done once
per link setup. This operation usually takes place during power on, although,
policy caching may enable results from previous configurations to be reused,
further reducing the effort. Credential evaluation is not repeated unless the
system is reconfigured. Moreover, re-keying the session key, which is done
at regular intervals, does not require a credential evaluation operation. Even
in cases in which a vehicle may face failure during operation and need to
switch from a primary system to a backup system, the necessary policy may
be already in place. We expect that reconfiguration will be done only when
the vehicle is quiescent. Once the secure channels are setup, the overheads
are similar to the statically configured case.
Also, our experimental result indicated that the increase in the latency
value is small even after applying IPsec. However, since most of the security
issues in the distributed embedded system communications are related to the
lack of a proper authentication mechanism to prevent unauthorized parties
from hijacking or sending false data, we believe that applying AH will solve
all the issues related to the absence of data origin authentication and data in-
tegrity with acceptable overhead on the efficacy. Achieving privacy by using
IPsec with ESP in such constrained resource systems will cause a significant
overhead that might degrade the system capabilities in terms of throughput.
We also believe that using more efficient encryption algorithm such as AES
instead of a 3DES algorithm will improve the performance of ESP.
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Using the traditional mechanisms to eliminate vulnerabilities and to ensure
security is insufficient by itself. As vehicle complexity grows, the likelihood
of hidden vulnerabilities and threats increases. Therefore, it is critical to pro-
vide run-time mechanisms to detect the presence of malware and to stop
the attackers before they manage to gain a foothold in the system. Using
signature-based detection mechanisms is inadequate since it cannot keep up
with the successive and unknown attacks which may target the vehicle dur-
ing its operational life.
Anomaly-based detection techniques seem to be more convenient and ca-
pable of detecting any off-nominal behavior by the component, which could
be caused by zero-day attacks. Anomaly-based mechanisms monitor the be-
havior of the component to identify any misuse that falls outside the prede-
fined profile, which represents the nominal behavior of that component. The
nominal behavior of a software component can be defined based on different
component properties (e.g., system calls, memory consumption, etc.). In this
chapter, we propose using the temporal specification of the observed task as
a baseline to define its nominal behavior. Attacks such as a code injection
or DoS attacks will usually cause a breach of this temporal specification, and
thus it will be detected.
The most critical aspect when using anomaly-based techniques is ensur-
ing the correct definition of the observed component’s nominal behavior. Us-
ing inaccurate or the wrong behavior as a reference for off-nominal behavior
detection may cause a high rate of false-positive and false-negative errors.
One example of inaccurate nominal behavior definition is the use of safety-
driven boundaries, which are used to define nominal behavior from a safety
perspective to identify security-based nominal behavior.
In this chapter, we show how a safety-based temporal specification can-
not be used to detect the malicious behavior of the observed component.

















FIGURE 6.1: Red-Zone Principle
We also introduce the Red-Zone principle, which aims to relax of a prede-
fined boundary in case they are very tight or to tight them in case they are
over-approximated. Based on that principle, we identify the proper tempo-
ral thresholds which give the system the ability to predict the presence of
malicious tasks. The system is then alarmed ahead of the actual temporal
limits violation. This early detection of off-nominal temporal behavior pro-
vides a sufficient amount of time to initiate recovery actions. Based on that,
we present a prediction scheme for Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOSes)
where we integrate our defined configuration.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we present
the Red-Zone principle that we consider for intrusion detection and predic-
tion as well as the required steps to adopt it. Section 6.2 provides a short
background about real-time tasks and their temporal properties. Section 6.3
explains the use of these properties to support the intrusion detection pro-
cess. Defining the prediction configuration for real-time tasks based on the
Red-Zone principle is presented in Section 6.4. In Section 6.7, we provide ex-
plained how to implement the system. Later, we detail our prediction scheme
and the implementation aspects in Section 6.8. Finally, Section 6.10 contains
some concluding remarks.
Parts of this work have been published in [Ham+18; PH15b].
6.1 Red-Zone Principle
Every task, in a given system, is usually designed to accomplish a certain
work and behave in a well-defined way. However, at run-time, a task may
not exercise all the intended functionality and, in some circumstances, a task
may stray outside its planned operational profile for many reasons;
• The task could be under an attack or it is already taken over and it is
carrying out the attacker’s commands.
6.1. Red-Zone Principle 97
• The task has encountered an error due to a hidden software bug as a
result of insufficient testing.
• The task is affected by unforeseen circumstances in the system environ-
ment (e.g., a heat wave or exceptionally heavy rain).
However, straying outside the predefined policy is not always refer to a ma-
licious behavior. The task may attempts to perform an action which although
legal, is not permitted by the existing policy. This is usually the result of an
incomplete security policy. This could be the case when the security policy
is defined by using under-approximated or very limited rules as a result of
incomplete test which did not cover all the implemented functionalities.
The security policy in many systems is defined as binary actions (autho-
rized, not authorized). The system keeps a task running only if it behaves
correctly by staying within its designated operational profile; otherwise, it
will be terminated.
Terminating a perfectly functional component because of a violation, such
as an overflow, may have spectacularly unintended consequences, as the
crash of the inaugural flight of the Ariane 5 booster demonstrates [LL96].
Moreover, In the case of an attack, terminating the malicious task without
any relevant information about the vulnerability may not be the right choice,
as an attacker could use the same obscure vulnerability to break the newly
instantiated tasks repeatedly. In addition, in the case of bugs, we need to
identify the chain of events that led to the failure which will hopefully help
us identify the bug in the design or the implementation of the system. Lastly,
the off-nominal behavior may not be malicious after all.
Therefore, rather than terminating the task, we introduce the Red-Zone
principle to permit the task to overrun its designed operational profile until
an ultimate limit but in an observed mode. This window of observation is
called the Red-Zone. Whenever the task exceeds the limit, it will be termi-
nated, leaving behind it an audit trace with potential information about the
vulnerability or the fault. Figure 6.1 illustrates the possible operational be-
haviors of a task. The four main areas represent: the intended behavior, the
actual behavior, the Red-Zone, and the termination zone for a given task.
An important benefit of red-zoning is that, assuming the attack is de-
tected, it allows an attack to be monitored in real time, while the subverted
application cannot cause problems to the system. We call this an “instant
honeypot” because the application ends up behaving like a honeypot [Pro03]
at the moment it enters its red zone.
Another critical goal of red-zoning is to provide an early detection of off-
nominal behaviors which will alert the system and provide the ability to re-
spond in an effective manner. The effective response is necessary for safety-
critical systems where losing or in-cognizant stopping of a subsystem may
severely impact the overall system’s behavior.
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6.1.1 Adopting the Red-Zone principle
To adopt the Red-Zone principle, the following three-stage process needs to
be accomplished:
• Establish the nominal behavior of the task.
• Formulate a security policy which defines the various execution areas
for the task based on observations made in the previous step. Moreover,
the security policy should determine the appropriate actions within
each zone.
• Implement a framework to enforce the security policy while the state of
the task is changing, reflecting the execution zones (nominal, red-zone,
off-nominal).
In general, the nominal behavior of a program cannot be established us-
ing static analysis [AM14]. Looking at the source code, it is not easy to de-
termine things such as: which parts of the code will be executed most fre-
quently, how many elements will populate the data structures, which files
will be opened, and so on. Consequently, we need to determine the pro-
gram’s behavior through dynamic analysis. Specifically, we need to execute
the program many times, collect useful information from its execution, and
analyze this information to determine its nominal behavior. Effective dy-
namic analysis requires that the program be exercised adequately during the
data collection phase. For programs that come with a good set of test cases,
executing the program with those test cases could be adequate. Although
the precise number of required executions cannot be determined a priori, it
is possible to use a control-flow or data-flow adequacy criterion to establish
an upper bound on the number of program executions.
Many mechanisms were used to monitor the nominal behavior of a task
based on different program properties such as power consumption [JMD04],
system call distribution [Yoo+17], system calls sequences [Ahm+09], control
flow graphs [BKM07], and so forth. Applying these mechanisms in the vehic-
ular domain entails several challenges including the limited computing/en-
ergy resource of most ECUs. In this work we investigate another property.
As we have stated in Section 2.1.2, modern vehicle contains safety-critical
and non-safety-critical applications. One of the main characteristics of safety-
critical applications is that they have strict temporal constraints. The timing
behavior of a safety-critical system could be used by an anomaly-based de-
tection mechanism to detect various attacks against such systems.
6.2 Properties of Real-Time Systems
In real-time systems the correctness of the system depends not only on the
functional results of the computations, but also on the time at which the re-
sults are produced [SR90]. A reaction that occurs too late could be useless or
even dangerous. For example, anti-lock braking system (ABS) on a vehicle
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FIGURE 6.2: Timing properties of real-time tasks. Dashed rect-
angle represents the effect of SPP scheduling policy where τ1
(has the highest priority) takes over the CPU previously allo-
cated to τ2 (has the lowest priority), thereby interrupting its ex-
ecution.
need to react to the brake-pedal pressure and activating the brakes within a
specified period; after this period, the vehicle may skid or crash into some-
thing. It is important here to point to a popular misconception that the real-
time system is a system which performs very fast.
The performance of real-time systems has to be validated against timing
constraints to guarantee that the results are available when they are needed.
Timing analysis is often used in order to provide off-line safe upper bounds
on the tasks execution and response times, in order to cover the set of all
possible executions including corner-cases which are the smallest (best) and
largest (worst) values that can be observed at runtime.
Before we go further, let us look in details at real-time tasks and their
different properties and timing constraints:
6.2.1 Real-time Tasks
Each real-time task has number of execution requirements illustrated in Fig-
ure 6.2. Every real-time task τi is defined by a tuple τi = (C+i , Di, Ti) where
C+i refers to the worst case execution time, Di refers to the relative deadline,
and Ti refers to the minimum interarrival time. Each task is assigned a pri-
ority πi, if a task is activated regularly we call it a periodic task otherwise we
call it a sporadic task and βi is used to characterizing the minimum distance
between two consecutive activation. Every instance of τi is called a job Ji j.
When a job of τi is activated and becomes ready for execution, it occupies the
resource (typically The CPU) for a duration no longer than C+i of execution.
The longest execution time (i.e., C+i ) can be derived using worst-case exe-
cution time analysis. The point of time when the task finishes its execution
called completion time. The idle time between the completion of a job of τi and
its deadline is called a slack Si. Such a slack can be used for the computation
of that job without causing it to miss its deadline [DTB93].
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Real-time task executions are constrained in time to guarantee the correct-
ness of the system. This time constraint is the relative deadline Di which is the
maximum allowable time for a given task to complete its execution. The con-
sequences of missing the deadline can be used to distinguish between two
types of real time tasks:
• Soft real-time tasks: Missing a deadline of such tasks is tolerable and
it may cause a degradation in quality of the service. In most cases, non-
safety-critical tasks are considered as soft real-time tasks.
• Hard real-time tasks: Missing a deadline of such tasks is intolerable,
and it could lead to catastrophic situations. All the safety-critical tasks
are hard real-time tasks.
Similar to that, a (sub-)system of the vehicle is considered as a Hard real-time
system when it contains at least one Hard real-time task. On the other hand,
when all the tasks are Soft real-time task, we refer to the (sub-)system as a
Soft real-time system.
6.2.2 Worst-Case Execution Time
Timing analysis computes for each task the Best-Case Execution Time
(BCET), we refer to it as C−i , and the Worst Case Execution Time (WCET),
we refer to it as C+i , guaranteeing that the execution time of the task will be
confined to these bounds. The derivation of the WCET of a task is the first
concern in the performance validation of real-time systems. WCET represent
an upper bound of the execution time of a given task when it is executed on
a particular hardware.
The WCET of a task depends both on the program flow, which includes
loop iterations and different function calls, and on architectural factors such
as pipelines and caches [EES01]. WCET can be calculated via various tech-
niques includes static [Wil+10; HF04], measurement-based [BFM97; WM01],
or hybrids of them [BCP02]. Using static techniques, see Figure 6.3, do not
require the execution of the task on a real hardware. Instead, it requires ex-
amine the source code of the task to determine its structure and program
flow, and combine this information with an abstract model of the hardware
architecture to obtain upper bound for the execution time of the task. The
WCET estimate by searching for the path with the longest execution time
and calculating the execution time of this path. It is very important to em-
phasize that static methods guarantee safety by producing bounds that the
execution time will not exceed these bounds.
6.2.3 Worst-Case Response Time
When real-time tasks are mapped to the same ECU, they share and compete
for the same hardware resource (e.g., CPU). The execution of these tasks is
controlled by a scheduler which decides at each time which task can be ex-
ecuted on the CPU. Different scheduling policies are adopted by the sched-
uler to arbitrate between the various tasks [MA05; Bal+98]. Static Priority








FIGURE 6.3: WCET Analysis based on [EES01]
Preemptive (SPP) scheduling [Aud+95] is well-known scheduling algorithm
which by adopting it, the scheduler will always allocate the resource to the
ready job of the highest priority task (see Figure 6.2), therefore, a lower pri-
ority task may be preempted by a higher priority one.
The response time Ri then characterizes the time which spans between the
activation of a job and its completion. Response time analysis [Sha+04] is
used to determine the worst-case response time (WCRT), it computes an up-
per bound on the response time of a task and validate it against its deadline
Di. The busy-window analysis is a well established technique for computing
the WCRT. It computes the maximum processing time B+i (q) which is neces-
sary to process q activation (jobs) of a task τi. B+i (q) under an SPP scheduler
is defined as follows:













is the maximum number of jobs from inter-
fering tasks τj during a time window of size B+i (q). Note that, the compu-
tation of the busy-window is a fixed point computation as B+i (q) appears
in both sides of the equation, which can be solved iteratively, starting with
B+i (q) := q.C
+
i . The computation of B
+
i (q) is proven to converge for some
Qi ∈N [Aud+95].
R+i , the WCRT of task τi, is computed as follows:
R+i := max1≤q≤Qi
{B+i (q)− (q− 1)Ti} (6.2)
Figure 6.4 presents a motivational example which we will use through
the next sections of the chapter. This example represents a hard real-time
system includes three periodic tasks τ2=(1,4,4), τ3=(1,5,5), and τ4=(2,8,8) or-
dered from the highest to the lowest priority. The system also contains one
sporadic task τ1 with execution time C1 = 1 ms and β1 = 2. The task τ1 has
the highest priority but is rarely activated. By using Equation 6.2, we can
compute the WCRT for every task of the system.























FIGURE 6.4: WCRT calculation for τ1, τ2, τ3 and τ4
Assumption: In this work we consider that the studied system is a hard
real-time system with a uni-processor and SPP scheduling policy.
6.3 Time-Based Intrusion Detection Approach
As the vehicle increasingly becoming more interconnected with the Internet;
the different hard real time (sub-)systems within it become an attractive tar-
get of various attacks. However, these systems have the advantage that they
are predictable by design, as they should comply with temporal constraints.
Therefore, from the security point of view, we refer to any malicious ac-
tivity which alters the predefined temporal behavior of a real-time task and
causes it to miss its deadline as a temporal attack. The temporal attack could
be caused by deliberate attacks, such as injection code attack when an at-
tacker tries to exploit existing vulnerability (e.g., buffer overflow [And72]) to
execute injected or preexisting malicious code to break the system or to force
it to do malicious actions [Kos+10]. The deadline miss may be the objective of
the attack (e.g., DOS), or a side-effect of the attack as the process now needs
to carry out both its normal tasks and the actions of the attacker. If the re-
sources allocated are tight, the extra effort will result in slower response time
and potentially missed deadlines.
In hard real-time systems, a task is considered as off-nominal whenever
it violates its temporal constraint (i.e., deadline). Therefore, an intuitive ap-
proach is to use the deadline as a demarcation line which indicates the off-
nominal temporal behavior of the task. However, using the deadline miss as
a sign to predict the off-nominal behavior is insufficient for many reasons.
Firstly, waiting for the task to exceed its deadline in order to trigger an alarm
about the off-nominal state is useless, especially in critical-safety hard real-
time systems, since it is too late for the system to recover, we refer to this as
belated detection. Secondly, the deadline miss of one task may cause a cascad-
ing deadline miss for lower priority tasks as shown Figure 6.5, the deadline
miss of τ3 causes τ4 to miss its deadline too. Finally, the use of deadline-based
monitoring may not always identify the off-nominal task correctly. Indeed,
the interference on a high priority task may lead lower priority tasks to miss
their deadline. In this case, the deadline-based detection will report an issue























FIGURE 6.5: Using the WCRT and deadline miss as an indicator
of compromise could lead to false identification of malicious
tasks.
in lower priority tasks without any sign about the initial misbehaving of the
high priority task. In Figure 6.5, monitoring system will report both τ3 and
τ4 as malicious tasks since they miss their deadline although τ2 is the one
should be identified since it is the actual task which causes this issue.
AUTOSAR, for instance, also recognized the problems associated with
deadline-based monitoring approach. Therefore, it chose to monitor the exe-
cution time of tasks rather than the deadline to ensure the time protection.
This mechanism’s goal is to prevent fault propagation by killing the task
which exceeds the WECT [BFT09]. However, as mentioned previously this
extreme solution may not be suitable for hard-real-time systems, as it may
cause the system to enter an unstable state. Zimmer et al. [Zim+10] use the
WCET timing bound to detect code injection attacks by comparing the WCET
value with the elapsed time along the return path. Petal et al. [PP08] pro-
posed an approach to monitor the execution time of the running tasks. They
use a dedicated security processor to supervise the application processors.
They change the binary file of the task by inserting instructions at the start
and the end of each block to instrument the execution time for each block. At
run time, the security processor will determine whether a given block takes
longer time than its defined WCET.
Therefore, defining other reasonable temporal boundaries to delimit the
off-nominal behavior of real-time tasks is required, in order to prevent the
propagation of the temporal constraints violations between tasks and to de-
tect early enough the presence of a malicious task in the system. We aim to
define these boundaries by adopting Red-Zone principle.
6.4 Red-Zone Boundaries for Real-Time Systems
We extend the use of the Red-Zone principle to establish appropriate pre-
diction configurations which can be adopted by different real-time systems.
These configurations define the monitoring boundaries which are used later
by the prediction scheme to detect the anticipated off-nominal tasks behavior.
The adoption of the Red-Zone principle is achieved by an off-line analysis for
each real-time task to define:










FIGURE 6.6: linking the Red-Zone areas to temporal line of the
real-time task.
• The nominal temporal behavior of each task.
• A Monitoring Point (MP): it is a point in time which represents the
border line between the nominal temporal behavior and the potential
off-nominal one, as in Figure 6.6. The temporal behavior of a task be-
comes suspicious whenever this point is passed.
• A Killing Point (KP): it is another point in time (see Figure 6.6); the
temporal behavior of a task becomes certainly off-nominal whenever
this point is exceeded. At this stage, a task should be either terminated,
the recovery policy should be applied, and/or the control may be trans-
ferred to back-up system.
Two key features determine the efficacy of any proposed mechanism for off-
nominal behavior detection, namely the False Positives Rate (FPR) and the
precision values. FPR, which is defined in Equation 6.3, identifies the number
of suspicious tasks which complete their jobs before the killing point over
the number of all monitored ones. An effective prediction techniques should
ensure a minimum value of FPR.
FPR =
#{Ri | Ri ≥ MP & Ri < KP}
#{Ri | Ri ≤ KP}
(6.3)
Precision, which is defined in Equation 6.4, used to determine the accuracy
of the off-nominal behavior detection scheme. An accurate prediction tech-
nique should ensure a maximum value of precision. it is defined as follows:
Precision =
#{Ri | Ri ≥ KP}
#{Ri | Ri ≥ MP}
≤ 1 (6.4)
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FIGURE 6.7: Execution trace of τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4.
As mentioned previously, the Red-Zone principle defines a time zone
where we can start monitoring the system in order to safely detect a pos-
sible malicious behavior and act on-time accordingly, before we consider the
extreme solution of terminating a task or a system.
The Red-Zone can be defined in different ways taking into account the
timing properties of real-time systems. In our work, we use the response time
(Section 6.5) and execution time (Section 6.6) properties of real-time tasks in
order to define boundaries (i.e MP and KP) for the red-zone detection mech-
anism. Note that in both Equations, 6.3 and 6.4, we have used the response
time Ri to compare it with both MP and KP. In case we define the boundaries
based on the execution time of the task, we replace Ri with the execution time
(Ci).
6.5 Response Time-Based Prediction Configura-
tion
As we described in section 6.4, we need to define the response time-based
temporal nominal behavior of the hard real time task. Consequently, we de-
termine the MP as well as KP.
6.5.1 Defining Temporal Nominal Behavior and MP
In real-time systems, the WCRT can be used in order to characterize the sys-
tem. An intuitive approach to designate the Red-Zone is to use WCRT as a
MP. Starting the monitoring at the WCRT allows detecting attacks that solely
push the response time of the system to be larger than the worst-case. How-
ever, waiting until the WCRT to start tracing the task is, in many cases, too
late. Allowing the response time to exceed the WCRT may cause a cascad-
ing deadline miss for lower priority tasks as shown Figure 6.5 where the re-
sponse time of τ2 has exceeded R+2 which causes both τ3 and τ4 to miss their
deadlines sequentially.
Furthermore, in a real-time system, which contains periodic and sporadic
tasks, the WCRT does not reflect the ordinary nominal behavior boundary
of the task. WCRT analysis takes into account the worst case scenario where
the maximum interference (i.e load) is considered. However, in many cases,


































FIGURE 6.8: The TWCRT and WCRT for the τ2, τ3, and τ4 .
in particular, in the presence of a transient overload (i.e., sporadic tasks), the
frequency of activation of these tasks is very low and therefore the worst-
case scenario with maximum load may never happen, but is nevertheless
considered, which results in very large bounds on the response time. Figure
6.7 shows the execution trace of the 4 tasks in our example for a period. It is
clear that most of the time the temporal transient overload does not exist (as
in the dashed, green rectangle).
Typical Worst-Case Analysis [QHE12] (TWCA) was introduced in order
to take into account the activation frequency of sporadic tasks and therefore
define a much smaller/tighter bound on the response time accompanied by
the frequency at which this bound might be violated based on the frequency
of the sporadic load [HR95]. Consequently, the purpose of the typical worst-
case is to get as close as possible to the most probable case to occur at run
time leading to typical (and not worst-case) performance. In other words, it
is used to define the nominal behavior boundary of the task.
By applying TWCA analysis for every task τi in the system, we get:
• a typical worst-case response time bound TWCRTi which could be used
as MPi for the task τi , along with
• for every k ∈N+, a bound on the number of executions of τi (let us say
m) which may have a response time larger than TWCRTi in a window
of k consecutive executions. We refer to it as m out of k. This bound
represents the maximum permitted FPRi of our prediction schema for
the task τi.
Indeed, we can define the nominal temporal behavior of task τi based on this
analysis that the nominal response time of task τi is between ]0, TWCRTi].
TWCA refers to the response time of the task τi without the transient over-
load (i.e., ignoring the sporadic tasks) as a typical worst-case response time
TWCRTi for this task. Figure 6.8 shows the two relative response times; left
part of the figure shows the TWCRT of the tasks while the right part shows
the WCRT which we already calculated. From the same figure we can see the
difference between the TWCRT for τ4, which is equal to 4ms, and the WCRT,
which is equal to 7ms.
By unfolding multiple executions of the periodic tasks (i.e., τ2, τ3, and τ4),
one can observe an upper bound of how many times out of the observed ex-
ecutions when those tasks may coincide with τ1 and have a response time
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larger than its TWCRT. For example, by considering the execution trace pre-
sented in Figure 6.7 and by calculating the response time of the three periodic
tasks during the tracing period, we find that out of 20 consecutive executions
of τ2, only 4 observed R2 were longer than TWCRT2. And, out of 16 consecu-
tive executions of τ3, only 2 observed R3 were longer than TWCRT3. For task
τ4, out of 10 consecutive executions, only 2 observed R4 were longer than
TWCRT4.
Figure 6.9 represents the relation between the FPRi and the defined
bound (i.e., m out of k) for τi. In our system, FPRi dose not refer to a probabil-
ity. At the start of monitoring, FPRi has a high value which will decreased by
the time of detecting cases where the a response time larger than TWCRTi.
After reaching the bound m, any response time larger than TWCRTi will con-
sider malicious. However, there is no guarantee that no one of the m cases
was not a result of the attack.
6.5.2 Defining KP
After defining the MP, we need to determine the other bound which enclose
the Red-Zone area (i.e., KP). In hard real-time systems, a task becomes mali-
cious whenever its response time exceeds its deadline. Therefore, deadline
is potential candidates to be used as KP. But, using the deadline as KP is not
suitable; keeping the task running until its deadline will cause a cascading
deadline miss of the low priority tasks, as we have seen before.
Another proposal is using WCRT of the task as a KP. However, it is known
that monitoring the task will introduce some overhead, i.e. Monitoring Over-
head (MOV). Therefore, using WCRT as a KP may cause killing (in the case
that the security policy requires the termination of the task when it passes its
KP) a benign task since the WCRT of this task was calculated without consid-
ering such an overhead. Thus, we defined another time point for each task
to represent its KP, called the Early-warning Deadline (ED).
Jobs




m m out of k
FPR
FIGURE 6.9: The relation between the detected FPRi and the m
out of k for task τi
108 Chapter 6. Temporal-Based Intrusion Detection
Definition 6.5.1. Early-warning Deadline (ED): EDi of task τi is the maximum
allowable time for τi to complete its execution without causing the lower priority
hard real-time tasks to miss their deadlines.
The EDi of any task τi represents the worst case response time in the ex-
istence of the monitoring overhead once for each one of the higher priority
tasks. To calculate the EDi we need to use the available idle time (i.e., slack)
without jeopardizing the hard timing constraints.
EDi of each task τi is defined as:
1.
WCRTi < EDi ≤ Di (6.5)
2.














where Sl represents the slack of task τl, H represents the set all hard real-time
tasks in the system, ∀i ∈ H: Di ≤ Ti.
The monitoring overhead MOVi is different for every task τi and is pro-
portional to the size of its Red-Zone.
MOVi = (WCRTi − TWCRTi)× f (6.8)
where, f is a factor which represents, for each task, the introduced overhead
per unit of time.
Figure 6.10 shows the the ED of each task in our example based on Equa-
tion 6.6. Note that for the sake of simplicity calculation of ED we assumed
that the overheads sum is equal to the minimum slack (i.e., ∑k∈H MOVk =
Smin = 1).
Figure 6.11 illustrate the proposed prediction configuration which defines
the Red-Zone for hard real-time tasks, and the relation between these points
and the existing temporal constraints.
6.6 Execution Time-Based Prediction Configura-
tion
Defining the time behavior of each task in the safety-critical system is a
mandatory requirement. In avionics systems, as an example, the standard
RTCA DO-178C [Inc11] requires determining the WCET for each task in the
airplanes under-development. Using static analysis methods to compute the
WCET will produce an over-approximated bound of the actual observed






























FIGURE 6.11: Temporal prediction configuration for hard real-
time systems.
value. Therefore, such worst-case scenario is rare to occur in real life, al-
though it is possible. The computed WCET traditionally refers to the max-
imum consumed time in the longest execution path. The use of such over-
approximated thresholds for detecting the off-nominal behavior of a real-
time task, as proposed in [LSL15], may give false sense of security. Indeed,
attackers may not always exploit the longest path. Violating the temporal
bound of arbitrary paths may not be detected while they are less than the
WCET.
Moreover, system could contain tasks which have multiple run-time be-
haviors. Such tasks behave differently based on the system modes (e.g., an
initialization mode, a recovering mode, etc.). The off-line calculation of the
WCET using the static methods considers only the worst scenario from all
modes. Therefore, using a single WCET is not suitable to detect the mali-
cious behavior of a task with different running modes.
Calculating a bound on the typical case for the execution time similarly to
the response time (i.e., most probable average behavior at run-time) is very
difficult using statistical analysis methods. Therefore, in order to define a
suitable execution-time based prediction configurations, we propose the use
of measurement-based (i.e., dynamic) methods or hybrid methods [Wen+05]















FIGURE 6.12: Execution time distribution.
to compute a measured WCET, where we execute the task, in each mode if it
is a multi-modes task, for a sufficient number of times on the given hardware
or a simulator for different set of inputs. Then, we derive the Worst and Best
Observed Execution Times (we refer to them as WOET and BOET respec-
tively) from the measured times. Figure 6.12 shows the relation between the
two produced values. The Red-Zone can then be defined by using the WOET
as a MP and the WCET as a KP. The introduced MOV of the monitoring
is covered as we assume that the WCET approximation is large enough to
include it. Another Red-Zone area can be defined between the BCET and
BOET to detect the malicious behavior of a task when it completes its job in
this interval. However, we are not able to trace the task in this case since
we do not know the completion time in advance. But we could, based on
the security policy, ignore the produced result, use the recovery one, and/or
monitor the next job of the task in the next period.
6.7 Design and Implementation
Our prediction configurations are defined for the system with temporal con-
straints. Such systems require a dedicated operating system to run it. RTOS is
a particular kind of operating systems which are designed primarily for sys-
tems with real-time requirements. RTOS uses scheduling algorithms, such
as SPP, to ensure deterministic behavior of the different tasks in the system.
Each task is represented by its Task Control Block (TCB). RTOS uses the task’s
TCB to maintain the properties and internal states of that task.
The common strategy is to integrate the implementation of the monitor
in the source code of the tasks, calculate the consumed time by each function
of the monitored task, and compare it with the saved temporal thresholds.
Such an approach suffers from the late detection of the temporal violation.
Not only that but it also has other drawbacks:



























FIGURE 6.13: The prediction scheme and the steps to monitor
the temporal behavior of tasks.
• Firstly, most of the safety-critical applications are certified. Moreover,
most of these tasks do not contain the monitoring code before they have
been certified. Adding monitoring instrumentation for these tasks will
cause the loss of the code integrity and require issuing a new certificate.
• Secondly, since the monitoring code is not included from the start of
the task implementation, the computed time constraints do not con-
sider the produced overhead by the monitoring. The newly added time
overhead for the task may cause the violation of the complete schedu-
lability analysis test.
• Finally, the monitoring instrumentation will be part of the task itself;
they share the same address space; consequently, an attacker who could
manage to take over the task will be able, naturally, to manipulate the
monitoring behavior.
Therefore, it is more efficient to implement the monitoring scheme into the
kernel ( i.e. in the scheduler). Since implementing the prediction mechanism
inside the kernel does not require modifications to the source code or object
code of the existing tasks. Moreover, by placing the monitoring code in the
kernel we isolate and protect it from the vulnerable code in the user space
tasks. Finally, the existence of the monitoring code in a single location will
give us the ability to calculate the newly introduced overhead efficiently; we
do not need to recalculate the WCETs for every task in the system.
We propose a prediction scheme, shown in Figure 6.13, compatible with
the RTOSes. Figure 6.13 illustrates the logical ordered steps to predict the


























































FIGURE 6.14: Monitored Running state and its relation with
other states.
off-nominal behavior of a task and trace it. The schema contains three main
parts: the new task state (i.e., Monitored Running) and the modified task
TCB, monitoring policy which is integrated into the scheduler, and the tracer
which logs the task activity. In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on
these parts in more detail.
6.7.1 Task States
Basically, each real-time task is designed to have a recurrent nature. During
its life cycle, it can be in one of three different states: either it is Ready to run,
it is already Running, or it is Blocked (i.e., it is waiting for some resources, or
it is Idle waiting for a specific timeout). In our proposed scheme, we intro-
duced another state called Monitored Running state as shown in Figure 6.14.
Whenever the task exceeds its monitoring point, it will enter to the Monitored
Running state where it is running under observation. During its running in
this state, the task could be blocked waiting for a resource, or another task
could preempt it. It could complete its execution before the killing point (KP)
or it may breach its KP which would force it to be terminated (i.e., based on
the applied security policy).
The implementation of such state could be accomplished in many ways.
The first option could be by adding a new queue, called monitored queue, to
the system similar to the existing queues (i.e., ready queue or blocked queue).
In this case, the scheduler needs to consider the new queue when it decides
to pick up the highest priority task to run it. The other option could be by
modifying the task’s TCB and add a new field to identify the state of the task.
This Boolean field will be checked whenever the task exceeds its monitoring
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point. Using the queue option could be more efficient if we want to know all
monitored tasks since they are all gathered in one place, without the need to
search in all existing tasks.
6.7.2 Monitoring Policy
Whenever a new task is created, the defined prediction configurations for
this task should be added to its TCB. Therefore, we modified the TCB to
include another four fields as shown in Figure 6.13. The first field is called
Monitoring Time (MT), which holds the value of the monitoring point. The
second field, called Killing Time (KT), contains the value of the kill point.
The third field is called Time To Monitor (TTM), and the last one is called
Time To Kill (TTK). At the initiation time, the TTM and TTK fields contains
the values MT and (KT−MT) sequentially. We used the TTM and TTK fields
to save the consumed time during each phase (i.e., nominal and Red-Zone)
whenever the task is preempted by another task with higher priority.
All these values are used by the integrated monitoring policy as described
in algorithm 1. Whenever the task is scheduled to run, the TTM value is
loaded into a timer (line 5). The task is kept executing normally without any
tracing (line 7-13) while its execution time does not exceed the MT (i.e., the
timer is exhausted). In the mean time, if a task with higher priority shows
up, the timer stops and its remaining balance is saved into TTM field of the
task TCB (line 9), and then, the context switching takes place. Whenever the
timer reaches its limit (i.e., task’s execution time passed the MT), the state
of the task is changed to “monitored” and an interrupt is caused (line 14-
15). The same procedure will be applied when the task is running under the
“monitored running” states (line 16-27).
6.7.3 Tracer
The tracer is implemented as a thin layer which wraps all the system calls.
The tracer logs the calls and parameters only if the calling task is in the mon-
itored running state. This will reduce the overhead of excessive logging of
the benign tasks’ activities. However, the malicious code could start ahead
of the monitoring point. Consequently, the logged information could not be
sufficient for detecting the reason for the off-nominal behavior. In this case,
the security policy could include a rule to trace the task from the start in the
next period.
The logged information can be used either in an off-line or on-line anal-
ysis. On-line analysis requires introducing a separate process called “Ana-
lyzer”. Finding the temporal slot to integrate such a task in the existing sys-
tem is studied in detail in [Has+16a; Has+16b; Ham+17]. Deciding the tem-
poral type (i.e., periodic, or sporadic) of this task is quite important. Defining
the Analyzer as a periodic task may introduce the problem of determining
the period of this task. Using a short period may add redundant overhead
when the Analyzer is running and the repository is empty. On the contrary,
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Algorithm 1 LoadTask: using the predic-
tion configuration while loading the ready task.
CntaxtSW: context switching and saving the monitoring values.
1: procedure LOADTASK( )
2: TIMER timer
3: TASK cur_task . current task
4: if (cur_task.TCB.monitored = False) then
5: timer.value←cur_task.TCB.TTM
6: start timer
7: while (timer.value >0 & cur_task not Done) do
8: cur_task runs without tracing










19: while (timer.value >0 & cur_task not Done) do
20: cur_task runs in monitored running state





26: Kill cur_task or apply recovery policy.
27: end if
28: end procedure
29: procedure CNTAXTSW(integer t)






36: load the preempting task.
37: end procedure
the repository could be flooded, especially in an embedded system, if the
Analyzer has a long period.
Therefore, we decided to run the analyzer task as an sporadic task under















FIGURE 6.15: ACC software components based on [Han+04].
The color of arrows within ECU1 refer to the source of the in-
formation which has the same color and mapped to ECU2.
whenever the tracer logs information to the logging repository. The imple-
mentation of the analyzer is however out of the scope of thesis.
The designed schema can be modified to predict the off-nominal behavior
using the response time-based configuration by using a hardware timer for
each real-time task and without the need to save the consumed time for each
stage when the context switching is taking place.
6.8 Evaluation
To evaluate our approach of adopting the Red-Zone on a real-time system,
we use the ACC use case which was explained in Section 3.2. Figure 6.15
shows the various software components which collaborate to achieve the
ACC functionality besides security monitoring component (Sec Monitor). All
these software components are mapped to the same ECU (i.e., ECU1), and re-
quire information delivered by other components within different ECUs and
sensors (e.g., Radar and internal sensors). The Radar sensor is used to moni-
tor the road ahead and inform the Object Recognition task. As long as there
is no object ahead, ACC maintains the speed set by the driver through HMI
input. Otherwise, ACC reacts based on the speed of the detected object. In
case that a head vehicle slowed down, Speed controller reduces the speed
of the car by releasing the accelerator and/or by activating the brake control
system. If the road becomes clear again, ACC accelerates to reach the desired
speed. In both cases, HMI output is used to inform the driver about the cur-
rent speed and other statues. The vehicle’s driver can, at any time, disable or
enable the system which is captured by the Logic mode component.
Table 6.1 illustrates the real-time properties of ACC tasks which are
mapped on the ECU1. Within this system, there are two sporadic tasks (i.e.,
τ0 and τ1) and the rest have periodic activation. Note that in this system the
deadlines of the periodic task are defined to be equal to the periods (Di = Ti).
The tasks are ordered in the table from the highest priority to the lowest one.
We are interested in comparing the defined MP with the calculated WCRT
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TABLE 6.1: WCETs and Deadlines of software components of
ACC system. Values for τ2-τ6 are based on [Han+04].
Task Task Name T WCET
τ0 Sec Monitor 150 4
τ2 Speed Controller 20 5
τ1 NIC 10,200 6
τ3 Distance Controller 100 20
τ4 HMI Output 100 2
τ5 Mode Logic 100 1
τ6 Object Recognition 100 30
TABLE 6.2: Red-Zone response time based prediction configu-
ration and FPR.
Task MP WCRT ED FPP
τ0 4
τ2 5 9 9,33 2%
τ1 16
τ3 30 51 52,75 8%
τ4 32 53 56,17 8%
τ5 33 54 58,58 8%
τ6 73 94 100 8%
for each critical task and see how early we could alarm the system. More-
over, we are concern about how often that our approach could indicate a
false off-nominal behavior of each monitored task (i.e., FPR value).
In Table 6.2, we show the computed bounds on each task, namely:
the worst-case response time (WCRT), the typical worst-case response time
which is considered as the monitoring point in our scheme (i.e., MP), the
killing point (overall monitoring overhead is considered equals to minimum
slack), and the false positive ratio. By comparing the WCRTs with the MPs we
observe that we alarm the system (putting the task in the monitoring mode)
early enough - in this example the MP/WCRT is ranging between most 55
to 78% - with a very low FPR (in average 8%). A one has to be aware that
the killing points KP are fair enough to let the task finishing its execution in
case of false positive monitoring (normal execution) and at the same time to
prevent any deadline miss for the lower priority tasks which may cause a
degradation in the QoS provided by the system.
One other important concern in the proposed scheme is its performance
overhead. Our monitoring algorithm is integrated to the system scheduler,
thus, it is applied for each hard and critical task in the system. The added
overhead of this modified scheduler comes from the use of the timers and
the required time to save its value later during the context switching. An-
other overhead comes from the tracer; This overhead directly proportional
to the type of the logging mechanism and the logging details. In our current
proposal, we traced only the application’s system calls.



















FIGURE 6.16: Moving from host based toward network based
IDS.
6.9 From Host to Network Based IDS
As we have seen in subsection 2.3.2, many proposed network-based IDS have
used the period of the transmitted messages over the bus as a reference to de-
tect any off-nominal behavior such as injecting malicious messages or drop-
ping messages. But it is crucial to know that the in-vehicle messages do not
have consistent timing intervals. The changes in regular driving operation
can change these timing intervals [You+19]. Also, sporadic messages, by its
nature, do not have such fixed period. These two cases make many of the
network-based IDSs, which depend on the period, not reliable.
In the previous sections, we have shown how we used the TWCA to cre-
ate temporal boundaries for the different hard real-time components in the
system by considering the sporadic components. These defined boundaries
are more suitable for detecting the security attack, which affects the tempo-
ral behavior of the system tasks. Figure 6.16 shows how we could similarly
look at the network resources as a single ECU which hosts the hard-real time
components. But, instead of the software components, we have the messages
which are transmitted by these components. Each one of these messages also
has its priority which is different from the one that applications that emit
this message have. Also, instead of using SPP, we consider the scheduling
algorithm for the network to be non preemptive (i.e., static priority non-
preemptive (SPNP) scheduling policy). By considering that, we can apply
the TWCA on the different messages, as in [Qui+14], will provide us with
TWCRT boundaries for these messages which could be used as an input for
the temporal-based network-based IDS.
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6.10 Summary
The early detection of the off-nominal behavior in safety-critical systems is an
important goal. It gives the system the ability to recover in an efficient man-
ner and prevents the fault propagation. In this chapter, we proposed a pre-
diction configurations for real-time tasks with temporal constraints to predict
the off-nominal behavior of these tasks. We used in particular the TWCRT to
define a bound which represents the least privilege temporal bound for each
real-time task. Whenever the execution (or the response) time of a given task
exceed these bounds, an alarm is triggered to notify the system about a poten-
tial off-nominal behavior which may be caused by the execution of malicious
code. Such configuration allows the task to execute outside its designated
profile under carefully controlled conditions.
Moreover, we presented a prediction scheme compatible with the RTOS.
The scheme used the prediction configuration to monitors the taskś behav-
ior and provides relevant log activities of the task during the relaxation of
the security policy (i.e., during the Red-Zone). Our approach depends on
tight temporal bounds which makes it applicable to be adopted by exist-
ing schedulable hard real-time systems. It is well known that determining
precise prediction bounds is always a challenge. However, the accurate def-
inition of the Red-Zone bounds will improve the efficacy of the prediction
scheme. As a future work, we could use different methods (e.g., statistical
analysis method) to define Red-Zone bounds and compare the efficacy of us-
ing the produced bounds with our current system.
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“It’s not what happens to you,
but how you react to it that matters”
Epictetus
7
Towards a Vehicular Intrusion
Response System
Recently, developments within the vehicular domain have made the modern
vehicle a network comprised of a multitude of embedded systems commu-
nicating with each other, while adhering to safety-critical and secure systems
specifications. Many technologies have been integrated within modern ve-
hicles to give them the capability to interact with the outside world. These
advances have significantly enlarged the attack surface. We have already
had numerous instances of successful penetration of vehicular networks both
from inside and outside the vehicle. To deal with these attacks, many in-
trusion prevention and detection mechanisms were implemented inside ve-
hicular systems, as we have shown in chapter 2. Despite the adoption of
all the proactive security mechanisms mentioned in the previous chapters,
there is no guarantee that the system becomes secure and that no attacker
can strike it. Having a system with absolute security is not achievable, and
the proof is that despite all these mitigation mechanisms, attackers were able
to exploit these vulnerabilities and mount severe attacks against a vehicle
[Kos+10; Che+11; Rou+10].
Since a vehicle is a safety-critical system, the response to an attack is as
pivotal as the detection of the attack itself. When an attack against a com-
ponent is detected, one way to respond is to restart the affected component
[Str+09], in case the resulting failure was a transient one. High system re-
silience and safety are two fundamental aspects that need to be always guar-
anteed by several response strategies, which the security policy of the vehi-
cle implements. These response strategies are implemented through an IRS.
Generally - and even more so in the vehicular domain - IRSs have received
less attention and research efforts compared to IDSs [SBW07], until now. In
this chapter, we try to investigate the main requirements and challenges that
face the adoption of IRSs in the vehicular domain. In addition, we propose
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an intrusion response framework for in-vehicle systems based on the Red-
Zone principle (which was discussed in Section 6.1). Parts of this work have
been published in [HTP19b; HTP19a].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.1, we present
some main taxonomy related to the IRS in general. In Section 7.2, we present
the challenges that IRSs face in a vehicular context and the requirements to
design such system. In Section 7.3, we present our proposed intrusion re-
sponse framework for in-vehicle systems. The development of this IRS and
the different related aspects are explained in Section 7.4. In Section 7.5, we
discuss the development process as well as the proposed responses using the
automated obstacle avoidance use case. Finally, we summarize our chapter
in Section 7.6.
7.1 Intrusion Response Systems
As the advancement of technology offers capabilities which result in attack-
ers at every level getting more competent and effective, attacks have become
more elaborate. Therefore, we need to establish an adequate level of secu-
rity in software systems. Complete system security of a system is unfeasible
and so it becomes imperative to detect a situation where an attack might
be unfolding and take action to respond to it. Consequently, intrusion pre-
vention mechanisms (firewalls, cryptography, access control, etc.) alone are
not sufficient to mitigate these attacks. IDSs were widely developed to de-
tect, analyze and report intrusions in a computing system. Whenever a task
behaves off-nominally or violates a predefined security policy, the IDS con-
siders this task as a malicious one. Some IDSs have already implemented
limited static responses, such as generating an alarm or report [KV02]. How-
ever, with increasing levels of attack complexity and targeted domains, more
comprehensive response strategies are required. These strategies could be
implemented through an IRS.
As the advancement of technology offers capabilities which result in at-
tackers at every level becoming more competent and effective, attacks have
become more elaborate. Therefore, we need to establish an adequate level
of security in software systems. Complete system security is unfeasible and
it thus becomes imperative to detect a situation where an attack might be
unfolding and take action in response. Consequently, intrusion prevention
mechanisms (firewalls, cryptography, access control, etc.) alone are not suf-
ficient to mitigate these attacks. IDSs were widely developed to detect, ana-
lyze and report intrusions in computing systems. Whenever a task behaves
off-nominally or violates a predefined security policy, the IDS considers this
task to be malicious. Some IDSs have already implemented limited static
responses, such as generating an alarm or report [KV02]. However, with in-
creasing levels of attack complexity and targeted domains, more comprehen-
sive response strategies are required. These strategies could be implemented
through an IRS.
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Authors in [SBW07; SS+12; Ina+16; Foo+08] have surveyed the existing
IRSs. They have proposed a taxonomy of these systems according to different
characteristics:
Nature of response: This feature determines the activity of the selected re-
sponse. IRSs can issue a response which aims to limit the effect of the
attack and minimize further damage (i.e., active response). Another
IRSs could respond only by notifying (or alarming) the system of the
existing attack (i.e., passive response).
Time of response: This aspect determines when the responding action
should take place. IRSs either activate the response after the occurrence
of the attack (delayed response) as in [Lew+01] or take action before
the attack has affected the system resources (proactive response), such
as [Foo+05].
Degree of automation: This characteristic defines how the response occurs.
Some IRSs require the interference of the system administrator in order
to apply the predefined response (manual response), while others are
totally independent and do not require any human interaction to react
to an intrusion (automatic response).
Response selection: This is used to distinguish between the different IRSs
based on the way these systems choose the applied responses. Most
of the IRSs use a fixed predefined response for a certain alert (static
response) [Loc+05; Ryu+03]. A number of IRSs chooses the response
based on attack metrics, therefore the response for the same attack
could be different from one instance to another (dynamic response)
such as [Bal+03; TK02].
Cooperation capability: This characteristic determines how the IRS acts
during the attack. This includes whether it works alone and applies
its chosen response locally (stand-alone system) such as [Bal+03]], or it
collaborates with other coexisting IRSs to apply the selected response
locally and globally (collaborative), such as [Lew+01].
7.2 Vehicular Intrusion Response System
The vehicle, which is considered as a safety-critical system, has its own spe-
cial properties and restrictions which limit the adoption of the existing IRS of
the other domains. Automotive systems are different from the conventional
networks from many perspectives. In this section, we explain some of these
challenges which affect the design of any intrusion response framework for
the in-vehicle system.
7.2.1 Challenges
• Highly interconnected architecture: As we mentioned in chapter 2, a
vehicle includes large numbers of ECUs running software supplied by
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different vendors with widely varying degrees of security awareness.
In order for the vehicle to function properly and safely, these ECUs
must exchange data, and therefore many of them share the same com-
munication bus. Unrestricted interaction among those ECUs puts the
entire system in danger. An attacker could launch a stepping-stone at-
tack, in which they compromise a less important ECU with weaker se-
curity (e.g., the entertainment system), in order to gain control of a more
crucial one (e.g., engine ECU) [Kos+10]. Consequently, any response or
mitigation mechanism should consider the highly interconnected and
distributed nature of a vehicular environment.
• Limited resources: The computational power of the embedded ECUs
inside a vehicle is far lower compared to the capabilities of computers
and servers in traditional networks. This limits the possibility of port-
ing strategies which are already in place in those networks, because the
limited-resource ECUs will be unable to cope with them.
• Ever-changing scenery: Many people think that the vehicle is a fixed
environment in which no changes need to take place after vehicle pro-
duction. But that is not entirely true, especially with current and future
vehicles. Cars are designed to work for an average of 12 years [Mar16].
So, a car in its lifespan may have updates to both its hardware and soft-
ware components. This means that the rules of the security policies in
an IRS cannot be static, but must be defined as dynamic and changing
in order to accommodate the behavior of the newly introduced compo-
nents.
• Autonomous and semi-autonomous nature: In a traditional IT envi-
ronment, a human administrator would be expected to approve and
apply responses. Nowadays, some might consider the driver as the ad-
ministrator of the vehicular environment. However, for safety reasons,
the driver’s attention must not be diverted while driving. Moreover, a
driver may not have the technical knowledge to address an attack un-
derway or the required response, so must not deal with such decisions.
Furthermore, in the case of an autonomous car, these actions will be
performed automatically, without any input from the driver.
7.2.2 Requirements
The existing IRSs which are deployed in other domains deal with only a sub-
set of the aforementioned challenges. Therefore, based on both the challenges
of the vehicular domain and general IRS taxonomies (see Section 7.1), we ex-
plain here the desired properties for any proposed IRSs for in-vehicle sys-
tems. The proposed IRSs should be:
Proactive: The IRS should predict an attack on the system and not wait until
after the attack takes place to take an action. Early prediction provides
the system with a sufficient amount of time to respond in an effective
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manner. However, false positives are of notable concern here. Unfortu-
nately, as the security constraints are tightened, the likelihood of false
positives increases.
Active: The proposed system should react in a way that mitigates the dam-
age caused by the attack and prevents its propagation to other subsys-
tems. In addition, it must consider issues such as containment, con-
tinued availability, interaction with other subsystems and, in certain
cases, latency. These requirements are in many cases in conflict with
each other; for example, security and availability often work against
one another [TGK00].
Proper: The IRS should react properly, based on the type and target of the
potential attack. In a case where the IRS detects that a component is act-
ing off-nominally, it responds to that behavior by terminating (killing)
the running process and executing a new instance. However, such a
response is not preferable because it may cause an accident. Moreover,
because of the lack of direct interaction with the driver to solve the
security issue, terminating the malicious task without any relevant in-
formation about vulnerability may not be the right course of action, as
an attacker could use the same obscure vulnerability to break the newly
instantiated task repeatedly.
Heterogeneous: The IRS should be designed to respond in multiple ways,
including a fully automated response. When a task is terminated, re-
gardless of the cause of termination (security related or otherwise) the
system should respond to the failure by (i) using a redundant com-
ponent to provide the functionality that is lost with the demise of the
failed task, (ii) determining whether the system can continue running
without this functionality (fail-continue), or (iii) forcing the system into
a fail-safe condition, i.e. it goes into a mode where the safety of the
vehicle and passengers is assured even if the system can no longer con-
tinue to operate. Although current regulations ensure that safety deci-
sions must only be taken by the driver [HKD09], the situation may need
to be changed to reflect the rise of autonomous and self-driving tech-
nology. In the meantime, a semi-automated response which requires
partial interaction with the driver could be adopted.
Dynamic: The IRS must be able to differentiate its response to the same at-
tack based on several factors, such as contextual information during the
vehicle’s different operational modes, the attack severity, the subsystem
targeted and other dependent systems. However, creating static secu-
rity rules or a decision table for all these different specifications is not a
trivial task. Therefore, the use of a dynamic security policy to express
these parameters could be a preferable solution [Deb+07; HNP17].
Deactivable: Any security measure employed to counter a malicious at-
tempt comes at a price. As such, the IRS introduces overhead on the
system’s performance, based on the type and duration of the response.









































FIGURE 7.1: Intrusion response system and its relationship
with IDS and security module.
To minimize this overhead, any proposed IRS should be able to de-
activate the response mechanism when specific, predefined conditions
specified within the security policy are met [Kan+13].
Distributed: Each ECU should be protected by its own IRS. When a com-
ponent is potentially under attack, the corresponding IRS detects the
malicious attempt and decides locally how to deal with it. Although
this decision may address the attack against the specific component, it
may not be optimal for the overall system. Each individual component
should be able to implement a response strategy locally which, how-
ever, must be defined for the system as a whole.
Responsive: Activating the response action should take place immediately
after the attack is detected. If a significant amount of time passes,
the damage might already be done, negating the existence of the IRS.
Therefore, the proposed IRS should evaluate the security policy as well
as any other inputs with minimal delay.
Low-cost: As mentioned before, the resources of the embedded ECUs are
limited. Therefore, the IRS should operate in a cost-effective manner
and not consume system resources more than necessary, thus avoiding
a situation in which other components are prevented from functioning
properly.
7.3 Proposed Intrusion Response System
Figure 7.1 shows our proposed multilayer security framework for every sin-
gle ECU within the vehicle. The figure shows the different layers of protec-
tion against intrusions and how they collaborate with the IRS, which repre-
sents the last layer of this framework. IRSs are used to determine the action
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needed when a security violation is detected either by the security module
(explained in Section 5.3) or the IDS. The main aim of this layer is protect-
ing the vehicle from entering an unstable state as a result of the discovered
attack.
The IRS requires inputs from the different system components (such as
the properties of the detected attack or off-nominal behavior) which is de-
livered by the security module or the IDS as a part of the alarm message
sent to the IRS whenever an incident is detected. The security policy is also
needed for this layer since it includes the possible responses to different at-
tacks. Contextual and operational information is also gathered by a detective
service and delivered to the IRS when it is required. The IRS contains a repos-
itory which is used to store the collocated characteristics of attacks (i.e., aim,
scenario, severity, etc.). This information is used as feedback or input for the
next threat modeling process.
7.3.1 Red-Zone as an IRS
Improving the response strategies of any security mechanism is dependent
on early detection (or the early prediction) of a potential attack. Early predic-
tion provides the system with a sufficient time to initiate recovery actions to
respond effectively. Our strategy to solve this conundrum involves using the
Red-Zone principle which we introduced in a previous chapter (see Section
6.1).
Figure 7.2 shows how we can use the Red-Zone principle as a base to de-
velop an IRS and how it could be used to manage the interaction with the
IDS. It also shows how, with time, the security attack turns into a failure
which requires the interference of safety countermeasures (i.e., the Fault Tol-
erance System (FTS)). Based on the Red-Zone principle, the IDS is used to
monitor and evaluate the behavior of the different vehicle software compo-
nents within each ECU, based on predefined security policies. Each policy
specifies the correct behavior of these components. Any violation of this pol-
icy is used as a prediction of a potential security breach. At this point, the task
enters the Red-Zone area and becomes suspicious. The activation of any re-
sponse mechanism is triggered as soon as the system receives an alarm about
a detected potential attack from the IDS. During the Red-Zone window, the
IRS is responsible for activating local and system-wide response strategies.
7.3.2 Local Response Strategies
Local tactics are used to respond to an attack against a component and other
components on the same ECU, as well as the whole ECU itself. The local
response to the malicious component can be:
• Suspicious / Malicious Operational: Although the task is considered
malicious, the IRS leaves the task running until a certain limit. While it
is executing, the IRS starts a series of possible responses, e.g., the com-
ponent could be isolated and its communication with the other compo-
nents on the same ECU or with other sub-systems becomes very limited






















FIGURE 7.2: IRS based on the Red-Zone Principle
and begins to be traced. The logged information can be used later to
design a proper mitigation mechanism. Moreover, the trust level of the
component is degraded, so other components become more cautious
about the information delivered to/from this component.
• Suspicious / Malicious Silent: The IRS kills the process whenever it
exceeds the ultimate bound since the component will suffer from a se-
curity failure at this point [Avi+04]. Although the IRS may stop the
component at the end, which could be the goal of the attacker seeking
to cause a DoS, the IRS has plenty of time to activate other response
strategies prior to this point. On the other hand, the IRS can implement
a response which ensures that a new healthy instance of the malicious
component is initiated with its entire state reverted back to a specific
point at which it was executing correctly, before killing the malicious
one.
All the above-mentioned tactics for the infected component affect the other
components on the same ECU as well. For example, some less critical software
components which are mapped to the same ECU on which the malicious
component is running may have to become silent/inactive to save resources
for the system to audit and recover.
The IRS applies very firm restrictions on the ECU which hosts the malicious
component. This could include performing more security auditing operations
on the communications of this ECU to prevent any stepping-stone attacks. If
the attack was propagated across the whole ECU, total isolation of the ECU
could be adopted.
It is important to note that the location where the IRS is placed as well
as the targeted system architecture play a significant role in determining the
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proper reaction. For example, the authors in [FL15a] propose disabling the
targeted ECU instead of the one hosting the malicious component. The rea-
soning behind such a selection is that it is hard to identify the origin of in-
coming messages in the case of a CAN network.
7.3.3 System-wide Response Strategies
System-wide responses are implemented by other IRSs on different depen-
dent ECUs within the vehicle. Such responses are activated as soon as a
notification from the IRS where the suspicious component exists, is initiated.
We can view these response strategies as an extension of the local ones. Here
we summarize some of the possible responses based on the locally applied
response:
• Reallocation: As we mentioned before, IRSs aim to ensure the avail-
ability of the different components by initiating at least one new healthy
instance of the malicious component (more than one replica can be used
at the same time). The place where the new instance is mapped is crit-
ical for the other dependent system components. If the new replica is
mapped to a new ECU, other components that depend on the misbe-
having one need to communicate with the newly initiated component
instead. This requires the use of a new communication configuration to
adjust the reallocation.
• Degradation and Propagation occur as a result of stopping certain
non-critical software components on the malicious ECU to support the
adoption of local responses. The same strategy has to be applied to
other interrelated ECUs which include components dependent on the
silent ones. In the same manner, if the trust level of the data provided
by the malicious component is reduced, the trust level of the other ele-
ments which use this data needs to be adjusted accordingly.
• Combination: The IRS could adopt a combination of the aforemen-
tioned tactics to achieve the best possible protection.
7.3.4 Intrusion Response Exchange Protocol
The proposed Intrusion Response eXchange Protocol (IRXP) is used to ex-
change the attack information and the system-wide response strategies
among the different IRSs. Figure 7.3 represents the different steps of IRXP.
The protocol is activated whenever the IDS or security module detect a vi-
olation of the security policy of any software components on the hosted
ECU. The IDS or security module passes the information of this violation
as an alarm to activate the local IRS. This alarm includes detailed informa-
tion about the attack (or the suspicious action). This information includes the
targeted component, the attack details, and attack detection time. All these
information are transmitted using a predefined format similar to the alarm
format proposed in [DCF07].
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FIGURE 7.3: Intrusion Response Exchange Protocol
This information is used by the local IRS to determine the required local
response for this attack. PES is used to support identifying such responses
based on the attack metrics as well as the local system policy. The IRS takes
these responses and sends them to the suitable component to be executed.
For example, it could be a new communication rule which needs to be added
to the decisions repository of the security module. Later, these attack met-
rics can be customized and sent to the other IRSs hosted by other ECUs
which could be affected by the local response. Besides the basic information
about the attack, the applied local responses are also propagated to ensure
the adoption of the system-wide response. we refer to these information as a
message (Msg)
The protocol uses similar mechanisms to these ones used during the ini-
tiation phase of establishing a secure link that we have explained in Section
5.4.1. In order to prevent any malicious third parties from manipulating the
transmitted message, the IRS uses the ECU’s private key to sign the mes-
sage (in our case IRS uses ECU1SK). Also, a monotonic counter value can
be used to prevent replay attacks by ensuring the IRS response freshness.
IRS on the remote ECU (i.e., ECU2) uses the received public key of the other
ECU (ECU1PK) to validate the message which will be used to feed PES (on
ECU2) with the required information to determine its local response. At this
point, the IRS on ECU2 repeats the steps that the IRS on ECU1 has already
performed.
7.4 Vehicular IRS Development
Developing the response strategies to cover the large number of distributed
components is a difficult task, requiring detailed knowledge of possible in-
teraction paths and the dependencies among all those components, as well
as the security threats that could target them and possible attack scenar-
ios. When considering an evolving system, which should be update-able
(whereby component interactions may change), this task becomes even more


















































FIGURE 7.4: General Scheme of IRS Development
difficult. The planning for the response strategies has to be well integrated
throughout the design and life-cycle of the system, i.e., it should be part of
the different design stages of the V-model.
In this section we show how to integrate the development of the IRS
within the entire development process of the vehicle system. In addition,
we discuss the various aspects of the system which affect the design and
implementation of the IRS. Figure 7.4 shows the general diagram for devel-
oping the IRS. In this section, we explain the different aspects which need to
be considered during the development of the different responses.
7.4.1 Threat Model
In Chapter 4, we explain how threat modeling is used to describe and clas-
sify security threats which affect the vehicle system. Moreover, we detail
how it provides significant information about the threats that could help to
safeguard the target system. We add here that threat modeling can be used
as a significant resource to develop effective response strategies against any
attacks.
During the design stage of the V-model, security requirements are defined
to address all existing vulnerabilities identified by the threat model. At the
same time, the response actions for violating these requirements are defined
from an abstract viewpoint. At a later stage (i.e., implementation and inte-
gration) the response actions become more detailed to reflect the final system
architecture and ensure compliance with the initial actions.
While adopting our SAVTA threat model, a response for each violation of
the security requirements (i.e., CIA3) has to be planned. For example, vio-
lating the integrity of a software component may require reducing the trust
level of that component. Violating the integrity of the RTE, which could be
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detected using a secure boot, may require fixing this issue before letting the
vehicle move. In such a case, we face a conflict with the availability require-
ment for each component (or at least, safety-critical ones). Such conflicts
need to be considered and solved by proposing a convenient response to loss
of availability of these components.
7.4.2 Attack Tree
Attack trees are used within our SAVTA threat model to detail how the at-
tacker could achieve his goal (i.e., attack paths). The attack tree is created
off-line for each system asset of the SAVTA threat model (e.g., hardware, soft-
ware, data and surrounding environment). Then, the defined attack trees are
used to evaluate the security risks, calculate the probability of a successful
attack, and measure the defense (local response) cost for each proposed re-
sponse [Edg+06]. Calculating these metrics depends on different aspects, as
we have discussed in Chapter 4.
Based on the attack information which is detected by the IDS or the se-
curity module, a system can determine the goal in the attack tree. This gives
it the ability to determine the attack’s severity, which is used as an input for
the IRS to choose the appropriate response, similar to [Foo+05].
7.4.3 Dependency Analysis
Another important aspect of implementing the response mechanism is to de-
termine all dependency relations between other components and the mali-
cious one. We call a task dependent on another task when it uses a service
provided by that task. These relationships can be denoted in a dependency
tree [TK02].
Then the direct and indirect dependencies are specified. Moestl et al.
[ME15] have proposed a cross-layer dependency analysis to detect depen-
dencies between the different components across the different architectural
model layers in safety-critical systems such as vehicles. By defining the de-
pendencies, the IRS on the local platform can notify all other dependent sub-
systems about the attack, and thus response mechanisms on other platforms
are also deployed. In addition, the system-based response cost can be evalu-
ated by using dependency analysis. A mechanism to ensure that the system
will not enter an endless storm of responses is required. Entering such a
situation may end up stopping the vehicle from functioning.
7.4.4 Security Policy
The security policy is used to define the response of the system when a task
enters the Red Zone area, the conditions under which a Red-Zoned task may
return to its normal state and, finally, the response to a task breaching its
ultimate limit.
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LISTING 7.1: Security policy with the different Red-Zone prin-
ciple areas
i f ( property == nominal )
do ( allow )
e lse //Red−Zone
i f ( property == suspic ious )
i f ( a t t a c k _ s e v e r i t y == high )
i f (mode == s t a r t u p )
do ( response )
e lse // malicious , f a i l u r e
do ( response )
Listing 7.1 shows the structure of the security policy. Based on a specific
property of a component (such as execution time, power consumption, sys-
tem call distribution or bit-rate of message exchange), the boundary of the
Red Zone is determined in the policy and the response action within each
zone is defined. Other properties such as the system operational modes (e.g.,
vehicle in startup mode) as well as the attack severity could affect the choice
of response action. All this information is collected while the system is run-
ning and evaluated using the Policy Evaluation System (PES) to choose an
action dynamically.
7.5 Use Case: Intrusion Response for Obstacle
Avoidance System
We will use the automated obstacle avoidance system, which is introduced
in Section 3.2, as a use case to explain how we could develop intrusion re-
sponse strategies. Figure 7.5 shows part of the final integration of that system
on the actual ECUs. One important functionality which is needed for the au-
tonomous vehicle to avoid obstacles is localization functionality. This func-
tionality gives the vehicle the ability to determine its position with respect
to the environment. The main information resource for this functionality is
provided by the GPS. We want to focus on this functionality to show how we
could develop response strategies when it is targeted by a security violation,
and discuss all the aspects presented in Section 7.4.
In the first stage, the security requirements for the relation between this
functionality and others are defined: (a) availability and (b) integrity. Any vi-
olation of these requirements demands the adoption of the proper responses.
Attack trees are developed to identify all the attack scenarios which could
violate these two requirements. Attacks such as a spoofing data attack, jam-
ming attack, and many others are defined [Car03; Nig+12]. Based on the
attacks details, detection mechanisms are defined and stated in the security
policy to detect these attacks while the system is on-line.
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FIGURE 7.5: Response strategies in the presence of security at-
tack on localization functionality of automated obstacle avoid-
ance use case.
The responses to these attacks also are defined. One response is receiv-
ing the service from another source. The Inertial Navigation System (INS)
could be used as a temporary resource for providing localization informa-
tion. Another response option is to reallocate the GPS module (in the case
of a Receiver Software Attack [Nig+12]) either within the same ECU or on
another one (ECU4 on our use case). Both strategies require communication
reconfiguration for the direct dependent components. Dependencies analy-
sis shows that the localization component (Local.), which is mapped on ECU5,
directly depends on the GPS module. Therefore, the security policy related
to Local. component on ECU5 should enable two communication paths with
ECU2 or ECU4 (based on the chosen response) whenever the GPS Module is
behaving maliciously.
Another response could be disabling the link with ECU1 to prevent attack
propagation. The HMI component, which is mapped on ECU3 and indirectly
dependent on the GPS module, could keep displaying the given data on the
map, but with an alarm signal activated to express the low level of GPS data
trust, as shown in Figure 7.5.
7.6 Summary
We propose to use the Red-Zone principle as the basis for developing an IRS
framework. Whenever a component is under cyber-attack, the IDS notifies
the IRS to be activated. The IRS uses the Red-Zone time period to imple-
ment response strategies. Based on this design, our proposed IRS meets the
proactive requirement. There is a period before the task reaches its ultimate
boundary and causes any harm. How long this period lasts is based on the
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selection of the boundary for the nominal behavior as well as the monitored
property. In the previous chapter, we have shown how the temporal property
can be used as an indication to predict an attack at an early stage, before vi-
olating the ultimate temporal boundary [Ham+18]. However, false positives
can be a side effect when increasing the Red-Zone time window.
During this Red-Zone period, the IRS is able to activate a first level of
response. We have already implemented many response strategies during
the previous chapters (e.g., system notification). The IRS can, subsequently,
apply a second set of actions such as placing the task under supervision.
Other response options can be defined through the security policy. Another
level of response can be applied when the task enters the termination zone
(i.e., system failure). All these different response venues attest to how our
system can be heterogeneous and active in complying with the respective
requirements.
The proposed framework is integrated within each ECU in the system
(i.e., distributed). IRSs are designed to use a predefined security policy in
different strategies. We have extended the security policy, which was used in
our previous work [HNP17] to define IDS rules, to include these strategies.
We use the policy evaluation framework to evaluate the policies and two
different policy enforcement points.
The role of the security policy is to define the proper response (correct) of
the system when a task enters the Red-Zone, based on (i) the system state as
well as the attack severity which could be calculated from the attack metrics
in conjunction with a reference to the attack (dynamic), (ii) the conditions
under which a Red-Zoned task may return to its normal state (deactivable)







“If a vehicular system is not secure, it is not safe”
8
Conclusion
This thesis is concerned with the security of vehicular systems. The com-
plexity, size and differing quality standards of the software running on the
multitude of ECUs aboard a modern vehicle make the existence of security
vulnerabilities a given. In addition, the lack of security mechanisms in exist-
ing vehicles enables the escalation of a compromise in one of the noncritical
sub-systems (e.g., the CD player) to threaten the safety of the vehicle and its
passengers. Having identified the need for a holistic solution which employs
diverse security mechanisms that coexist and collaborate to guarantee the
security of the system over its whole life cycle, in this thesis we propose a
multilayer secure framework which aims to prevent such attacks in the first
place, detect them if prevention mechanisms have failed, and finally, respond
properly to any detected attacks. Applying these overlaid security protection
layers decreases the chance of successful attacks and/or their consequences.
In the following, we summarize the different security layers in our proposed
framework, how they solve the various challenges which were introduced in
chapter 1, and how they meet the main requirements stated in Section 3.1.1.
Security Analysis: The first step towards securing the in-vehicle system
is by performing a security analysis to define all the existing vulnerabilities
and threats as well as the agents who may exploit them. Using an individ-
ual approach which concentrates on a certain aspect (e.g., assets, attacker, or
software) will not provide a complete analysis, which may in turn lead to
insufficient mitigation solutions. In chapter 4, we proposed using SAVTA, a
comprehensive threat model, to support security analysis for vehicular sys-
tems. SAVTA combines different existing threat modeling approaches (i.e.,
Software, Assets, Vulnerability, Threat, and Attacker-centric methods) to cre-
ate a hybrid model. The model seeks to answer three main questions in the
following ways: (1) What are we facing? By looking at the threat agents who
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may threaten the vehicular system and studying their motivation, capabili-
ties, and goals. (2) What do we have? By looking at all the assets that we
have, identifying their vulnerabilities, and linking these vulnerabilities with
predefined threat agents. (3) Finally, what do we need? By defining the se-
curity requirements for each of these assets to prevent potential threat agents
from achieving their goals.
Secure Communication The massive number of attacks against the in-
vehicle network is a result of the lack of: (1) proper authorization mecha-
nisms which specify permissions and prohibitions to deny malicious parties
from communicating with other system components. (2) data integrity and
authentication mechanisms to prevent unauthorized parties from altering or
sending false data. (3) And to a lesser extent, data confidentiality mecha-
nisms which prevents unauthorized parties from disclosing the exchanged
data. The reasons behind the lack of such mechanisms are numerous. In the
case of authorization mechanisms, the absence of a security policy and the
use of a single point (i.e., central gateway) to enforce this policy (if it exists)
are the reasons behind inappropriate authorization mechanisms. The dif-
ficulty of creating a comprehensive security policy, which determines who
should talk to whom and under which conditions, leads many OEMs to ig-
nore the need for one altogether. In other cases, the late development (i.e.,
during the final system integration) of the security parameters may lead to
incorrect access control rules. These rules may violate the security require-
ments specified in previous phases of the development life cycle. In Chapter
5, we proposed a methodology supporting the gradual definition of the se-
curity policy, starting from the designer of the component and then adapting
and specializing the policy as the component is linked to other components
and eventuality integrated with the rest of the system.
Moreover, instead of having a single place to enforce our defined secu-
rity policy, we proposed a distributed access-control framework (influenced
by the distributed firewall [Ioa+00]) to allow only authorized components
to communicate with each other, both inside the vehicle and with external
entities. Each ECU is equipped with a security module acting as a connec-
tion ingress policy checker by vetting incoming and outgoing communica-
tion and enforces the distributed security policy locally.
Regarding the adoption of security mechanisms which ensure the in-
tegrity and confidentiality of the connection, the perceived overhead of using
such mechanisms has been a significant factor in the resistance to including
them. In Section 5.5, we have shown that using IPsec ensured high security
protection while the increase in overhead was almost negligible when using
AH to safeguard (data and origin integrity). In addition, our measurements
showed that even when using ESP (data confidentiality and integrity), the
increased latency overhead is almost 2%.
We believe that our results dispel the myth that using secure communica-
tions protocol (such as IPsec) are too expensive for vehicular communication.
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These results should encourage other researchers to adopt secure commu-
nication protocols in their system, especially if we consider the continence
improvements in processing capabilities of the micro-controllers.
Intrusion Detection: Using prevention mechanisms to protect the system
is not sufficient by itself. It is critical to also have a run-time mechanism
to detect the occurrence of malicious activities. Anomaly-detection methods
were adopted to achieve that goal. Anomaly-based mechanisms monitor the
behavior of the component to identify any misuse that falls outside the pre-
defined profile representing the component’s nominal behavior. In chapter
6, we proposed using the temporal properties of safety-critical applications
to construct their nominal behavior. We showed how real-time safety-driven
specifications (i.e., WCRT, WCET, and deadline) cannot be used to detect ma-
licious behavior (from the point of view of security) of the observed compo-
nents. Therefore, we introduced the Red-Zone principle to impose tighter or
stricter specifications to create an inner layer of defense which gives the sys-
tem the ability to detect the presence of suspicious activities. We use the time
window, when the task enters the Red-Zone area until reaching an ultimate
boundary, to monitor the task to discover the reason behind the malicious
activities, and in the case of an attack, we can use this knowledge later to fix
the vulnerabilities which led to it.
Intrusion Response The security policy in many systems is defined in bi-
nary actions; the security monitor keeps the task going while it behaves nor-
mally. Otherwise, it will be terminated (losing availability). In a system
where a tighter security policy is adopted, the chance of having false posi-
tive alarms is high. If the security system responds to a false alarm by termi-
nating the suspicious components, it may lead to a continuous loss of some
component availability, which may cause the vehicle to stop functioning. In
chapter 7, we proposed an intrusion response framework for in-vehicle sys-
tems based on the Red-Zone principle (which was discussed in Section 6.1).
Within this framework, we present different response strategies which could
be applied locally (on the ECU which runs the malicious component) and
globally (on the other ECUs which contain components dependent on the
malicious one) before reaching the point where the attack become a failure
and the task need to be terminated. Our efforts in this chapter can be consid-
ered as an introduction to implementing such a system.
8.1 Future work
We made a deliberate decision to focus on the performance overhead of our
proposed security module (mainly IPsec); the reason behind this decision
was that there was concern that automotive in-vehicle system hardware (i.e.,
ECUs) is not capable of implementing conventional approaches similar to
the one we have implemented. Other evaluation measurements such as the
measurement of the complexity of developing, maintaining, and managing
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the security policies for the massive number of components is one relevant
direction to investigate in the future.
In Chapter 6, we presented a host-based intrusion detection framework
by using the temporal properties of the hard real-time components. We also
introduced a network-based IDS by adopting the same methodology as for
the host-based one. We left the more detailed investigation of the temporal-
based networked IDS as well as the decision about when to use the temporal-
based host and/or network-based IDS for future work.
Within our proposed intrusion response system (see Chapter 7), we did
not explain how to calculate the cost of the response to the security incident
or the cost of the possible damage. We envisage a future direction of research
to use modeling technologies to estimate the cost of such response options
and use that to determine the optimal response strategy.
Finally, although we have focused only on in-vehicle communication,
securing the vehicle’s V2X communication is achievable by adopting our
framework. To achieve that, we need to implement our different security
mechanisms in the On-Board Unit (OBU) which is used to support the com-
munication between the in-vehicle components and the outside world (we
already started that in our work [HAP18]). However, developing the secure
communication policies for components belonging to different vehicles re-
quires the existence of a central Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI).
Defining and developing a cross-domain VPKI trust model and integrating
it with our framework are left as future work. Furthermore, studying the ef-
fect of the intrusion response of one vehicle on the other vehicles sharing the
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